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ABSTRACT 
Vulnerabilities within software are the fundamental issue that provide both the 
means, and opportunity for malicious threat actors to compromise critical IT 
systems (Younis et al., 2016). Consequentially, the reduction of vulnerabilities 
within software should be of paramount importance, however, it is argued that 
software development practitioners have historically failed in reducing the risks 
associated with software vulnerabilities. This failure is illustrated in, and by the 
growth of software vulnerabilities over the past 20 years. This increase which is 
both unprecedented and unwelcome has led to an acknowledgement that novel 
and radical approaches to both understand the vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure system (VDDS) and to mitigate the risks associate with software 
vulnerability centred risk is needed (Bradbury, 2015; Marconato et al., 2012).  
The findings from this research show that whilst technological mitigations are 
vital, the social and economic features of the VDDS are of critical importance. 
For example, hitherto unknown systemic themes identified by this research are 
of key and include; Perception of Punishment; Vendor Interactions; Disclosure 
Stance; Ethical Considerations; Economic factors for Discovery and Disclosure 
and Emergence of New Vulnerability Markets. Each theme uniquely impacts the 
system, and ultimately the scale of vulnerability based risks. Within the research 
each theme within the VDDS is represented by several key variables which 
interact and shape the system. Specifically: Vender Sentiment; Vulnerability 
Removal Rate; Time to fix; Market Share; Participants within VDDS, Full and 
Coordinated Disclosure Ratio and Participant Activity. Each variable is 
quantified and explored, defining both the parameter space and progression 
over time. These variables are utilised within a system dynamic model to 
simulate differing policy strategies and assess the impact of these policies upon 
the VDDS. Three simulated vulnerability disclosure futures are hypothesised 
and are presented, characterised as depletion, steady and exponential with 
each scenario dependent upon the parameter space within the key variables.   
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1 Introduction  
The growth of software vulnerabilities, which are defined as a weaknesses that 
may result in harm (ISO/IEC, 2005, p.3), has been unprecedented within the 
past 15-20 years. This has led to an acknowledgement that existing approaches 
which aim to moderate this growth, have on the most part failed (Bradbury, 
2015; Marconato et al., 2012). It is argued that fundamentally new and radical 
approaches are needed which attempt to both reframe the complex issue of 
software vulnerability and offer new insight into the system and processes 
causing this increase. (Schneier, 2007; Schwartz and Knake, 2016)  A number 
of historically promising techniques that combine technological, mathematical 
and economic approaches have been offered, however, all have been in 
isolation, and therefore the utility has not thoroughly been investigated, not least 
from a systems perspective.  (Alhazmi and Malaiya, 2005; Anderson, 2001a; 
Finifter et al., 2013; Frei, 2009; Ozment, 2007). Despite the best efforts of 
academics and practitioners the relentless surge of discovered vulnerabilities 
continues unabated, and for all intents and purposes in an uncontrolled manner, 
bringing both the risk and harm this unchecked growth brings.  (Alhazmi et al., 
2005; Ozment, 2007; Woo et al., 2011). 
This research investigates the fundamental question at the heart of the 
vulnerability debate; what are the factors driving the growth of software 
vulnerabilities within commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software? More 
specifically, what are the structures, interactions and entities within the system 
that is driving the increased rate of recorded vulnerabilities. Moreover, an oft 
overlooked aspect of this growth is the way in which disclosure of vulnerabilities 
are treated, as a significant amount of research focuses upon the technical 
approaches to discovery (Joh and Malaiya, 2010; Mcqueen et al., 2009; Rahimi 
and Zargham, 2013). Consequently, the aim of this research is to advance the 
underlying theory of software vulnerability, ground it in real empirical data and 
provide a systemic model to increase the understanding of policy choices upon 
the vulnerability system. Additionally, it is the authors’ assertion and to the best 
of his knowledge that no one has systematically collected and scrutinised a 
  - 24 - 
corpus of evidence to examine from within the vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure system (VDDS).  
1.1 High Level Investigation Outline 
This research is split into two distinct analytical sections, with the third 
consisting of modelling and simulation activities which builds upon the previous 
activities. The initial analysis consists of a qualitative investigation into the 
VDDS and provides a grounded analytical foundation based upon empirically 
observed data. This initial analysis investigates a number of factors that are 
hypothesised to take part and influence VDDS processes, information flows and 
structural interactions. This foundational analysis uses a technique widely used 
within psychology known as thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Thematic analysis is a technique that allows exploration and classification of 
human centred systems, and provides techniques to investigate the VDDS in a 
systematic manner. Following on from the thematic analysis an exploration of 
the numerical aspects of the VDDS is provided. This numeric examination 
consists of exploratory statistics, observations and remarks upon behaviours 
identified from the previous thematic analysis. The numerical exploration uses 
techniques garnered from the movement known as exploratory data analysis or 
EDA (Tukey, 1980). Statistics gathered and interpreted via EDA techniques 
provide insight as to how entities behave over time, quantification of potential 
variables of interest and any behavioural systemic effects. The final section 
brings both analytical pieces together within a system dynamics framework, 
presenting both simulated policy recommendations and quantitative impacts of 
those polices. 
1.2 Why Investigate the Vulnerability Discovery and Disclosure 
System? 
Simply put we have failed (Anderson, 2001b; Anderson et al., 2013; Schneier, 
2007). This failure is centred on the inability to implement secure software 
development practices and standards and influence organisational incentives 
and to produce vulnerability free software, thus helping eliminate a large 
percentage vulnerability centred risk. Consequently, the potential for malicious 
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exploitation and subsequent compromise of information systems has increased, 
and, as we have now become critically dependent upon these systems the 
safety and wellbeing of society maybe in jeopardy  (Lewis, 2006, p.11; Trim and 
Lee, 2014, p.45). Furthermore, it is argued by the UK government that if the 
software systems and services that are used to transact and transmit our 
information are considered ‘unsafe’ or ‘insecure’ then confidence placed in 
conducting business within cyberspace may diminish, along with the benefits 
that come with it (HMG, 2016, p.25; UK Cabinet-Office, 2011, p.40; UK Cabinet 
Office, 2009, p.7).  Nevertheless, it is unrealistic and unfortunate to assume that 
society and policy will undergo an epiphany to solve the aforementioned 
failures. 
It is a widely accepted assumption that software vulnerabilities exist due to 
mistakes (human or otherwise) within source code that is compiled to create 
software (Klein, 2011, p.3; Ring, 2015). These mistakes are traditionally classed 
by software engineers as software faults, or bugs, and are considered to be 
benign in nature (Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Hassan, 2009). Conversely, 
software vulnerabilities whilst closely related to software faults (and in some 
cases may indeed be identical), differ in the malicious way that the fault or 
vulnerability is activated, or to use the correct terminology exploited (Sowa et 
al., 2009). This exploitation leads to the circumvention of a security control 
within a software system, which in turn may provide privileged access to an 
operating system or subvert a critical security function  (Holt and Kilger, 2012; 
Wei et al., 2010).  
The act of vulnerability discovery is defined by Klein (2011) as: 
“.. the process of finding security critical software bugs” (Klein, 2011, p.2). 
This definition is added to by Gallagher et al (2006) defining the process of 
discovery as  
 “…testing attempts to find vulnerabilities in the software and to verify whether 
it’s possible for an attacker to misuse the software program…”. 
 (Gallagher et al., 2006, p.2) 
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Moreover, Maurushat (2013) extends these definitions by providing specific 
techniques for uncovering vulnerabilities within software such as reverse 
engineering and traffic observation. These three definitions identify several 
aspects of the vulnerability growth problem, suggesting three or four areas that 
are of importance in the context of a vulnerability: the discovery processes, 
people who uncover issues and what actions are undertaken with the 
discovered vulnerability. 
The increase of vulnerabilities is particularly acute when it is considered in 
terms of the criticality of the software systems that underpin the wellbeing of the 
of todays globally connected economic and social systems. However, given the 
vast and ill-defined potential scope of the problem, limited research has been 
performed in characterising systemic, technological, cultural, economic and 
social influences which are considered to have caused the growth to occur 
(Goldsmith et al., 2013). Furthermore, the structures that surround the discovery 
and disclosure of vulnerabilities have  been characterised as a ‘wicked problem’ 
(Singer and Friedman, 2014, p.9). A wicked problem is defined as an ill-
formulated, confused and has many entities and actors within it (Churchman, 
1967). This class of problem is generally considered difficult as the solution to 
the problem is not immediately obvious, or is potentially counterintuitive. 
However, whilst difficult, the VDDS is not intractable, and with significant effort 
investigations can yield positive results. So, given the critical nature of software 
the malfunctioning of this software, either intentionally or otherwise, could if left 
unchecked may have significant global ramifications (Brodsky and 
Radvanovsky, 2011, p.189). Consequentially, if we assume that the software 
vulnerability issue, is by definition a global one, inclusive of the dynamics of 
human behaviour it is clear that approaching this in a pure software engineering 
or mathematical manner will be inadequate. 
1.3 High Level Research Question 
Given the breadth of the VDDS, the high-level research questions of this 
research are defined and bounded as:  
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What are the constituent parts, dynamics and structures of the COTS legitimate 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure system? 
 And; 
What are is the potential impacts of strategies employed to reduce vulnerability 
centred risk? 
As stated current academic research on software vulnerabilities is, and 
continues to be centred on new models for predicting or discovering software 
vulnerabilities. This is coupled with philosophical discussions around the 
economics of security or creating theoretical models to control risks generated 
by software vulnerabilities (Anderson, 2001a; Cohen, 1997; Miller, 2011; Rahimi 
et al., 2013). Consequentially a thorough understanding of the VDDS dynamics, 
structures and modes of behaviour are not well understood.  
Whilst undoubtedly useful, reductive  mathematical models or philosophical 
initiatives are akin to treating the symptom of an illness, rather than the 
underlying cause (Forrester, 1975, p.239). Therefore given the complex nature 
of vulnerability discovery it is arguably impossible to get a clear understanding 
of the total system by considering it via reductionist approaches (Pye and 
Warren, 2011, p.204). Consequently, proposed within this research is a new 
approach that builds upon existing theories and approaches which are then 
incorporated into a novel supervenient framework based upon empirically 
observed and analysed data.  
1.3.1 Investigatory Strategy 
This investigation was carried out within a mixed methods framework, bringing 
together the desirable features of qualitative and quantitative data gathering and 
analysis (Baxter et al., 2008). Mixed methods approaches have produced good 
results when investigating a previously unknown phenomenon. Thus, a 
combination of a mixed method approach and a phenomenologically based 
stance is advocated within this research to provide clarity on the creation of a 
model to describe the VDDS.  
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Phenomenological approaches, and resultant models, aim to capture the 
functional aspects of empirical observation without trying to explain the 
underlying processes in reductionist detail (Brodie et al., 2014; Moulin et al., 
2014) The phenomenological approach when applied to complex problems is 
extremely powerful in subjects as diverse as Particle Physics and Leisure and 
Tourism. Examples of differing usage of the phenomenological approach can be 
found in studies by Gastmans and Shim et al (Gastmans et al., 2011; Shim and 
Santos, 2014). It is therefore argued that the phenomenological approach is 
well suited to the study of vulnerability discovery and disclosure and used to 
construct models of behaviour. 
As a basis for investigation, the following assumptions can be made. A) that 
entities within the VDDS interact and undertake as yet unknown discovery and 
disclosure activities, which in turn cause actions to occur within the B) the 
driving forces behind the observed behaviours from these interactions are 
definable and can be modelled and C) the factors stated in assumptions A and 
B can be changed to provide differing observed behaviours. However, the 
positive nature of these interventions is at present unknown. 
1.4 Research Aims 
It is argued that to understand any system or process it is necessary to 
characterise the key aspects of that system. Specifically, the processes within 
that system, the entities that exist within it, the environment it sits within and 
external forces that act upon it (Forrester, 1975, p.2).  Therefore, this research 
contributes to the understanding of these factors and characterises the VDDS in 
these terms with subsequent policy recommendations. 
1.4.1 Novelty and Research Contributions  
Central to this research is the creation of a novel systems approach. This 
approach looks at the software vulnerability discovery and disclosure system as 
a whole, and draws together qualitative, quantitative and system dynamic 
modelling techniques under a mixed methods framework. The approach 
outlined within this research draws upon the previous vulnerability discovery 
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work and extends it in several ways. Firstly, by combining concepts from 
previous work, the best, or most appropriate can be considered and included 
within the model as appropriate. Secondly, nothing is excluded from the model 
based on academic purity or discipline scope. Thirdly the resultant model has 
been constructed from data derived from the VDDS, and closely matches how 
the reality of the VDDS behaves. Finally, a systems approach and 
characterisation of the VDDS has not been undertaken previously, and is again 
considered unique.  
The novel systems model unifies several existing, key yet unconnected 
theories, alongside providing empirically observed data from both a quantitative 
and qualitative perspective.  Additionally, this research provides new knowledge 
and contribution in several areas, specifically:  
• Systematic analysis of the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system, 
and constituent components and structures. 
• Inductively constructed Thematic model, showing the structure of the 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure system; 
• Construction of a System Dynamics model to simulate differing policy 
impacts; 
• Analysis of the impacts, with suggesting of new policy strategies; 
• Collection of a wide-ranging data corpus, to use in further research; 
• A taxonomy of the entities involved within the vulnerability discovery 
system is provided. 
Crucially, this research also argues that current reductionist strategies for 
vulnerability mitigation do not offer credible solutions for contemporary 
information systems. In contrast to this, this research offers novel and 
actionable strategies to assist in reducing software vulnerabilities. 
1.5 Scope  
Due to the global nature of vulnerability discovery and disclosure, and the 
potentially vast amount of data available it is necessary to scope the problem 
tightly. As such the research, will be focused upon three key elements of the 
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system. Firstly, the processes and discourse that constitute the vulnerability 
discovery systems itself. The initial discovery aspect of the system is largely 
uncoordinated, decentralised and globally distributed. This is due to ubiquitous 
nature of deployed software and the potential for millions of hackers, crackers 
and researchers (both internal to software vendors and externally) looking to 
uncover software vulnerabilities. Therefore, a representative number of 
empirical data sources will be used to draw out the essence of the VDDS, 
outlined in chapter 3. 
Secondly as it is impractical to investigate all software products and all software 
vulnerabilities within them, at any depth the research will use a software 
applications to derive behaviours of vulnerability discovery and disclosure. 
Consequentially the Microsoft suite of operating systems have been chosen to 
test hypotheses set out by this research. Microsoft represents a significant 
proportion of all vulnerabilities found within COTS, and therefore, provides a set 
of behaviours upon which to test hypotheses. 
Fourthly, the scope of the investigation is limited to the legitimate or ‘white’ 
VDDS as data is readily available, and relatively easy to obtain. The illegitimate 
VDDS, whilst important is not within the ethical approval of this research.  
Explicitly out of scope are technical methods for discovery of vulnerabilities, 
complex economic models, risk assessment or analysis techniques and 
technical countermeasures.  
Finally, as this research is not political in nature, the ramifications of the recent 
WannaCryptor malware is out of scope. However, this particular malware strain 
is unique insofar as the vulnerability that was used to overcome the security 
controls was allegedly uncovered by the US government (Goodin, 2017b, 
2017a). The vulnerability that was released was a zero-day vulnerability, which 
when used in conjunction with the malware as it infected hundreds of thousands 
of vulnerable legacy Windows machines. It is alleged that the US government 
has stockpiled this vulnerability since 2013, and had had not disclosed the 
details (Smith, 2017). This example serves to reinforce the need for coordinated 
  - 31 - 
disclosure, whatever the rationale for discovery or indeed the stockpiling of 
vulnerabilities by nation states (Ablon and Bogart, 2017) 
1.6 Personal Motivation 
The initial motivation that inspired this research is a seminal study from 
researchers located within Colorado University, USA. Yashwant Malaiya and 
Omar Alhazmi published in 2005 a study titled ‘Quantitative Vulnerability 
Assessment of Software Systems’, (Alhazmi et al., 2005). Alhazmi and Malaiya 
applied a software engineering approach to characterise the growth of software 
vulnerabilities over time known as a software reliability growth model (SRGM). 
The study proposed a number of key factors that shown the growth of the 
number of vulnerabilities that exist within a selected group of software 
applications (Alhazmi et al., 2005). These factors were limited to market 
acceptance and total number of vulnerabilities within the software. Each of 
these factors were measured, counted and proposed as being proportional to 
the number of discovered vulnerabilities. Alongside this, Alhazmi and Malaiya 
(2005) postulated that three distinct phases of vulnerability discovery existed; 
learning, linear and plateau. Each phase is centred around specific periods 
within the discovery lifecycle, with discoverers learning how the software works, 
a period of productivity and discovery and finally saturation or exhaustion of the 
supply of vulnerabilities within the software (Alhazmi et al., 2005). This study 
marked the first attempt at quantifying vulnerability growth, and importantly 
speculated on the reason for observed growth.  
A secondary personal motivation stems from the keen interest in cyber security 
globally. This interest is despite the fact that software vulnerability as a topic of 
academic discourse has existed for a number of years (Aslam, 1995; Bellovin, 
1989; Gupta and Gligor, 1991). However, recent societal changes, for example 
the social media revolution, our dependence upon software for increases in 
both economic efficiency and global trade have made software hypercritical to 
the continued functioning of the global economy (Dunn, 2005; Westrin, 2001).   
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1.7 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter one introduces the thesis. Chapter 
two provides critical analysis and synthesises existing literature and research 
around software vulnerability and cyber security. This chapter explores the 
problem and critically appraises previous studies, highlighting any limitations 
within the findings and conclusions. An exposition of the search methodology 
and key philosophical concepts within vulnerability discovery is also presented. 
Chapter three outlines the experimental approach and data collection methods 
that support the construction of the analytical and modelling phases. Chapter 
three also provides a rationale why the modelling technique known as system 
dynamics (SD) has been used and why a mix methods approach is appropriate. 
Chapter four provides in-depth analysis of the collected data from a qualitative 
stance and outlines the thematic analysis technique. It also provides the 
foundation for model construction. Chapter five contains an exploration of 
collected data and several historical reference behaviours (or modes) derived 
from collected data showing behaviours over time.  Chapter six provides 
detailed causal models and sub-models to assist the understanding the 
structure, entities and dynamics of discovery and disclosure. Furthermore, 
several causal loop diagrams and stock and flow models are offered. Chapter 
seven contains simulation and sensitivity analysis of policy choices, and the 
impacts thereof. Chapter seven concludes with a range of simulation runs, 
based upon the observed dynamics of the system. Chapter eight provides a 
discussion of the results, hypotheses and relationship to work in the area. 
Chapter eight concludes the research and offers recommendations for future 
research. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure problem space, research methods and research scope. By 
integrating three distinct yet complementary approaches EDA, Thematic 
analysis and System Dynamics within a mixed methods framework this 
research provides a unique perspective on the VDDS. This is crucial given this 
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deficiency and inability for society and global organisations to tackle this 
complex problem of significant proportions. In the seminal book, the Limits to 
Growth, which outlines the potential collapse of the global economy and society 
due to pollution, food production and resource depletion we see there are 
alternatives to seemingly intractable problems (Meadows, 1972). First published 
in 1972, the Limits to Growth uses systems dynamics in a consequence and 
interaction model known as World3 to simulate the world’s human and natural 
systems. Using the approach outlined in this research and utilising system 
dynamics we can see that integration of differing methods is suited to dealing 
with messy behavioural aspects of systems i.e. the way entities interact and 
influence to generate an overall system behaviour. As such a novel way is 
needed to investigate and define what VDDS is, how it operates and what 
entities impact upon it. Secondary to this characterisation, but no less important 
is the idea of positive interdiction, whereby policy decisions are made to 
influence how the system operates. It is these ideas of consequence and 
interaction that are central to this research, and subsequent policy 
recommendations. 
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2 Review of Existing Literature 
This chapter presents a critical review of literature that was carried out to 
explore the topic of software vulnerability discovery and disclosure. This is to 
identify key academic studies and texts, and understand current theory and how 
it applied to the VDDS. One of the initial choices that must be made when 
embarking upon a critical review of the surrounding literature is the review 
approach and to weighing up both the pros and cons of each approach.  
In the case of this research a traditional narrative review was chosen over more 
systematic or chronological approaches. A narrative review summarises key 
texts, presents critical analyses and finally draws conclusions from the common 
body of knowledge, differing from chronologic and systematic in how the review 
progresses – thematically. A narrative review was chosen as it provides 
transparent, structured and rigorous framework to draw conclusions from the 
literature. Narrative reviews are also well suited to some exploratory mixed 
methods approaches as the review provides a balanced platform to base both 
qualitative and quantitative theory upon and ultimately draw conclusions. The 
result of this process is a clear and explicit search strategy providing confidence 
of the final conclusions, and is less biased than a more traditional systematic or 
chorological approach. This is due to the transparent selection criteria that has 
been used to select studies. Systematic reviews were initially considered 
however discounted due to the exploratory nature of this research. Used in the 
healthcare sector, systematic reviews provide an evidence base upon which to 
base sound clinical judgements upon (Cochrane, 1972; Oakley et al, 2005). 
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2.1 Thematic Review Question  
At this initial stage of the review it is key to restate the research questions, 
outlined in the initial chapter of this study, this is to draw out salient aspects of 
the literature review: 
What are the constituent parts, dynamics and structures of the COTS legitimate 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure system? 
 And; 
What are is the potential impacts of strategies employed to reduce vulnerability 
centred risk? 
Within this statement there are several areas that need to be expanded upon. 
Firstly, an investigation of the ‘constituent parts’ that make up the vulnerability 
discovery and disclosure system is needed. How many parts exist, and what 
are the interaction aspects of the system and entities.  Secondly what is meant 
by change, and what the factors or influences that are more critical than others, 
or are all factors equal? Thirdly what are the interrelationships between ‘parts’ 
that make up the discovery system? How strong are the relationships and how 
transient are they? Finally, how do the observable phenomena, such as rate of 
change or quantity of vulnerabilities relate to the discovery system?  
To structure the investigation a series of research sub-questions (RSQ) were 
created to allow a systematic approach to take place: 
 
• RSQ1 Which structures, behaviours and interconnectivity exist within the 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure system?   
• RSQ2 What are the actors/entities of the components stated in RSQ1 
• RSQ3 Are all components stated in RSQ1 equally important to the 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure system? 
• RSQ4 How do identified component behave over time? 
Figure 1 below shows the relationship between the sub research questions. 
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Figure 1 - Relationships of Sub Research Questions 
2.1.1 Search Process and Review Concepts 
The search process used to conduct this search is structured around the sub 
research questions, and therefore provides certain key concepts that allows us 
to search existing literature. This structure allows us to search wider than just 
specific terms related to software vulnerability. As expected most academic 
studies and literature that exists does so in electronic databases, such as 
Scopus, Google scholar, Sciencedirect, IEEE Xplore and the ACM digital 
Library. These resources were utilised to search for key texts and studies. 
Alongside these electronic databases, traditional library resources have also 
been utilised allowing access to non-digital literature articles. Searching 
electronic database provides a wide range of sources, however key texts can 
be obfuscated due to the sheer volume of the results that are returned. As such 
appropriate keyword and phraseology was used to aid in searches coupled with 
both synonyms and acronyms (e.g. VDM, or SLOC). Moreover, specific 
language and terminology were also included. Finally, combinations of Boolean 
operators such as AND, OR and NOT where use to expand and narrow the 
search as appropriate.   
The use of online databases provides a critical tool in providing a good overview 
and set of pointers to the subsequent stages of the research as they provide 
indicators on existing research. As with most literature searches there is always 
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a level of a-priori knowledge that influences the initial stages of the search. As 
such initial search terms based upon the authors knowledge and experience 
were used to start the search. These terms, or concepts, are set out in Table 1 
below.  
 
Concept Synonym 
Software Vulnerability {Software} Fault, Weakness, Flaw, Susceptibility, Error 
Vulnerability Components {Vulnerability} Mechanisms, Section, Module, Part 
 
Vulnerability Discovery  {Discovery} Detection, Finding, Unearth, Recognition, Exposure 
Connections Influence, Network, Links, System 
Table 1 – Initial Literature Review Search Terms 
2.1.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
All sources and databases that were searched are in English, and were not 
limited by time, however most papers and studies were published in the last 30 
years. The range of publications that were used in this literature review consist 
of published books, academic journals, peer reviewed research theses and 
government publications.  
Excluded from this literature review, but included elsewhere in this research are 
social media sources, interviews, web based material and commercially 
produced marketing research. These sources are noted via the data collection 
exercise that gathered data sources and empirical evidence used to construct 
models and theory. This evidence base is separate to the literature review as it 
forms part of the analysis phases of this research. However, findings from within 
the literature review are important, such as identification of entities and probable 
structure of VDDS processes and guided the data collection strategy. 
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2.2 Overview of Software Vulnerability  
Prior to entering the main review, it is worth providing general security 
definitions from which to work from. When first investigating software and cyber 
security, two key concepts emerge, risk and the environments that software 
operate within. Risk in general terms is defined by Chavas as: 
“representing any situation where some events are not known with certainty” 
(Chavas, 2004, p.5). 
This definition whilst useful as a general definition of risk, it does not capture the 
nature of software, nor the nature of any impacts (positively or negatively). 
Therefore, a more nuanced and contextual definition is required. The ISO/IEC 
international committee via a well-known international standard offer a definition 
of information risk that defines information as an asset, and the components 
that generate risk:  
 “the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group 
of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. It is measured in terms of 
a combination of the probability of an event and its consequence” (ISO/IEC 
13335-1, 2004, p.4  s2.19). 
This definition extends that of Chavas (2004), and captures three key aspects of 
information risk; a) potential of an event happening, b) exploitation of 
vulnerabilities and c) consequence. These concepts are critical when we 
consider the factors of software vulnerabilities growth as they potentially drive 
the vulnerability discovery system. Both definitions use an implicit assumption 
that risk is essentially a measure of uncertainty, and that this uncertainty leads 
to a negative impact. This assumption is pervasive throughout security literature 
and is a generally accepted tenet of most studies cited within this thesis (Dunn, 
2005; Rescorla, 2005; Schweitzer, 2003). Within the idea of risk, ISO/IEC 
unpack further the constituent parts of information risk: 
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“Definition One: Asset, anything that has value to the organisation; 
Definition Two: Threat, potential cause of an incident that may result in harm 
to a system or organization; 
Definition Three: Vulnerability, a weakness of an asset or group of assets that 
can be exploited by one or more threats”. 
(ISO/IEC 13335-1, 2004, pp.1 & 4 ,s2.2, 2.25, 2.26) 
Given these definitions and the context of information risk, it is possible to frame 
the topic of software vulnerability. Software vulnerabilities can be defined as 
mistakes within source code used to compile the software, or can be introduced 
via the configuration and implementation of information systems (Fidler, 2014; 
Frei et al., 2010; Radianti and Gonzalez, 2007a; Scambray and Shema, 2009, 
p.49). The mistakes that are made within the software are defined as software 
faults, or bugs, and were initially considered benign in nature (Lewis and Hilton, 
2015). Software vulnerabilities on the other hand, whilst closely related to 
software faults (and in some cases may indeed be identical), critically differ in 
the malicious way in which the vulnerability could be used to subvert a security 
control or countermeasure (Aslam, 1995; Lewis et al., 2015). Litchfield (2002) 
provides a good example whereby a sample webpage included within the 
Oracle database server maybe used to bypass security controls.   
2.3 Anatomy of a Vulnerability – The Buffer Overrun  
At this point in the review, it is worth describing the technical nature of software 
vulnerabilities, and characterise how they occur. Simply put a vulnerability 
overwrites data at a specific location within computers Random Access Memory 
(RAM) with potentially malicious instructions, the location of which may be used 
for critical system or security functions (Lewis et al., 2015; Moshtari et al., 
2013). Howard and LeBlanc (2002) describe how a buffer overrun occurs:  
“…when a buffer declared on the stack is overwritten by copying data larger 
than the buffer…user input [is] passed to a function and the result is that the 
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return address for the function is overwritten” (Howard and LeBlanc, 2002, 
pp.127 & 441). 
Within the Howard et al (2002) description there a number of key principles that 
warrant explanation, in particular buffer, stack and function. A software buffer is 
an area of RAM that is used to hold instructions from a software application, this 
is generally a fixed size, which is defined by the software developer (British 
Computer Society, 2002, p.290) The stack is a list of areas within memory, 
normally linked, that are ‘pushed’ or ‘popped’ to store data. (British Computer 
Society, 2002, p.253) Finally, a function (or subprogram) is a set of instructions 
which are used to perform a specific task, yet is not a complete application of 
program (British Computer Society, 2002, p.213). The result of copying, deletion 
and replacement of legitimate functions within potentially key areas of the 
software security systems is the key aspect of software vulnerabilities and why 
they are of intense interest to software vendors, security researchers and cyber 
criminals. Vulnerabilities come in many forms, however the most well-known is 
styled as the ‘buffer overrun vulnerability’ (Lewis et al., 2015). This is defined by 
CWE (2016) as: 
 “Improper Restrictions of Operations within Bounds of a Memory Buffer” (Mitre, 
2016). 
Buffer overrun vulnerabilities are critical security issues, and are most prevalent 
of all vulnerabilities despite being simple to prevent and mitigate once 
discovered (Allodi and Massacci, 2014; Arbaugh et al., 2000; Murtaza et al., 
2016).  
2.3.1 Fault and Vulnerability Discovery Models 
Vulnerabilities do not exist in a singular way, with groups of differing classes of 
vulnerability occurring within a software system (Ahmad et al., 2011). As such 
significant efforts have been made to predict and understand the progression of 
vulnerabilities within software (Alhazmi et al., 2005; Neuhaus et al., 2007). 
Analogous to vulnerability discovery models are Software Reliability Growth 
Models, (SRGMs) are a common parametric technique to indicate the number 
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of failures that may be encountered after a system goes live (Lin, 2011; 
Littlewood, 1979). SRGMs provide an approach to count and estimate the 
number of potential remaining faults within a software system (Kapur et al., 
2015). SGRMs provide a good basis for the prediction of ‘naturally’ occurring 
faults (i.e. faults that are not maliciously induced) within software. Analogous to 
SRGMs are vulnerability discovery models (VDMs), which use the same basic 
principles of SRGMs and have been shown to provide good accuracy. Studies 
by Lewis et al. (2015), Woo et al (2011) and Kapur et al. (2015) have validated 
these classes of model in popular software products such as the Microsoft 
windows series of operating systems, web browsers and popular database 
systems. (Kapur et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2015; Woo et al., 2011) 
Vulnerability discovery models or VDM’s are a special class of a fault discovery 
model which look to predict the increase of faults within software. A fault within 
software is concerned with the manifestation of an error (or bug) within the 
software, with the activation of the error via an input value, which then in turn 
produces an incorrect output (Musa and Okumoto, 1984). With respect to 
vulnerabilities Browne et al. (2001) coined the term ‘Vulnerability Exploitation 
Model’, whereby the study investigated the process of vulnerability discovery 
(Lewis et al., 2015). Browne et al. (2001) additionally presented a model that 
examined the trends within vulnerability exploitation specific software 
applications, namely the domain name service application BIND, and common 
gateway interface, CGI. Browne et al (2001) performed statistical analysis upon 
computer incidents using computer emergency response team data collected 
over a ten-year period. The conclusion suggested a linear relationship between 
elapsed time and vulnerability discovery, and concluded with a predicted 
number of vulnerabilities into the future (Lewis et al., 2015). 
One of the initial vulnerability discovery models is known as the Anderson 
thermodynamic (AT) model, which was based on a reliability growth approach 
and uses time as the independent variable (Anderson, 2001a; Lewis et al., 
2015). Anderson (2001a) argued that the rate of discovery is proportional to the 
number of tests that have been undertaken, and assumed no new 
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vulnerabilities are introduced via the software fix process. This concept is 
known as perfect debugging, with the converse known as imperfect debugging 
(Lin, 2011). Anderson (2001a) also suggested that a thermodynamic analogy 
using the concept of entropic decay best represents the amount of 
vulnerabilities left within the software system as a function of time (Lewis et al., 
2015). However, subsequent studies have discounted this model due to the low 
predictive capability (Alhazmi et al., 2005, 2007; Nguyen and Massacci, 2012; 
Woo et al., 2011).  Despite the ground-breaking aspect of Anderson’s 
assertions it was ultimately disproved, however it gave rise to the concept of 
defect density, which influenced subsequent vulnerability discovery models, 
specifically (Alhazmi et al., 2007). Following the AT model Rescorla (2003) 
proposed a new method for examining vulnerability growth. Whilst the Rescorla 
study was not a true model for measuring the level of vulnerability with the Linux 
operating system, it did lead to the idea that one may be able to observe the 
amount of vulnerable servers as a function of time (Rescorla, 2003). Rescorla 
(2003) additionally  proposed two further models, the Rescorla exponential (RE) 
model and Rescorla Quadratic (RQ) model (Lewis et al., 2015; Rescorla, 2005). 
The Rescorla study focused and evaluated OpenSSL v2.0, a free encryption 
library within Apache to secure web traffic  and Redhat Linux 6.2 (Lewis et al., 
2015). Both models utilised the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) datasets 
and demonstrated that once an exploit is released into the wild, and a patch to 
that vulnerability is released, the vulnerability of that deployed application 
exponentially decreases as a function of time, commonly known as exponential 
decay (Lewis et al., 2015). Rescorla based the RE model on a technique widely 
used within traditional reliability modelling, that of reliability growth modelling. 
Growth modelling is a general way to characterise the reliability of a system by 
employing a counting model, which records the number of events over a given 
time period. This counting growth process is central to the predictive aspects of 
reliability models and shows the progression of events.  
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2.3.2 Vulnerability Discovery Models and Growth Measurement 
The accepted way to measure software reliability is via statistical engineering 
techniques used to measure and predict the quality, or robustness of software 
(Chowdhury et al., 2011; Garrison, 1993; Tamai and Nakatani, 2002). Software 
reliability models in general use probabilistic techniques to predict the growth of 
faults within software. This primary focus is to measure the reliability of 
software, and to measure the elapsed time prior to a mean time to failure 
(MTTF). This type of analysis is generally expanded to include time intervals of 
software to failure, and frequency of events (Roumani et al., 2015). The 
measurement of time to failure, while useful in friendly environments, does not 
take into consideration the malicious nature of security threats and are therefore 
imprecise. Software vulnerabilities are actively sought out, therefore have many 
external influencing factors of the discovery rate.  
Vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) are grouped into two categories, effort 
based and time based (Younis et al., 2011). Time based models use elapsed 
time, generally in days, months and years, whereas effort is measured in CPU 
cycles abstracted to installed component or market share (Alhazmi et al., 2005). 
Within these models a counting method is used which focuses upon predicting 
the number of vulnerabilities that maybe present in software (Chowdhury et al., 
2011).  Most count based VDMs are univariate, with time or effort used as the 
independent variable. Discovery events are the dependant variable showing 
cumulative evolution of vulnerability discovered.  A relatively small number of 
vulnerability discovery models exist when compared to software fault models; 
however, the models which do exist suggest a degree of predictive accuracy 
(Lewis et al., 2015; Roumani et al., 2015) 
2.3.3 Alhazmi Malaiya Logistic Model 
One of the well-known VDMs is the Alhazmi Malaiya Logistic model (AML) 
which was proposed in 2005. The AML model uses a time based counting 
method based upon cumulative measurement of vulnerabilities within a given 
software system (Alhazmi et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2015). The model observed 
from collected data that three distinct phases of underlying vulnerability 
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discovery exist (Alhazmi et al., 2005). These phases of discovery are labelled 
‘learning’, ‘linear’ and ‘saturation’, each following sequentially (Alhazmi et al., 
2005; Lewis et al., 2015).  Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) hypothesised that the 
learning phase incorporated the familiarisation aspects of the vulnerability 
discovery phase. Alongside the familiarisation aspects, vulnerability discoverers 
were also learning to overcome any introduction of software security controls 
introduced by the software vendors such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP) 
and Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) to prevent the successful 
activation of vulnerability code (Ablon et al., 2017, p.79). The AML model is 
represented by a symmetric logistic curve, transitioning from growth to decline 
halfway through the lifecycle of the software (Lewis et al., 2015).  
	Ω # = 	 %%&'()*+ 	+ 1	 
Equation 1 - AML logistic Differential Model Source : (Alhazmi, 2006)  
Following on from the initial learning phase is a secondary phase known as 
‘linear’, when a period is encountered whereby the rate of vulnerability 
discovery tends to grow at an increasing and constant rate (Alhazmi et al., 
2005, 2007; Lewis et al., 2015).  Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) argue this phase 
is when the software system is most prone to exploitation, due to the number of 
discovered vulnerabilities. This assumption is based upon a significant lag time 
between a vulnerability discovery event, and a patch being available and 
installed. In contrast Arora et al. (2010), cite numerous examples of the time lag 
between discovery and patch time reducing, and the potential risk therefore 
increasing thus suggesting the linear phase may be more complex than a 
simple linear increase. 
The final phase, known as ‘saturation’, is where Alhazmi and Malaiya describes 
a decline in the rate of discovery. With this decline it is hypothesised to be an 
indication of the residual number of vulnerabilities left within the software to be 
found (Alhazmi et al., 2005, 2007; Woo et al., 2011). Alhazmi and Malaiya 
(2005) and Woo et al. (2011) argue that this decline in the final phase is linked 
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to the declining interest of hackers or crackers and increasing software security, 
although no evidence is presented.  
A key aspect of the AML model is the notion of vulnerability density within 
software whereby the number of vulnerabilities is measured against the size of 
the software (Alhazmi et al., 2005). The vulnerability density, VD , is given by the 
equation below, where S is the size or the software in source lines of code 
(SLOC) and V is the number of vulnerabilities discovered. 
 
./ = .0 
Equation 2 – Vulnerability Density Source: (Alhazmi, 2006) 
In the PhD thesis of Alhazmi it is argued that the relationship between 
vulnerability density, VD , and known vulnerabilities, VKD ,  is related to the 
residual risk of potential exploitation as there would still be a number of 
vulnerabilities within the software, thus: 
“It is actually the residual vulnerability density (depending on vulnerabilities not 
yet discovered) that contributes to the risk of potential exploitation. Other 
aspects of the risk of exploitation include the time gap between the discovery of 
a vulnerability and the release and application of a patch” (Alhazmi, 2006, p.16). 
The AML model is the most extensively considered and validated, cited by 
many authors as the most consistent for vulnerability discovery prediction over 
time (Joh et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2015; Roumani et al., 2015; Ruohonen et al., 
2015, 2016; Woo et al., 2011; Younis et al., 2011). Many studies have 
confirmed the basic three phase model exists within additional datasets 
gathered from software vulnerability event data (Chen et al., 2010; Kapur et al., 
2015). However, subsequent studies have shown that whilst the model provides 
significant predictive capability, there are inconsistent results depending upon 
the type of software and age that is under analysis (Lewis et al., 2015; Nguyen 
et al., 2012; Rahimi et al., 2013). For example, later versions of the Microsoft 
operating system Windows show that secondary and tertiary ‘linear’ and 
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‘saturation’ phases exist (Lewis et al., 2015; Woo et al., 2011; Younis et al., 
2011). Additionally, numerous studies have confirmed the AML model closely 
describes the discovery process, however Joh et al., (2010) point to a subtle 
flaw (albeit not critical) within the AML model (Joh et al., 2010; Joh and Malaiya, 
2014)   
The AML model whilst useful assumes that that the vulnerability discovery 
process is symmetric in nature and follows a normal probability distribution. 
However, Joh et al., (2010) showed that in some cases the probability 
distribution is asymmetric or skewed (Joh et al., 2010, 2014). In the context of 
VDM’s, skewness characterises the degree of asymmetry its mean value, with a 
negative skew displaying a shortened ‘learning’ phase, and elongated 
‘saturation’ phase, suggesting different or modified processes at work within 
phases (Joh et al., 2014).  
One deficiency within all studies is around the lack of investigation between 
VDM’s and the hypothesised lifecycles. This is particularly notable given the 
pervasive nature of phasing within the vulnerability discovery models and the 
observed behaviour, it is unusual that none of the literature mentioned 
attempted to relate the vulnerability discovery lifecycle, and the phases of 
learning, linear or saturation.  
Joh et al., (2010) suggest that the probability of observing discovery events is 
higher toward the beginning the software lifecycle, accelerating the onset of the 
2nd linear/saturation phases of discovery. The converse is also true with an 
extended learning phase, and shortened saturation phase.  (Joh et al., 2010, 
2014). Joh et al., (2014) provided predictive goodness of fit of scores for a 
Wiebull based discovery model against data form Windows 2003, Windows XP, 
Redhat Linux and Redhat enterprise Linux (Joh et al., 2010). The results 
suggest that whilst the Joh model fits slightly better than the AML model, the 
improvement in r2 values is insignificant  ~0.02 (Joh et al., 2010).  
In addition to the work from Joh et al., (2010, 2014), Kim et al. (2007) proposed 
a multi-cycle or multi version (MV) model. Kim et al. (2007) studied major 
versions of Apache webserver and MySQL. Additionally, an aspect of code 
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sharing between the versions was investigated. The key differentiator from 
previous models is that the MV model takes into consideration new versions 
and patches that are added to the software over time via a process known as 
imperfect debugging (Lewis et al., 2015; Pham, 2000, p.126). The MV model 
takes a similar approach as the AML model, however where the AML models 
assumes a stable implementation, with no changes to the software the MV does 
not (Lewis et al., 2015). Kim et al. (2007) argues that addition of new code gives 
rise to observed secondary and tertiary ‘learning and ‘linear’ phases of 
discovery. Kim provided goodness of fit statistics when fitting the MV model to 
Apache and MySQL data which resulted in positive results (p>0.99). A 
multistage superposition between subsequent versions of Apache and MySQL 
occurred, resulting in a more accurate prediction of vulnerabilities and relative 
rate prediction (Kim et al., 2007). 
Finally, Younis et al., (2011) proposed an augmentation to the Joh et al., (2010) 
asymmetric model using a concept known as ‘folded distribution’ (Younis et al., 
2011). Younis et al., (2011) examined four software systems Windows 7, Apple 
OSX 10.5.x, Apache 2.0 and Internet Explorer 8. Goodness of fit tests were 
applied to predictive trends, resulting in encouraging results with P values of 
>0.99. Younis et al., (2011) argued that software, which is earlier in lifecycle or 
with shorter ‘learning’ phases, is more suited to the folded model, whereas older 
more established software is suited to the AML model. This is primarily due to 
the early onset of ‘linear’ and ‘saturation’ phases, which adds symmetry to the 
cumulative distribution. This is in stark contrast to the MV model, which argues 
the inclusion of imperfect debugging is the cause of multiple ‘linear’ and 
‘learning’ phases.  Later in a study  Younis et al., (2016) built on previous work 
from and Kim et al. (2007) showing a progression of thinking toward a multiple 
set of AML phases, that may suggest several differing behaviors within the 
VDDS. However, analysis stops short of speculating that these phases are of 
interest, or in any way related to the vulnerability lifecycle or entities within 
them. Many studies state that vulnerabilities should be considered a subset of 
software faults, as they share the same fundamental issue, that of a mistake 
caused by human (Kim et al., 2016; Vijayan et al., 2016) There is also 
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agreement that there is a level of duality, when a fault can be both a fault and a 
vulnerability (Kim et al., 2016; Vijayan et al., 2016). A philosophical discussion 
on this topic can be found in Andersons study on security vulnerability 
economics (Anderson, 2001a). 
2.4 Software Vulnerability Discovery Process  
The discovery of a vulnerability within software is akin to ‘panning for gold’, as 
the vulnerability is already in existence, it is the technique, detail and expertise 
that uncovers the vulnerability that is key. Studies have claimed that a software 
vulnerability goes through a number of distinct phases, characterised as a 
vulnerability lifecycle (Clark et al., 2010; Frei et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 2 – the lifecycle of a vulnerability Source: (Frei et al., 2010) 
Moreover, phases are argued to be distinct periods of time whereby differing 
events occur, and sub-processes are triggered. This claim is substantiated by 
Shahzad et al., (2012) who states that key phases within the lifecycle are 
characterised by differing behaviours of actors within the VDDS. There is 
consensus among authors that the lifecycle always starts with a vulnerability or 
bug being introduced into the software, which, in some cases may lie dormant 
for years. In the case of three well-known vulnerabilities, ‘shellshock’, 
‘Heartbleed’ and ‘goto fail’ all lay dormant and undiscovered for over 24 months. 
(Banks, 2015; Delamore and Ko, 2015; Larsson and Sigholm, 2016). This is 
important when the issue of vulnerabilities is framed in the context of discovery, 
but not disclosure, as a separate set of actions occur.  
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The second phase within the lifecycle is typically the discovery phase, whereby 
software that contains an undiscovered vulnerability is subjected to robust 
probing and testing (Klein, 2011, p.3).  This undiscovered vulnerability is 
detected via specialised discovery tools. These tools range from bespoke 
applications used for software security testing such as SPIKE and peachfuzz, to 
general programming tools such as debuggers (Klein, 2011, pp.6–8; Sutton et 
al., 2007, p.351). Vulnerability discovery tools are difficult to operate as they are 
generally designed to be utilised by highly skilled discoverers and software 
developers. However, the complexity of these tools has been shown to be 
reducing over time which may in part allows allowed potentially new entrants to 
the discovery system to influence the discovery of vulnerabilities. (Klein, 2011, 
p.181).  
Once initial discovery phases have occurred, there is considerable 
disagreement as to which phase in the lifecycle follows, as can be shown in 
table 2 below. Frei (2013a) argues that the next step in the lifecycle of a 
vulnerability is that of exploitation, where measured time between discovery, 
exploit and patch is a factor. The assumption here is that that discovery of the 
vulnerability is via a malicious actor, driven to cause harm. Whilst this is 
appropriate, Frei (2013a) fails to consider the discovery of vulnerabilities by so 
called ‘white hat’ researchers, and internal discovery teams within the software 
vendor, which are deemed out of scope.  In contrast to Frei, Ruohonen et al., 
(2016) hypothesises a seven step process which changes the sequence of 
events, placing disclosure directly after discovery. According to Ruohonen et al., 
(2016) this modification makes the assumption that the vulnerability is disclosed 
to a vendor, prior to any malicious exploit development. The main difference 
between suggested models is the sequence of events between patch, exploit 
creation and disclosure, however not consider the different modes of disclosure 
(Arbaugh et al., 2000; Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Li and Rao, 2007; Marconato et 
al., 2012; Ozment, 2007; Radianti et al., 2007a, 2009; Sood, 2009). In the study 
presented by Ozment (2007) there is the notable exception to this as a stated 
model includes the ‘injection’ of the vulnerability into the software prior to 
release. This injection phase is assumed to be within the software development 
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lifecycle, however this is not made clear.  Within all these studies is the tacit 
assumption that the vulnerabilities that are discovered and result in a 
disclosure, and that the process is a smooth progression. However, no 
consideration is given to the time taken to navigate all the stages within the 
VDDS, and no studies have made efforts to measure the time that is taken 
between a vulnerability entering and ultimate exit of the VDDS. 
 
Study Vulnerability Lifecycle Sequence Number of 
Phases 
Type of Model 
(Frei, 2013a; Frei et 
al., 2010) 
Creation, Discovery, Exploit, Disclosure, Vendor Patch, Patch 
Installation. 
6 Linear 
(Ruohonen et al., 
2016) 
Birth, Discovery, Disclosure, Patching, Publication, Exploit Dev, 
Death 
7 Linear 
(Arbaugh et al., 2000) Birth, Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, Publicity, Scripting, Death. 7 Linear 
(Cavusoglu et al., 
2007) 
Introduction, Identification, Vendor Patch, {3rd Party Coordination, 
Vendor Patch} 
4  
(optional 2) 
Linear 
(Li et al., 2007) Release, Discovery, Exploit, Vendor Patch, End  5 Linear 
(Marconato et al., 
2012) 
Discovery, Disclosure, Patch, Exploit 4 Linear 
(Sood, 2009) Discovered, Made Public, Known to vendor, Vendor Notification, 
Security tool updates, Vendor Patch, Patch Known, Patch Install 
8 Linear 
(Ozment, 2007) Injection, Release, Discovery, Disclosure, Public, Patch, Scripting 7 Linear 
(Radianti et al., 
2007b, 2009) 
Creation, Discovery, Disclosure, Black Market Trade, Exploit, Patch  6 Network 
(Takanen et al., 2004) Discovery/Reaction, Correction, Disclosure, Nullification  4 Network 
(Okhravi and Nicol, 
2008) 
Introduction, Discovery, Exploitation, Disclosure, Public Exploit, 
Patch, Patch Test, Patch Deploy 
8 Linear 
(Okamura et al., 2009) Birth, Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, Publicity, Scripting, Death 7 Network 
Table 2 - Comparison of Vulnerability Lifecycle Phases. 
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A further area of disagreement within the literature is centred around the 
disclosure phases within the lifecycle. All studies consider the disclosure 
phases as important, yet  all identified different paths the vulnerability may 
follow the VDDS (Arbaugh et al., 2000; Concas et al., 2007; Frei, 2013a; 
Radianti et al., 2007a; Sood, 2009). The final phases of the lifecycle are centred 
around the installation of  vendor patch, effectively removing the vulnerability 
from the software (Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Frei, 2013a; Radianti et al., 2007a; 
Sood, 2009).  A detailed analysis of the disclosure phase is discussed below. 
All suggested vulnerability lifecycle models are subjective as they describe the 
journey which an individual vulnerability undergoes from a narrow point of view. 
The assertions from studies lends itself to a network of potential bifurcation of 
paths through the VDDS, each with hypothesised incentives, ethical choices, 
influences and timescales attached.  
There is general agreement that the process a vulnerability follows is linear, 
progressing from creation and discovery to the eventual remediation of the 
issue. However, both Radianti et al. (2009) and Takanen et al. (2004) describe 
the differing entities and roles that are played within the VDDS and argue that 
the process is not linear in nature, that the lifecycle a vulnerability may  contain 
loops, complex information flows (hidden of otherwise), and time delays.  
Whilst the nature of the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system appears 
to differ considerably between authors, this could be due to the narrow research 
question that is being tackled. All studies, again with the notable exception of 
Ozment (2007) deal with ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities as they are the highest 
impact, however other classes of vulnerabilities exist. So, called ‘one-day’ 
vulnerabilities which are vulnerabilities that are known about publicly, yet not 
patched are still critically important due to the impact of them (Ozment, 2007, 
p.87). 
2.5 Software Quality Related to Vulnerabilities 
Several studies have put forward theory describing software quality metrics that 
are used to quantify the quality of software by counting the occurrence of faults 
(Elish and Elish, 2008; Janes et al., 2006; McCabe, 1976; Nagappan et al., 
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2006; Succi et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2007). Most relevant to software 
vulnerability are studies that examine the correlation of software complexity, 
cohesion and coupling (CCC) metrics and the Chidamber-Kemerer (CK) object 
orientated metric suite have been applied to software security (Chowdhury et 
al., 2011; Lewis et al., 2015; Moshtari et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2011). One of the 
most widely used metrics to understand the complexity of code is Halstead’s 
software science complexity metric (Halstead, 1977, p.127; Lewis et al., 2015). 
This metric is used to estimate number of errors or faults within the software by 
calculating the complexity within the source code, and difficultly in debugging 
(Lewis et al., 2015). However, Hamer (1982) and Shen (1983) argue that there 
is ambiguity of what can be classed as a operand and the derivation of the 
formula regarding effort required to debug a piece of code is very subjective and 
based upon unproven psychological theory. Hamer (1982) also draws attention 
to a lack of rigorous experimental design, the usage of non-probabilistic 
methods was unsuitable and a serious lack of experimental data within 
Halstead’s (1977) study. Nevertheless, Halstead provides a good foundation for 
quantifying software quality, this is despite being published over 30 years ago 
as they serve as a timely reminder of the issues faced today. 
A competing software metric known as the cyclomatic, or conditional complexity 
metric was proposed in the late nineteen seventies (McCabe, 1976). McCabe’s 
cyclomatic complexity metric describes and measures the control flow of a 
program. McCabes technique utilises directed topologies, or graphs, to count 
logical decision points within the software. McCabe (1976) states that a 
program with a low level of complexity is easier to produce, maintain and 
ultimately will have a lower amount of faults (Lewis et al., 2015; McCabe, 1976; 
Watson and McCabe, 1996). However, Sheppard (1988) argues that McCabe’s 
metric is of very limited utility due to the simplistic approach to decision point 
counting, the apparent dissonance with established software development 
practices and a seemingly inability to deal with modern development 
approaches e.g. object orientated.  
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Despite obvious shortcomings complexity as a general measure of software 
reliability has persisted with numerous theories and empirical studies refining 
and validating McCabe’s and Halstead’s initial complexity hypotheses 
(Chidamber and Kemerer, 1994; Douce et al., 1999). More specifically, studies 
have evaluated the effectiveness of CCC metrics and their utility for predicting 
software vulnerability. Neuhaus et al. (2007) determined correlation between 
software features such as code complexity and buffer usage and the number of 
vulnerabilities. Chowdhury et al. (2011) attempted to validate the usefulness of 
CCC metrics in vulnerability prediction with good success (Lewis et al., 2015). 
Chowdhury et al. (2011) established a significant relationship between the 
number of vulnerabilities present within the Mozilla Firefox web browser and 
CCC metrics with over a 70% success rate (Lewis et al., 2015). Alongside this 
Nguyen et al. (2010) established a relationship between component 
dependency graphs (CDG) and the density of vulnerabilities within the 
Javascript engine of Mozilla Firefox. Shin et al. (2011) built upon the Chowdhury 
study by exploring complexity, code churn and developer activity (CCD) as 
metrics for understanding the propensity for code to have vulnerability (Lewis et 
al., 2015). Moshtari et al (2013) generated CCC metrics from a range of 
software types, and performed classification activities upon the dataset to their 
establish predictive quality, with again significant results and predictive 
accuracy (Lewis et al., 2015).   
The literature that investigates the twin concepts of software quality and 
software faults, however is seems that multiple authors treat the issue of fault, 
and indeed vulnerabilities within software as an engineering problem. Perhaps 
this is due to the historical nature of software and software quality originating 
from mathematically orientated disciplines. Therefore, all studies suffer from the 
serious shortcoming as they assume that issues can be engineered out, and do 
not address the inevitability of discovery of issues.  
 
  - 54 - 
2.6 Software Vulnerability Disclosure 
Many Studies have stated that the final or penultimate phase within the VDDS is 
disclosure (Arbaugh et al., 2000; Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Frei, 2013a; Frei et al., 
2010; Li et al., 2007; Marconato et al., 2012; Okamura et al., 2009; Okhravi et 
al., 2008; Ozment, 2007; Radianti et al., 2009, 2007b; Ruohonen et al., 2016; 
Sood, 2009; Takanen et al., 2004). Vulnerabilities within software, and the 
techniques that are used to identify, or discover a vulnerability within software is 
largely uncoordinated and globally distributed.  Once discovered by a 
vulnerability discoverer a number of potential disclosure strategies are available 
ranging from doing nothing, privately selling the vulnerability, exploit creation or 
simply disclosing the details to the general public (Arbaugh et al., 2000; Concas 
et al., 2007; Frei, 2013a; Radianti et al., 2007a; Sood, 2009).  
The decision to follow a particular approach is argued to be highly subjective to 
the individual and is based upon previous experiences. (Cavusoglu et al., 2007; 
Takanen et al., 2004). The two main courses of action open to vulnerability 
discoverers are full disclosure and coordinated disclosure (Maurushat, 2013, 
p.5). The full disclosure strategy is an approach where vulnerability details are 
released to the general public without modification or dilution normally via online 
channels  (Maurushat, 2013, p.5). It is argued that this approach was born out 
of frustration with the software vendor community as it was felt that vendors 
were not doing enough to prevent and fix vulnerabilities within software 
(Maurushat, 2013, p.6; Schneier, 2007). Conversely the coordinated disclosure 
movement advocates a closed security dialogue, whereby the discussion of 
vulnerabilities in a private manner allows software fix process to occur in a 
controlled and reduced risk environment (Maurushat, 2013, p.6). However, this 
closed approach however has come under question in recent years due to the 
vendors’ inaction to produce a fix to issue and hostile actions toward 
discoverers. A recent alternative to a private coordinated disclosure movement, 
which is predicated on a closed approach, is paid coordinated disclosure. This 
strategy promotes private dialogue with the software vendor, enabling a fix to 
the issue to be created prior to public release however is mediated by a third 
party (Bradbury, 2007; Hackerone, 2016). This coordinated vulnerability 
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strategy is considered the first, and by some authors the only strategy to adopt 
when a vulnerability has been discovered as harm is reduced. 
2.6.1 Full Disclosure of Software Vulnerabilities 
The full disclosure movement was born out of two distinct views on what to do 
with a vulnerability, one philosophical in nature, the other frustration. The 
philosophical approach to full disclosure comes from the notion that information 
and software should be open, and in the case of vulnerabilities the wider the 
discursive audience the better. The second however negates a number of key 
aspects of vulnerabilities, namely; the harm to the users of the software and 
professional conduct of the discoverer (Matwyshyn et al., 2010; Takanen et al., 
2004). Full disclosure is defined as: 
”…detailed discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities: 
what they are, how to exploit them, and how to fix them” (Arbaugh et al., 2000). 
Combined these two facets bring to bear the ethics of vulnerability disclosure. 
Matwyshyn et al. (2010) argue that the first concern of any individual is to avoid 
harming others when it is clear in the case of full disclosure the vulnerability 
details will be used by actors, who may decide to create malicious software for 
criminal intent. This is supported by evidence of the myriad of viruses, malicious 
software and exploitation kits that exist (Caballero et al., 2011). Whilst not all 
malicious activities stem from the full disclosure process, a significant proportion 
do according to Matwyshyn et al., (2010). Clark et al. (2010) state that between 
49% and 66% of malicious software is derived from this type of disclosure 
stance.  Proponents of the full disclosure stance argue that forcing the vendors 
to act, due their inaction, is argued to be less harmful in the long run as it forces 
up software quality due to potential reputational damage to vendors (Martin, 
2000a; Schneier, 2008). Nonetheless, this approach is not without criticism, as 
it effectively hands over critical information about weaknesses within software to 
malicious actors, potentially affecting millions of end users globally.    
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2.6.2 Coordinated Disclosure 
The disclosure of vulnerabilities is considered to be in most cases a complex 
set of steps that need to be managed carefully as the potential negative impact 
on information system could be significant (Bradbury, 2007; Tang et al., 2016). 
An alternative to the full disclosure strategy exists known as coordinated, or 
ethical disclosure. Coordinated disclosure is defined as: 
“...timely, fair, and accurate disclosure of the existence of security vulnerabilities 
that put consumers, business partners, and the social system at risk, thereby 
enabling these affected parties to mitigate their exposure to information risk” 
(Matwyshyn et al., 2010). 
The confidential disclosure of a vulnerability to a software vendor once 
discovered allows the vendor to produce a fix to the issue that has been 
uncovered, therefore mitigating risk of exploitation (Arora et al., 2010). 
However, this mitigation is based upon the assumptions that vendors will both 
create a fix for the vulnerability and the vulnerability is not rediscovered 
independently during the coordinated disclosure period (Ozment, 2007, p.90). 
Whilst the rediscovery of a vulnerability is largely an uncontrollable event, 
production of a fix is firmly within the control of the software originator. It has 
been widely documented that the process which vulnerability discoverers enter 
into, and the time which the vendors take to process the received vulnerability 
information is extremely variable (Algarni and Malaiya, 2013; Clark et al., 2010; 
Fidler, 2014; Ruohonen et al., 2016; Schneier, 2007). This variability manifests 
itself at one extreme as efficient, welcoming and consists of responsive 
communication with vulnerability discoverers and quick production of a fix to 
identified issues (Damontoo, 2012). At the other extreme, discoverers are often 
ignored, ridiculed or threatened with legal action culminating with very 
significant time periods between initial disclosure and a fix being produced, if at 
all (Cavusoglu et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2010).  It is claimed by studies that this 
apparent volatility, coupled with the potential for punitive actions from 
originators has forced the discoverer to adopt a full disclosure strategy, despite 
the willingness to disclose without recompense or reward (Sowa et al., 2009).  
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2.6.3 Vulnerability Markets 
Given the variability of disclosure, and apparent dissonance within the VDDS a 
new mechanism was sought to minimise the risk from uncoordinated 
vulnerability disclosure and apparent lack of engagement of vendors – 
vulnerabilities markets. Markets for vulnerabilities are split into two main types, 
legitimate, illegitimate (Anderson, 2001a). Legitimate software vulnerabilities 
markets are a relatively recent phenomenon which have been the subject of 
many recent studies (Ablon et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2013; Böhme, 2005; 
Egelman et al., 2013; Fidler, 2014; Goncharov, 2014; Grier et al., 2012; Lewis 
et al., 2015; Miller, 2007; Schechter, 2004). Bohme (2005) suggests that four 
legitimate markets exist; bug challenges, vulnerability brokers, exploit 
derivatives and cyber insurance. The utility of legitimate markets has been the 
subject of scrutiny since the initial concept of rewarding vulnerability discovery 
with payment was initiated in 2007 with the ultimate establishment of schemes 
such as Hackerone and Bugcrowd (Bradbury, 2007; BugCrowd Homepage, 
2017; Hackerone, 2016). Illegitimate, or black markets are defined by Ablon et 
al. (2014) as: 
 “the collection of (skilled and unskilled) suppliers, vendors, potential buyers, 
and intermediaries for goods, or services surrounding digitally based crimes”.  
Ablon et al., (2014) go on to state that black markets are organised for the 
purposes of cybercrime, and optimised as such, with the intent of the 
participants within the market as the main driver: 
 
• Individuals or small groups: intent is for financial gain; 
• Organised criminals: intent is for financial gain; 
• Nation State: Intent is to monitor, exploit or attack threats; 
• Cyberterrorists: intent is to degrade, destroy, disrupt, deny or deceive; 
• Hacktivists: intent is for notoriety or visibility. 
(Ablon et al., 2014; Lewis et al., 2015) 
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2.6.4 Illegitimate Markets (Black) 
Notably a series of studies have speculated on the structure and motivation of 
vulnerability black markets (VBM). Published between 2007 and 2010 these 
studies utilised a System Dynamics approach to understand the VBM and 
provided insight into the potential dynamics of underground black markets 
(Lewis et al., 2015; Radianti, 2010a; Radianti and Gonzalez, 2006; Radianti et 
al., 2007b, 2009). Additionally, the studies dealt with various scenarios that 
showed potential policy effects upon black markets (e.g. increased risk of 
capture from law enforcement). The studies initially focus on VBMs as a closed 
system with no exogenous influences or factors (Lewis et al., 2015; Radianti et 
al., 2006, 2007a). The proposed initial model was subsequently improved upon 
to include the fluctuations of vulnerability researcher reward and ethical 
strategies, creation of exploitation software, disclosure, supply and demand, 
patching. The series of studies culminated in a study outlining the social 
behaviour within online black markets, (Lewis et al., 2015; Radianti, 2010b) 
Each study advanced and documented a series of potential structures that 
black markets can adopt and the dynamics within them. Whilst undoubtedly 
useful, several shortcomings are assumptions are present within the studies 
which in some areas undermine the validity of the research. Models presented 
in Radianti et al. (2007a) and Radianti et al. (2009) omit three critical aspects of 
vulnerability discovery. The first is that the inherent software quality that gives 
rise to the initial set of vulnerabilities within software or the software vendor 
themselves is not addressed. This critical omission undermines the model as it 
does not take into consideration different types of vulnerability as the model 
treats each vulnerability as a discrete event having the same severity and 
characteristics (i.e buffer overflow, XSS etc). Within this is an assumption that 
more vulnerabilities means more patches and exploit development. Secondly, 
the capability of the vulnerability researcher is omitted. This is equally critical as 
it has been noted in several studies that a small ‘elite’ of researchers are 
responsible for the discovery of a disproportional amount of vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, factors such as vulnerability discovery tool availability and 
discovery techniques being sharing between researchers are not addressed. 
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Finally, and potentially most significantly an assumption is made that the 
discovery process follows a linear process over the lifespan of the software with 
no time delays. The omission of any detail on time, versions or debugging 
assumptions are a useful as simple approximation; however these have been 
shown to be inaccurate when describing real-world discovery events (Joh et al., 
2010; Kim et al., 2007; Younis et al., 2011, 2016). 
Alongside this, is the notion of nation state stockpiling vulnerabilities for usage 
within intelligence and military organisations. This is particularly acute, when we 
consider the WannaCry malware, and alleged theft of US government 
developed vulnerabilities (Ablon et al., 2017; Goodin, 2017b). It is suggested 
that vulnerabilities were developed by the US government, and weaponised to 
to be used within malware development (Goodin, 2017a). 
2.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter provided a review of the literature that surrounds the topic of 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure. In summary, it has been shown from this 
review that software vulnerability and associated models, frameworks and 
theory is an important, yet a small subset of the wider computer security field. 
As such the number of studies that have been conducted is relatively small in 
comparison to older, more established disciplines such as cryptography. 
Consequentially, the literature search that was undertaken uncovered a lack of 
in-depth socio-technical orientated empirical studies, and no grounded system 
studies employing mixed method approaches to software vulnerability discovery 
and disclosure. It is suggested that the existing literature is scarce due to the 
technical nature of the previous authors focus, and comparative immaturity of 
the domain.  
Since the series of studies published by Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) their AML 
model has become the standard for representing the evolution of vulnerability 
with software systems.  The AML model has been adopted, enhanced and 
validated by several studies, all of which accept the tacit assumption that 
software evolves in a similar fashion over time, and this evolution consists of 
one or more of the three phases stated. This assumption has led to obvious 
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analogues between software reliability growth models and vulnerability 
discovery models. However, no studies have taken steps to investigate the 
underlying factors that cause this observed growth, and have only speculated 
on the reasons.  
In general most studies characterise the vulnerability discovery and disclosure 
process as a linear set of events, and fail to address the question as to how the 
vulnerability discovery process operates at sufficient depth (Clark et al., 2010; 
Frei et al., 2010; Ozment, 2007; Shahzad et al., 2012; Sood, 2009). However, 
studies do provide insight into parts of the discovery process, and linkages 
between differing phases. The critical flaw in most studies is the general claim 
that the phases follow a sequential flow, and that these phases are distinct, yet 
none have investigated this from a wide scope. Furthermore, methodological 
issues within literature raise questions on the diversity of data that these 
conclusions have been reached. For example, in Clarke (2010) the National 
Vulnerability Database is used in conjunction with commercial closed dataset, 
however only a subset of exploited vulnerabilities is used to base their 
conclusions upon. A further issue with the literature is around the claims made 
by authors in follow up activities. In all studies, the activities stop at a time 
defined by the researchers, normally due to availability of data. This is also 
compounded by studies as no follow up studies are undertaken to assess the 
validity of claims made, with the exception of Alhazmi et al. (2005) series of 
papers (Alhazmi, 2006; Alhazmi et al., 2005, 2007; Woo et al., 2011).  
It is stark that the only appreciable foray into any investigation into a systems 
approach to vulnerability discovery are the Radianti studies and a single 
presentation at the hacking conference Blackhat 2015 (Moussouris and Siegel, 
2015). These studies are the only appreciable example of investigating the 
vulnerability discovery mechanisms from a systems perspective. Even so, 
Radianti et al. (2007) only considered the black-market trade of vulnerabilities 
alongside the legitimate market. Whilst the Radianti findings are cogent, they 
lack detailed empirical evidence as to how the system works, and why 
interactions exist as they do. Furthermore, the structure of the system will have 
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changed significantly due to new markets, discoverers and policy, rendering 
Radianti’s (2007; 2010) studies out of date. Although studies undertaken by 
both Radianti et al., (2007; 2010) and Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) have 
examined the behaviour of vulnerability discovery there has not been a 
definitive conclusion as to what is driving the growth of vulnerability discovery. 
The investigation of disclosure and discovery, coupled with a systems approach 
seems obvious, yet there has been no significant literature in any quantity 
published. This failure has been addressed albeit in a rudimentary manner by 
the practitioner community.   
A large corpus of non-academic literature does exist outside of traditional 
resources. This type of literature is used to form the basis of the thematic 
analysis, and exists due to the heavily practitioner focus of vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, the impact of time upon the VDDS has not been investigated in 
any depth. 
Given the lack of investigation and studies on systemic approaches to the 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure this study will build upon and contribute to 
the literature and address the lack of research in this area. In the chapter that 
follows, a mixed methods approach is provided that sets out the investigative 
approach to understanding the factors that underlie the vulnerability discovery 
and disclosure system.  
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3 Research Methodology and Data Collection Overview 
The following chapter presents a rationale and methodology for investigating 
the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system, this includes techniques for 
collecting, analysing and modelling. The problem of discovery and disclosure is 
assumed to be both a complex yet tractable one (Malone and Malone, 2013; 
Rahimi et al., 2013). Coupled closely with this description is the accepted fact 
that the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system operates as a socio-
technical system, with influences arising from participants within the system 
(Banks, 2015; Castelfranchi and Tan, 2001; Polatin-Reuben et al., 2013). 
Therefore, to investigate not only the structure of the system, but the nature and 
behaviour of the system we must employ several analytical techniques to draw 
insight and conclusions from collected data.  
Consequentially, we can define this investigation as both data driven and 
inductive in nature. As such it is useful at this point to restate the research 
questions, outlined in in the initial chapter of this study: 
What are the constituent parts, dynamics and structures of the COTS legitimate 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure system? 
 And; 
What are is the potential impacts of strategies employed to reduce vulnerability 
centred risk? 
3.1 An Ontological View of the VDDS 
Outlined in chapter two, many researchers have utilised mathematical models, 
engineering approaches and deductive data collection techniques to investigate 
and infer behaviour of vulnerability (Alhazmi, 2006; Kim et al., 2016; Radianti et 
al., 2006, 2007a). However, none framed their investigations in an ontological 
manner and addressed the philosophical aspects of the VDDS, thus providing a 
arguably myopic view on the VDDS. Consequentially this investigation has 
adopted an ontological construal, specifically subjectivism. Subjectivism is 
defined by Saunders et al. (2009, p.111) as: 
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“..social phenomena are created from the perceptions and consequent actions 
of social actors”. 
As the VDDS is socially constructed phenomenon, which is assumed to be 
constantly evolving, the subjective approach is well suited as it roots any 
conclusions that are drawn from the VDDS as constructed from the reality of 
participants within the VDSS. Alongside the ontological underpinnings adopted 
by this investigation, philosophical pragmatism has also been adopted as to 
fully explore the VDDS. 
3.1.1 Epistemological Enquiry 
According to Saunders (2009) research can capture data and interpret it 
correctly, however the essence of the system may be lost if we do not consider 
why we collect it.  This is of relevance when we take into consideration the 
focus of this research – vulnerability growth – and previous studies. Therefore, 
epistemologically speaking consideration of the approach that is taken towards 
the investigation of the VDDS, or more specifically what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge of the VDDS must be made. To provide insight into the phenomena 
of interest Saunders et al. (2009, p.108) argue that it is crucial that the first task 
of any research is to choose a suitable philosophical stance when considering 
the nature of the research. Presently, the approach that has been chosen to 
investigate the VDDS is constructive, or explicitly, social constructivism. This 
stance allows for the building of theoretical edifice to assist in the interpretation 
of events and actions, whilst still considering the fluid nature of the VDDS.  The 
reality of the VDDS is that it is viewed via social lenses, perceptions and 
choices, which influence the outcomes of the system of vulnerability discovery 
and subsequent disclosure.   
3.2 Research Approach – Building Theory  
As the philosophical underpinnings of this enquiry are firmly rooted in 
epistemological interpretation and understanding, an abductive research 
enquiry has been chosen.  Abductive investigations place greater emphasis on 
the explanation of events from potentially incomplete data alongside, 
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exploration and interpretation and construction of theory (Akcam et al., 2011; 
Kock, 2007; Massie, 2015, p.45). Currently theory and understanding that 
surrounds the VDDS exists within a mathematical, or inductive paradigm, which 
is derived from the engineering disciplines upon which modern computing and 
information systems have originated.  However, given the advent of the internet 
and enabling technological focused systems that exist online to become social 
constructs, we must now adopt a different, broader abductive approach to the 
construction of theory.  
3.2.1 Methodology – Observation of VDDS Phenomena 
The selection of an appropriate methodology, and philosophical approach to 
investigations aids both rigour and depth, and provides key insight into the 
phenomena of interest.  As such the methodology that has been chosen to 
investigate the VDDS is phenomenological in nature due to the passive 
observational character of the data and the opaqueness of the system. A 
phenomenological approach is defined as: 
“defined meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences or a concept 
or phenomenon, describing what participants have in common as they 
experience a phenomena”. 
(Creswell, 2013, p.58) 
Given this definition, an initial aspect of the VDDS is the number of unidentified 
elements within it. Therefore, initial questions to consider are centred around 
control mechanisms of the VDDS, participants within it and any behaviours 
exhibited. As stated, central to this research is a constructive research 
approach, combined with an observational phenomenological stance as we are 
observing a phenomenon. Hence when approaching the problem on the scale 
and complexity of the discovery and disclosure system one needs to take an 
expansive and exploratory philosophical and approach to it, yet appreciate the 
ontological nature of the phenomena. 
The construction of a theory as to how the VDDS operates is the focus of this 
research. Therefore by using a constructive approach to both problem 
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identification and production of a solution the impact can be measured on the 
current states of affairs (Pasian, 2015, p.94). This approach is in contrast to a 
pure phenomenological enquiry as to do so would limit construction of theory to 
a simple of the study of a phenomena, and loose potential richness (Creswell, 
2014, p.85; Vagle, 2016). The abductive nature of this research, coupled with 
the stance of problem identification and resolution have been integrated. This is 
due to the opaque nature, and incomplete state of data describing the system 
that surrounds discovery and disclosure. These approaches provide a way to 
construct a theory, or partial theory, as to what is driving an observed 
phenomenon – the growth in disclosure of vulnerabilities with in software. When 
coupled with the abductive approach this dual method provides a powerful 
philosophical underpinning as it allows for the construction of theory from 
observing participants of the system interacting.  It is accepted that as modelling 
is generally considered an abstraction of reality, therefore, the way in which we 
approach the problem is an important consideration, as the approach is the 
embodiment of the techniques used to model it.  
3.3 Investigative Method – Mixed Methods 
So far the philosophic and methodological approaches to the research have 
been discussed, providing mental construct to investigate the VDDS with the 
pragmatism and rigour required. The constructive and phenomenological 
approaches that underpin this research are important, as they provide a basis 
for continued investigation, however a practical framework is required. Given 
the importance of exploration and investigation that is central and critical to this 
research as it follows that analytical and practical research frameworks 
embodying this must be chosen to fit the mental model.  
To fully investigate the VDDS both quantitative data and qualitative 
observations must be made. Using both qualitative and quantitative data 
together gives a richness of perspective upon the VDDS with the embodiment 
of this approach known as mixed methods (Creswell, 2014, p.86). A mixed 
approach incorporates elements of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
permitting the use of two distinct forms of data providing deeper insight into the 
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research area (Creswell, 2014, p.89). By utilising this mixed approach, it allows 
the exploration of the research problem with much greater granularity, and from 
two potentially conflicting viewpoints. Once adopted the mixed method 
approach requires the selection of techniques to be used within the framework, 
specifically within qualitative and quantities analysis phases.  
Mixed methods when used within academic research are commonplace within 
the humanities, yet when consideration is given to their use within ‘hard science’ 
disciplines such as computer science and engineering it is rare when contrasted 
with existing studies considering the VDDS (Alhazmi, 2006; Alhazmi et al., 
2005, 2007; Rahimi et al., 2013; Woo et al., 2011).  
3.3.1 Mixed Methods - Approach 
The mixed method approach lends itself well to the understanding of complex 
and ill-defined issues, such as the VDDS. A key strength in using mixed 
methods is the ability to map analytical relationships between key aspects of 
data and analytical stages (Creswell, 2014, p.90). The identification of areas of 
importance early in the research process provides an anchor point so areas can 
be revisited and explored further downstream. This ability to provide insight and 
build upon initial areas allows for a more holistic investigation to take place. The 
mixed method approach involves the collection of both qualitative and 
quantitative data, analysis of both which is integrated via merging and 
connecting both sets of data and informed by philosophical underpinnings 
(Creswell, 2014, p.565). Within the mixed framework, four differing approaches, 
or paths, can be selected dependent upon the quantity or quality of information 
available. An overview of the different approaches, and rationale is provided in 
Table 3 below. 
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Convergent Parallel Both qualitative and quantitative data is collected and 
analysed in parallel, with  subsequent stages of 
comparative analysis and interpretation. 
Explanatory Sequential  Quantitative data collection is undertaken along with 
analysis, which is followed up with qualitative data 
collection and analysis and a final interpretive stage. 
Exploratory Sequential   Qualitative data collection and analysis is undertaken 
which builds to a collection of quantitative data and 
interpretation stages.   
Table 3 - Mixed methods approaches (adapted from (Creswell, 2014, p.224)) 
The specific approach adopted for this research is Exploratory sequential, with a 
bespoke system dynamics modelling, simulation and testing stage incorporated 
into a final analysis stage. The rationale for choosing an explanatory sequential 
configuration of the framework is due to incomplete or unknown availability of 
data and currently ill-defined structure of the VDDS. The exploratory approach 
allows for the themes and properties of the system to ‘emerge’ throughout the 
initial qualitative analysis stage, which is refined to establish a foundation upon 
which to build the subsequent quantitative data gathering and analysis stage. A 
further justification for this approach is the extraction of themes and interactions 
between entities, allowing for the construction of qualitative diagrams, to 
illustrate the structure of the VDDS. This in turn provides a basis for selecting 
and exploring key variables within the secondary quantitative phase of the 
process.  
The final stage, incorporated within the analysis is the construction and testing 
of a model, derived from the previous data collection and analysis steps. This 
validity test provides a critical step to build confidence in the model by testing 
and refining it with empirical observations. Whilst the explanatory sequential 
method provides structured data gathering and analysis stages this is only part 
of the solution. The final bespoke stage that extends the framework defined by 
Cresswell (2014 p. 224) is the ability to model and simulate a system. This is 
achieved by adding two additional steps to the framework, modelling and 
simulation. Taken from the system dynamic approach these two supplemental 
steps complement and extend the mixed methods approach as it takes previous 
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analysis, based upon collected evidence to formulate the dynamic hypothesis 
upon which a formalised map of the causal relationships can be created, 
modelled and simulated. 
 
Figure 3 – Overview Research Flow  Adapted from (Creswell, 2014, p.574)  
Centred upon the notion that researchers report reoccurring patterns and 
themes that are within the data, thematic analysis directs that  these patterns 
are codified in a rigorous and systematic manner as being important to the 
phenomena under investigation (Braun et al., 2006) This approach provides a 
framework that constructs insight and structure from seemingly disparate and 
incoherent data. However, the key here is not the volume of the data items, 
although this is important, it is the quality of veracity of the data item, known as 
‘keyness’ also needs to be considered (Clarke and Kitzinger, 2004). 
The theme of exploration and investigation is central and critical to this research 
as it allows for themes that may have been regarded as folly or may have been 
dissuaded against to be explored. Both approaches are within the exploratory 
mixed research framework thus enabling both qualitative and quantitative data 
to be collected, analysed and used. Given the abductive and phenomenological 
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approach of this research and the critical nature of concepts emerging from the 
data, it is key to adopt a specific role when approaching the problem on the 
scale and complexity of the discovery and disclosure system. 
3.3.2 Enhanced Research Steps  
One of most powerful aspects within the mixed methods framework is provision 
to choose the most appropriate analytical techniques for inclusion within the 
quantitative and qualitative stages.  However, as this analysis has expanded the 
traditional framework, and expanded with two additional steps an explanation 
how this is arranged is required. In total six steps exist within the enhanced 
investigation into the VDDS. The steps are: qualitative data collection; 
qualitative analysis; quantitative data; quantitative analysis; model construction 
and simulation analysis. Each step within the process maps to the mixed 
method framework, which is outlined below in Figure 4 below, with steps five 
and six added.  
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Figure 4 - Mixed Methods Mapping to Chosen Analytical Techniques Adapted from (Creswell, 2014, p.86). 
3.4 Analysis Techniques 
Within each investigation step is a set of techniques that have been chosen to 
build and lead to the next step within the analysis. The initial qualitative analysis 
technique that has been chosen are thematic analysis methods set out by 
Braun and Clarke (Braun et al., 2006). This technique provides a set of tools for 
the identification and reporting of patterns and themes within a data corpus, and 
provides a semi-organised structure to allow interpretation (Flick, 2014). The 
initial phase of analysis within the thematic framework is to familiarise one’s self 
with the sources and the content of the data source, followed by coding and 
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identification of themes. As the exploratory nature of the research codes, 
themes and theories that are generated are tightly coupled to the data and are 
therefore abductive in nature as they are data driven and emerge from the 
investigation.  
Secondly, the quantitative analysis framework that has been chosen is 
Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA). EDA is a collection of methods and 
techniques such as frequency distributions, visual graphs and measures of 
central tendency. This framework is well suited to recognising new information 
about the vulnerability discovery system as it allows us to explore and provide 
key inferences about the data to include in the creation of the model (Tukey, 
1977). 
3.4.1 Thematic Analysis 
In keeping with the exploratory and abductive nature of this investigation, 
thematic analysis draws from the same philosophical movement. Thematic 
Analysis advocates and relies upon an inductive approach to constructing 
theory and mental models as to how an observed phenomenon behaves. This 
is in turn closely connected to the data and the analysis performed upon it 
(Braun et al., 2006).  Widely used within the social and psychological 
disciplines, thematic analysis grew out of a wider field known as grounded 
theory, whereby one tries to establish patterns from within the data, yet is 
constrained by a theoretical ideal. Thematic analysis provides a ‘process’ on 
how to describe and synthesise the data, and indicate previously unknown 
relationships between emergent patterns and themes. 
Thematic Analysis has been characterised as a poorly demarcated and rarely 
acknowledged analytic method which provides a systematic way to classify and 
codify qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, this critical appraisal 
is not due to the inadequacies of the method, but are due to the unstructured 
way in which the thematic method guides the analyst toward a working model 
(Braun et al., 2006). The thematic analysis framework provides a flexible 
research approach that produces rich, detailed and complex account of the 
phenomena under study. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest a six-phase 
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approach to undertaking a thematic analysis approach to qualitative data 
analysis, which whilst at first inspection maybe considered linear is in fact a 
recursive process. The six phases are outlined in Table 4 below (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). 
 
Phase Description 
Familiarizing yourself with your data: Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading 
the data, noting down initial ideas. 
Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant 
to each code. 
Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data 
relevant to each potential theme. 
Reviewing themes: Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), 
generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
Defining and naming themes: Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, 
and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research 
question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the 
analysis. 
Table 4 – Thematic Analysis Process Overview (Reproduced from Braun and Clarke, 2006, pp 87). 
Within each phase of the Thematic Analysis process the act of searching and 
iteration occurs actively provoking continued identification of patterns and 
meaning within the data. Furthermore, the action of reading and re-reading 
provides a way to become intimately familiar with the data (Braun et al., 2006). 
Once the initial phases of the thematic method have been completed, initial 
codes that describe the investigated phenomena (in our case vulnerability 
discovery and disclosure) are generated. These codes form the basis of the 
analysis, which in turn provide insight into the themes and reoccurring 
categories. The final phases of the analysis method provide time to reflect upon 
the generated codes and themes, thus allowing for the creation and review of a 
thematic map to define identified themes.  
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3.4.1.1 Coding and Theme Identification  
Thematic Analysis relies heavily upon the act of coding, and therefore the 
choice of which coding paradigm is adopted when performing analysis is 
crucial. Flick (2009, pp.306–322) suggests two main approaches to coding, 
inductive or deductive coding, with the former being data driven and codes 
emerging from the data, and the latter being formed around a predefined idea. 
In both cases the choice of coding paradigm provides evidence which in turn 
helps construct themes and identify patterns within data. Identified patterns and 
themes may then be used to create a model of the phenomena under 
investigation. 
With respect to this research the adopted coding approach is inductive as it 
matches the philosophy of the research, and is therefore driven by the data. An 
inductive approach ensures that themes which are identified are strongly linked 
to the data itself (Patton, 1990). The inductive coding approach was chosen as 
it encourages a deep understanding of the research data that is collected, 
provides a clear link to the identified themes and patterns, and ultimately theory 
that is created. The inductive approach when applied to the VDDS provides 
strong linkage to identified themes allowing for data items themselves to be 
identified and queried and revisited if required  (Patton, 1990; Taylor, C Gibbs, 
2005).  
Once a coding method has been selected, several guidelines are available 
which suggest the ‘best’ or most appropriate way to code, dependent upon what 
is under investigation. Ryan and Bernard (2003) cite several areas to focus 
upon when coding, set out in Table 5 below. 
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1 Behaviours, specific acts Seeking reassurance, Bragging 
2 Events – short once in a lifetime events or things people have done 
that are often told as a story. 
Wedding day, day moved out of 
home for university, starting first 
job. 
3 Activities – these are of a longer duration, involve other people 
within a particular setting. 
Going clubbing, attending a night 
course, conservation work. 
4 Strategies, practice or tactics. Being nasty to get dumped. 
Staying late at work to get 
promotion. 
5 States – general conditions experienced by people or found in 
organisations. 
Hopelessness “I’ll never meet 
anyone better at my age” settling 
for someone who is not really 
suitable. 
6 Meanings – A wide range of phenomena at the core of much 
qualitative analysis. Meanings and interpretations are important 
pars of what directs participants actions. 
 
a. What concepts do participants use to understand their world? 
What norms, values, and rules guide their actions. 
The term ‘chilling out’ is used by 
young people to mean relaxing and 
not doing very much. 
b. What meaning or significance it has for participants, how do they 
construe events what are the feelings. 
Jealousy “I just felt why did she get 
him”. 
c. What symbols do people use to understand their situation? What 
names do they use for objects, events, persons, roles, setting and 
equipment? 
A PhD is referred to as ‘a test of 
endurance’ (because finishing a PhD 
is a challenge). 
7 Participation – adaptation to a new setting or involvement. About new neighbours “In my new 
house I have to keep my music 
down at night as the neighbours 
have young children”. 
8 Relationships or interaction. Seeing family “ Now my sister lives 
in the next road she visits more and 
we’ve become much closer. 
9 Conditions or constraints. Loss of job (before financial 
difficulties), moving away (before 
lost contact with old friends). 
10 Consequences. Confidence gets dates, positive 
attitude attracts opportunities. 
11 Settings – the entire context of the events under study. University, work place, housing 
estate. 
12 Reflexive – researcher’s role in the process, how intervention 
generated the data. 
Probing question “How did you feel”? 
Table 5 – Coding Behaviours Adapted from (Ryan and Bernard, 2003) 
Using the criteria outlined in Table 5, we can adopt a systematic approach to 
coding the gathered data items and structure them in an organised way. Massie 
(2015) developed a coding card that provide an aid memoir around what to 
include, exclude and examples of data that was coded. This approach allows for 
consistency and comparison with the coding process as it reinforces why the 
previous codes were selected.  
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3.4.1.2 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) 
Coding tools can be used to manage any collected data, specifically computer 
based tools. Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) software 
is a relatively recent phenomena, and are used as a set of computer based 
tools that allow the researcher to manage their data (Bazerley and Jackson, 
2013, p.2). These tools add a level of automation to the analytical process, by 
potentially increasing efficiency in searching and analysis methods. Many 
CAQDAS tools exist, and range in sophistication, however one of the more 
common is QSR Nvivo. Nivivo is a CAQDAS software package that facilities for 
the capture, coding and analysis of multiple forms of data (Bazerley et al., 2013, 
p.56). Nivivo v10.0.641 SP6 was used to code all qualitative data that was 
collected. 
3.4.2 Exploratory Data Analysis 
In common with both the phenomenological research approach and the 
thematic analysis method, a complimentary quantitative method of analysis, 
which shares the same exploratory stance was chosen - known as Exploratory 
Data Analysis (EDA). EDA was first codified as an approach by Tukey who 
argued that data analysis is detective work, either numeric, counting or 
graphical in nature, which provides indications of how a system may behave 
(Tukey, 1977) Furthermore, Church (1979) states that EDA is a highly visual 
approach that is used to discover potentially new information about the data by 
utilising simple methods such as frequency distributions, visual graphs and 
measures of central tendency (Church, 1979). The EDA method is well suited to 
uncovering new information about the VDDS as it allows the exploration of key 
inferences about the types and behaviours of data to include.  
The philosophy of exploration is central to EDA in stark contrast to traditional 
confirmatory data analysis (CDA), whereby inference or estimates are made 
about the data and system under scrutiny (Tukey, 1977). Moreover, Tukey 
(1980) provided an iterative evolution to EDA, which allows phasing of the types 
of question to ask when conducting an explorative investigation. 
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Figure 5 – Suggested EDA Exploratory Steps Source: (Tukey, 1980, p.23) 
The EDA process allows the examination of data to take place without any 
preconceived ideas, and allows the behaviour of the phenomena under 
investigation to emerge from data (Martinez et al., 2011, p.3). Two typical 
techniques that are used to investigate data within the EDA framework are 
pattern discovery and visualisation (Martinez et al., 2011, p.6). Pattern 
discovery is the process of uncovering the structure of the data, and ultimately 
the phenomena that is producing the data, with techniques such as principle 
component analysis and cluster analysis. (Martinez et al., 2011, p.7). Whereas 
visualisation using statistical techniques such as tree maps, histograms and 
scatter plots provide ways to look at the shape, distribution or correlation of the 
data that may uncover important aspects of data (Martinez et al., 2011, p.6).  
3.4.3 Modelling Choices and Techniques 
Once both thematic and exploratory data analysis stages of the research 
framework have been undertaken and yielded results, the final stages are to 
build a model and simulate the vulnerability system. The building of a testable 
systemic model, rather than an reductive model, provides the capability to test 
differing scenarios. These scenarios take the form of changing the conditions 
upon which the simulation will run. A simple example of a scenario is changing 
the quantity of vulnerabilities which exist within a software application.  
There are many approaches that permit the creation of conceptual theory, 
however most do not offer the capability to test differing scenarios choices, nor 
provide an analytical framework to build and test a model. Therefore, the choice 
of a modelling technique must both embrace the exploratory underpinnings of 
this research and provide robust tools to create and test any model. Several 
approaches were investigated, each with specific strengths and weakness, with 
the final choice being System Dynamics. System Dynamics tools and 
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techniques provide both the flexibility to construct a data driven inductive model 
and the ability to test different scenarios (Sterman, 2000).  
3.4.3.1 Soft Systems Methodology 
An alternative to Systems Dynamics is Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 
developed in 1981 by Peter Checkland (Checkland, 1981). SSM draws upon 
systems theory to create a practical methodology which could be applied to ill-
structured or ‘soft’ real world problems. Checkland (1981) defined SSM as a 
holistic paradigm – that of whole systems, concerned with the wholes and 
properties (Checkland, 1981, p.13). The philosophical underpinnings of SSM 
are interpretive, or hermeneutic, and give rise to the central tenet of SSM’s 
ability to deal with real-world problems, the role of the individuals’ world view 
(weltanschauungem). Once established this world view provides the backdrop 
for using a technique known as rich pictures. Rich pictures allow the analyst to 
bound the problem, but provide insight into how the system functions. 
Furthermore, this holistic view provides unique perspectives on how systems 
may be interconnected, and how solutions may present themselves (Jayaratna, 
1994, p.178). This underlying philosophy is an effective tool for exploring 
political and social analysis, however once the initial findings are presented 
there is limited guidance on how to take things forward toward a simulation or 
other tests.  
3.4.4 System Dynamics Overview 
When one considers a system on the scale of the vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure system an appropriate and robust method that provides an 
understanding of that system is critical. System Dynamics deals with the 
simulation and interaction between objects in dynamic systems (Forrester, 
1958). System Dynamics also provides a robust platform to bring together both 
qualitative and quantitative data that has been collected, utilising techniques 
such as causal loop diagramming, stock and flow models and time series 
simulations. System Dynamics also provides an analytical framework to analyse 
elements of a system that are organised for a purpose. and emphasises the 
actions of information, action and feedback (Coyle, 1996). The notion of 
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feedback loops is crucial within System Dynamics, and takes two forms: 
positive and negative. Coyle describes both loops as: 
“A positive feedback process, or loop, is one which acts to reinforce a change in 
a system level….a negative loop is goal seeking, that is it tries to move a level 
toward a desired target”. 
(Coyle, 1977, pp.38–40) 
The System Dynamic approach also allows the investigation of how different 
variables affect how the system behaves over time.  It allows the creation of a 
dynamic model as the artefact of interest, with the value of the artefact 
demonstrated via the execution of the model under differing conditions. 
3.4.4.1 Model Construction and Simulation 
The final phase within the mixed methods framework is to build upon the 
analysis undertaken in the previous steps and construct a conceptual model of 
the vulnerability discovery system. This is a critical step as it allows the 
visualisation of the system and identify key elements and information flows 
around the system. The initial representation of the system is via Causal loop 
diagrams (CLDs) which are based upon the thematic analysis, highlighting 
themes, subthemes and feedback loops that are present within the system. In 
the case of the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system there are several 
hypothesised interrelated system archetypes, information flows, causal links 
that come together to form a larger model.  
Using the CLD technique to visualise structures and identify loops that are 
derived from analysis is a key aspect of this investigation. The interaction of two 
or more balancing and reinforcing loops is suggested to cause identified 
behaviours within systems. These archetypes may cause oscillations, 
exponential growth or ‘s-shaped’ growth within a system.  
System Dynamic modelling has been used to understand real-world systems 
and problems since its creation in the 1960’s (Forrester, 1975). As part of the  
evolution of System Dynamics, many complex systems have been shown to 
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produce similar behaviours although the systems under scrutiny are very 
different; and are known to confirm archetypical dynamic hypotheses and 
explain generic system behaviours (BenDor and Kaza, 2012; Senge, 1990, 
pp.379–390)  
In the context of the VDDS there are a previously observed influences and 
interactions within the system that are hypothesised to makeup a diverse set of 
loops and archetypes. However, the main behaviour that has been shown to be 
exhibited by the system is the S-shaped growth curve (Alhazmi et al., 2005). 
This S-shaped curve, known as logistic, suggest that the underlying process 
that causes this growth to occur is a combination of both balancing and 
reinforcing loops which initially drive growth, then reduces growth when a limit 
has been reached. Using simple archetypes is a possible way to capture the 
underpinnings of seemingly impenetrable levels of complexity, and the 
interactions of the participants who exist within the VDDS. As stated the VDDS 
is hypothesised to be made up of entities, interactions and delays. However, to 
move further and begin to understand the systemic behaviours how the VDDS 
operates, and crucially how variables impact each other, we must construct a 
model of the VDDS.  
3.4.4.2 The VDDS as a Dynamic System 
Within the final phase of this research and to accurately model the VDDS we 
must first adopt a specific nomenclature to describe the aspects of the VDDS 
correctly. To this end the terminology used by Voinov (2008) has been adopted 
when entities, relationships and interactions are described. Initially we start with 
describing an element which is considered to be a building block of a system, 
and is considered to have both properties and features (Voinov, 2008, p.7). 
Features are a distinctive property of system (Peter interacts with Paul), 
whereas a property is an attribute (ie colour) of a feature/ Interaction is defined 
again by Voinov by describing the type of relationship that may exist between 
elements; specifically flows of material and information (Voinov, 2008, p.9). 
These definitions of interaction are key when modelling the VDDS as we are 
essentially looking to understand the rules of the system as a whole (Voinov, 
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2008, p.7). The representation of flows that are present within a system, 
combined with the elements are the important essence of the VDDS as they 
represent the disclosure choices that are made, and rewards that are given.  In 
common with other systems that exist, several interactions have been identified 
within the VDDS, and these sets of processes clearly operate to facilitate the 
discovery and disclosure of software vulnerabilities.  
Adding to Voinovs’ (2008) definitions we can further characterise potential 
processes by using system dynamic modelling vocabulary defining two further 
aspects of a system, state and resource. Resources within System Dynamics 
are defined as is anything that has value which can be transferred from one 
element to another (Sterman, 2000, p.127). Alongside resource, state of a 
particular resource in the context of system dynamics can be defined as “any 
accumulation of that resource” (Wolstenholme, 1996, p.12). By applying and 
characterising a system in these terms it is a small, yet important leap to 
introduce a further term, stocks. Stocks within System Dynamic models are 
measurable amounts of a resource at any given, state and time (Wolstenholme, 
1996, p.12). Applying a systems approach, nomenclature and vocabulary we 
can define in a broad sense the VDDS as:  
‘The VDDS converts raw vulnerabilities (State1: Undiscovered 
Vulnerabilities) into refined vulnerabilities (State2: Discovered 
Vulnerabilities) to be either sold for profit (State3: Money) or disclosed for 
free (State4: Knowledge)’. 
 
Figure 6 – State Transition of Deriving Value from Vulnerability 
A key aspect of the transition between states are the rate in which the 
conversion between states occur (Wolstenholme, 1996, p.12). The rate at which 
the conversion occurs are represented within the system dynamic modelling 
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process as rate variables and are key to understanding the behaviour of the 
system. In particular, we can see that vulnerabilities transition between states 
linearly. 
3.4.4.3 Why Systems Dynamics? 
The construction theory and model that is intended to represent real-world 
phenomena must start at first principles, or as close as realistically possible if 
current theory is not adequate. It is also reasonable to assume that the any 
model will be continuously improved and future generations will represent reality 
more accurately. Given these assumptions, many modelling approaches exist to 
assist and suit differing classes of problem when trying to understand the 
behaviour of a system (Kelly et al., 2013). System Dynamics provides a robust 
approach for bringing together both the collected qualitative and quantitative 
VDDS data by utilising techniques such as causal loop diagramming, stock and 
flow models and time series simulations. System Dynamics deals with the 
simulation and interaction between elements within in a dynamic system and 
crucially integrates the concept of feedback whereby elements may influence 
each other, in positive and negative ways. (Coyle, 1996, p.2; Forrester, 1958). 
Coyle (1977) describes this influence in terms of processes or loops: 
“A positive feedback process is one which acts to reinforce a change in a 
system level….a negative loop is goal seeking, that is it tries to move a level 
toward a desired target” (Coyle, 1977, pp.38–40). 
The System Dynamic concepts outlined by Coyle (1977), Wolstenholme (1996), 
Sterman (2000) and Forrester (1975) for the investigation of how different 
structure, resources and rates affect how the system behaves over time 
provides a very powerful investigative framework. The framework provides tools 
for the creation of dynamic models, characterisation of the artefact being 
investigated with the behaviour of the artefact demonstrated via the execution of 
models under differing conditions (Sterman et al., 1997). System Dynamics also 
provides an analytical framework to assess elements of a system organised for 
a purpose and emphasises the information, action, feedback paradigm (Coyle, 
1996, p.5). This concept of feedback is crucial when we consider the systemic 
  - 82 - 
nature of the VDDS, as it these types of flows that ultimately govern how the 
system behaves and how it will continue to do so in the future.  
3.4.4.4 The System Dynamic Modelling Process 
To model any system or process the analysts must adopt a process as to how 
to go about investigating the phenomena (Sterman, 2000, p.85). Consequently, 
several process steps have been put forward by authors outlining general steps 
that are followed in constructing a System Dynamic model. The most 
comprehensive is outlined by Sterman (2000), which brings together processes 
steps from both Coyle (1996, p. 11) and Wolstenholme (1996, p. 26-19): 
Step 1: Problem Articulation (Theme Selection; Key Variables; Time 
Horizon; Problem Definition) 
Step 2: Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis (Initial Hypothesis 
Generation; Endogenous Focus; Mapping) 
Step 3: Formulation of a Simulation Model (Specification; Estimation; 
Tests) 
Step 4: Testing (Comparison to Reference Modes; Robustness Under 
Extreme Conditions; Sensitivity) 
Step 5: Policy Design and Evaluation (Scenario Specification; Policy 
Design; What if...; interaction of Policies) 
(Sterman, 2000, p.86) 
As stated by Senge (1990) there are six modes of behaviour that have been 
identified within the System Dynamics movement. The archetypes are 
characterised by feedback loops and interactions of those loops in one or more 
ways. Furthermore, modes of behaviour have been characterised, and by using 
influence diagramming and codified so that they can be readily identified 
(BenDor et al., 2012; Sterman, 2000, pp.264–291). Of the fundamental 
systemic archetypes that exist all are grouped around the growth and decline of 
a value or an observed variable, for example the growth of bacteria in a petri 
dish (Goodwin, 1970). These dynamic system archetypes are postulated to 
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exist within the VDDS, taking the form of loops of information or movement of 
resources within the system. The commonly found archetypes, along with 
structures that are found within systems are outlined in Table 6 below.  
 
 System 
Archetype 
Governing 
Equation 
Diagram 
1. Linear Growth 121# = 3  
2. Exponential 
Growth 
 121# = 	45 
 
3. Goal Seeking 
Growth 
 121# = 	& − 23  
 
4. Logistic Growth  121# = 32 1 −	 2& 	 
 
5. Oscillations 121# = 35	 
 121# = 372	 
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6.  Overshoot and 
Collapse 
121# = 382 −	392 :&;	 
 121# = 4;2 
 
Table 6 - Systemic Archetypes Adapted from (BenDor et al., 2012; Senge, 1990) Note: S = stock, C= goal/carrying 
capacity, k = constant, Ks/Kr = S or R related constants. 
3.5 Data Collection Method  
The initial phase of the exploratory sequential framework is to collect and 
analyse qualitative data which then in turn provides a foundation for further 
quantitative data collection and analysis. Traditional thematic literature reviews 
provide a good foundational step towards answering these questions on the 
initial collection aspects, however due to the nature of the investigation, a 
combination of both literature and practitioner based knowledge is required. 
According to Creswell (2014) a data collection approach to purposefully select 
data on participants, documents and material is crucial and will assist in 
understand the problem and research question (Creswell, 2014). Additionally, 
Miles and Hubeman (1984) state that four aspects are important when 
considering what data to collect and where it may reside. These consist of a) 
the setting where data maybe collected, b) actors which are involved in the 
phenomena under investigation, c) events that surround the problem, and d) 
processes that surround phenomena. Table 7 below outlines the four categories 
or data that were collected, and the context upon which it was collected. 
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 Observational Interview 
Setting Social Media and Email Distribution Lists. News blogs or 3rd party emails. 
Actors Vulnerability Researchers, Software Vendors, 
and Vulnerability Brokers.   
Vulnerability Researchers or Blogs. 
Events Discovery of a Vulnerability or Disclosure 
activities. 
Disclosure of Vulnerabilities or 
participation within black markets. 
Process The process of discovery or disclosure. Disclosure or selling of a vulnerability 
and discourse surrounding activities. 
Table 7 -  Categories of Data and Contexts 
3.5.1 Qualitative Data Collection: Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of both the data that is collected and the analysis that is 
generated from the data is critical. This is even more important when we 
consider the foundational role data forms within this research. Flick (2014, 
p.387) states that the reliability of data should consider two particular aspects, 
the genesis of the data and the procedures that are followed to collect the data. 
This is alongside analytical bias introduced by the researcher is a critical 
consideration when investigating a phenomenon that can be influenced or 
observations can be biased toward the researchers preconceived ideas.  
Observations of all data collected for this investigation are historical in nature 
and therefore cannot be influenced by the researcher. Thus, researcher bias is 
mitigated insofar as the raw data that is collected. However, using the first of 
Flick (2014) criteria, that of genesis, there is probable researcher bias as the 
selection where the data has been collected from. However, consideration must 
be given to the fact that there are limited places to collect vulnerability discovery 
data items. Addressing the second criterion, collection procedure, vulnerability 
discovery is overall an online activity, where participants and processes occur 
on the internet. Therefore, it is possible to observe interactions between 
researchers and other participants as Garfinkle (2009) states “via their internet 
footprint” (Garfinkel and Cox, 2009, p.1). Several actions are recorded in 
various forms ranging from social media posts through to discussions via email 
and forums.  These records of online interactions provide key evidence into how 
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researcher and other participants behave. Procedurally the following was used 
to apply consistency around the collection of data: 
• Step one: Identification of location of data items; 
• Step Two: Selection of data items, via keyword search within the data 
repository; 
• Step Three: Collection of the data, via NVivo Ncapture; 
• Step Four: Importation into the Nvivo software package. 
The search methodology that was used to gather data utilised the research 
question and was used to limit the scope of the search to vulnerability to focus 
upon related areas, such as disclosure discourse. The systematic search 
methodology selected, synthesised and appraised data and information that is 
relevant to the question. The main tools and platforms that was used to identify 
key data items were as follows:  
• Google;  
• Google Scholar; 
• British Library, EthOS; 
• CiteUlike; 
• Seclists.org; 
• Reddit; 
• Searchblogspot.com; 
• Hackernews.com. 
The keywords that were utilised to search for data items are outlined in Table 8 
below. 
Software AND vulnerability Software AND 0day Software AND Hacker 
Vulnerability AND quality Application AND vulnerability Application AND Hacker 
Vulnerability AND Discovery Software AND Exploit Software AND Security 
Software AND Vulnerability AND 
ethics 
Vulnerability AND Disclosure Vulnerability AND Tools 
Table 8 – Keywords for Searching 
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3.5.2 Initial Data Retrieval Steps 
A number of data retrieval steps were undertaken in the initial stages to 
establish where the most appropriate data was located. Consequentially, the 
eligibility criteria for inclusion within the research was initially limited to the 
search terms listed in Table 8. However, a small set of useful results were 
returned, therefore the search terms were widened thus helping identification of 
social media and specific repositories of VDDS discourse. Using Braun and 
Clarke’s (2006) taxonomy for classifying data types data was arranged, labelled 
and assigned to categories thus enabling a more systematic data collection to 
occur. For example dataset in the context of this research is defined all social 
media posts within a set period of time, whereas a data-item is defined as 
singular social media post. Finally, a data extract is a coded subset of a data 
item highlighting a unique or common theme. The taxonomy is outlined in 
Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7 – Thematic Data Analysis Refinement (Source: Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79) 
3.5.2.1 Third Party Interviews 
Resulting from the keyword searches a considerable number (>50) of interviews 
were retrieved that were performed by journalists from popular blogs or news 
sites. These interviews provide evidence on the experiences, discourse and 
actions that researchers undertake when uncovering and disclosing 
vulnerabilities. Interview data-items provide context and evidence as the 
•All	Collected	Data	(e.g	
VDDS)
Corpus
•Particular	Topic	(e.g	dsclosure)Set
•Individual	Piece	of	Data	(Discoverer	Post)Item
•Coded	Chunk	of	Data
•(e.g.	quotation)
Extract
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participant of the interviews are subject matter experts, or significant actor 
within the VDDS.  
3.5.2.2 Commercial Reports and Popular Media 
A further source of evidence are commercial reports created and distributed by 
organisations who participated within the VDDS. Due to the nature of 
vulnerability discovery many commercial organisations have vested interest in 
producing marketing material the area of vulnerability and software security in 
general. As such commercial reports are a source of information on the 
discovery and disclosure processes, entities that are involved and potential 
dynamics that are present. Specifically reports on the frequency and prevalence 
of zero day (0day) vulnerabilities, and potential discovery techniques are 
described in detail. These types of commercial reports also contain interesting 
insights into organisational stances toward disclosures and the potential 
environmental factors. Furthermore, several commercial reports have 
undertaken investigative work to describe the black-market dynamics of 
vulnerability research and trading. Popular media news outlets provide 
commentary about software vulnerabilities and security in general, with varying 
degrees of accuracy and bias. Nevertheless, they are still practical sources of 
data that provide insight into the vulnerability discovery system. 
3.5.2.3 Third Party Semi-Structured Interviews with Subject Matter Experts 
During the main literature review several studies were identified as important, 
these are known as the Radianti studies. As the research was deemed valuable 
contact was made with Radianti and original primary information was obtained 
via email, and word document (Radianti, 2010a, 2010b, Radianti et al., 2006, 
2007a, 2007b, 2009). This primary material is in the form of a structured survey 
and semi structured interviews whereby Radianti asks specific questions and 
requests clarifications from vulnerability researchers. The surveys provide 
detailed information on how the researcher entered both the black and grey 
markets and the movement between the two. Additionally, the surveys provide 
detailed data on the ethical considerations researchers take when selling a 
vulnerability.  
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3.5.2.4 Further Survey data 
Many surveys were initiated by the author to provide an overview not readily 
available via normal open source research. To assist in the collection of the 
data an online questionnaire was created and requests for information were 
sent to: 
• General call for respondents to complete the survey via twitter and 
linkedin.com 
• Targeted call for respondents to complete the survey within community 
groups on linkedin.com 
• Request to CPNI to circulate to Security Researchers Information 
Exchange (SRIE) 
• Bespoke interview requests to Microsoft, VUPEN, Hackerone and 
Endgame Inc 
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the response rate was low to the 
questionnaire and no responses were forthcoming from Microsoft, VUPEN, 
Hackerone and Endgame. The author presented to the CPIN SRIE which was 
greeted in a favourable manner, but yielded no survey responses. The Survey 
detail can be found in appendix A, and analysis found in chapter four.  
3.6 Ethical approval 
Due to the nature of this research several ethical considerations have been 
considered. These considerations include the storage or personal information, 
informed and recorded consent, ability for the participant to withdraw and risk 
associated with researching the areas of vulnerability discovery.  Ethical 
approval for this research study was applied for and approved by the Science 
and Engineering Research Ethics Committee (SEREC) on the 19th Aug 2014, 
attracting the reference 116-2014. Ethical Approval documentation can be 
found Appendix A 
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3.7 Chapter Summary  
Thus far this investigation has argued that the VDDS is a complex issue, 
requiring a new approach to characterise and investigate the dynamics of it. As 
such three techniques, have been selected to assist in the investigation, 
Thematic Analysis, Exploratory Data Analysis and System Dynamics. All 
techniques will be used within a mixed methods research framework, founded 
upon a exploratory phenomenological philosophy. Practically speaking, the 
mixed methods approach lends itself well to comparing differing perspectives 
which can be drawn from qualitative and quantitative datasets. For example, 
initial results from Alhazmi and Malaya (2005) were presented from a 
quantitative and statistical perspective providing an mathematical view on the 
observed behaviour (i.e., sigmoidal cumulative growth of vulnerabilities over 
time). However, when subsequent observations were made within later studies 
these initial observations were revised. It is therefore suggested that the use of 
triangulation methods inherent within the mixed method approach provide an 
erudite approach to understanding the VDDS and provides a richer, complete 
and coherent picture of observed phenomena.  
To provide confidence in inductively constructed models, the accuracy of data 
under scrutiny, and the variables themselves is critical – particularly when a 
complex System Dynamics model is constructed. One key issue when we 
consider models that describe vulnerability discovery processes is that all data 
is observational in nature. We can observe events occurring and infer 
relationships between entities, but we cannot make absolute claims of 
precision, nor existence.  Consequentially, the breadth of data that has been 
collected and analysed was drawn from a wide set of quantitative and 
qualitative sources. The main qualitative sources are from open sources, such 
as social media platforms, subject specific forums, academic studies and 
professional news pieces. These sources provide narrative and social discourse 
into what is taking place within the VDDS. For example, a longitudinal analysis 
of the attitudes toward vulnerability discovery and the evolution over time may 
yield important evidence around the rate of vulnerability creation and discovery. 
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Alongside this, several closed sources have been used for example personal 
interviews, forums and commercial reports.  
 
Figure 8 - The Research Onion Source: (Saunders et al., 2009, p.108) 
Due to the nature of the research topic the datasets upon which conclusions are 
drawn is disparate and incomplete, hence abductive. Therefore, two specific 
data analysis frameworks are offered for use, EDA and Thematic analysis. 
These provide the tools to analyse both the qualitative and quantitative data that 
has been gathered. The data corpus is extremely varied, ranging from 
structured interviews and social media posts, through to empirically observed 
market share of operating systems. As with any research methodology, the 
mixed methods approach is not without its limitations and challenges to the 
researcher. Whist mixed methods provide a solid approach from both 
quantitative and qualitative perspective, this effectively doubles the data that is 
required. It also requires a level of fluency in quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis. Moreover, this doubling of data and analysis is also time 
intensive, especially when we consider the fidelity that is required for the later 
system dynamic modelling stages. Indicated by the red oval is the collection of 
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world views, philosophies, methodologies, methods and approaches the 
research has adopted. In the next chapter I present the principle qualitative 
analysis of the collected datasets, items and coded extracts. The collected data 
was analysed using the techniques from within the Thematic Analysis 
framework. These Analytical procedures and results are described in detail 
within chapter four. 
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4 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
In the following pages I present the usage of the Thematic Analysis framework 
and techniques outlined in Braun and Clarke (2006). This is alongside 
supporting analysis used to draw out concepts and themes from collected data. 
An overview of collected data is provided along with analysis of the validity and 
credibility of the data sources. This is followed by an explanation of the codes 
generated inductively from the data and a codified thematic structure of the 
VDDS. Alongside the structure, a detailed description of actors that generate 
interactions and dynamics that accompany them are offered. Finally, a causal 
structure of influences is provided as a basis to form the basis for a theoretical 
model of vulnerability discovery and disclosure to be constructed. 
4.1 VDDS Overview                                                       
The VDDS has been characterised as a complex yet, tractable problem, 
inhabited by entities that interact over time (Malone et al., 2013; Rahimi et al., 
2013). Therefore, the first phase of constructing theory, and subsequent model 
of the VDDS is an exploration of the human and social aspects of the system. 
To do this Thematic Analysis was employed as the technique of choice within 
the qualitative stage of the mixed methods approach. The mixed method 
approach provides differing lenses to observe the system and triangulate 
between, thus providing further confidence in the analysis (Creswell, 2014, 
p.207). Once collected data was arranged and categorised into data sets, items 
and extracts and finally coded with any observed patterns being noted as a 
potential theme. Once noted, codes were analysed and drawn out from the data 
items, leading to the formation of a potential themes, relationships and 
interactions.  
4.1.1 Structuring the VDDS 
Data collected about the VDDS is both unstructured and heterogeneous in 
nature as it is predominantly derived from entities who do not conform to a 
specific standard (Katal et al., 2013). Hence, once data was collected 
organisation and structure was required to make sense of the data and provide 
  - 94 - 
a framework to undertake analysis. The Thematic Analysis approach provides a 
method that provides structure to data by allocating, or coding, data items with 
descriptive tags, highlighting relationships between data items. This approach 
allows for the identification of sub-themes and themes to emerge from within the 
data (Braun and Wilkinson, 2003; Braun et al., 2006). 
4.1.1.1 Data Item Descriptions 
Social media and blog data items contain rich seams of information whereby 
vulnerabilities are discussed, debated and interactions between entities are 
described and defined. Specifically social media platforms are seen to be more 
technology focused such as Reddit, Hackernews and 4chan are used for this 
purpose (4chan, 2017; Reddit, 2017; Ycombinator, 2017). Open social media 
platforms such as these are a valuable source of data and to the discourse 
around vulnerability discovery and disclosure as they provide a historical record, 
and environment to discuss vulnerabilities. This is alongside the need to discuss 
current and new tools for discovery.  
A further primary source of evidence is email, which has been used for several 
years. In the context of vulnerability discovery large email archives exists, 
specifically a well-respected email distribution list known as ‘Full Disclosure’ 
(Seclists.org, 2002). The full disclosure email distribution list is the place to 
disclosure security vulnerabilities to the community and wider public. The full 
disclosure list is a further valuable source of evidence to support or refute 
hypotheses stated about the discovery process and - importantly - the 
disclosure process. 
Alongside social media, a further medium that is used to communicate between 
vulnerability researchers and other participants within the vulnerability discovery 
system is speciality web forums. These web forums can be publicly available for 
comments, or closed requiring authentication to view posts. Given the nature of 
the subject matter, it is probable that a lot of discussion around the trading, 
discovery and production of software vulnerabilities is within these closed fora. 
Moreover, given the proliferation of anonymization tools such as ToR or L2P a 
lot of the discussions that occur are unobtainable for analysis. However, open 
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forums such as Reddit, and other bespoke open forums provide insight into the 
market participants and their interactions.  
A further source of evidence that was used in constructing theory was the 
usage of interview transcripts. Interviews with vulnerability researchers or those 
who are involved within the brokering, disclosing or purchasing vulnerabilities is 
an invaluable source of information about how the system behaves and is 
structured. The interviews that have been analysed in this section are semi-
structured, and were undertaken by third parties, typically conducted by social 
media outlets, and subsequently published on the web.  
A significant number  (>1000) of reports and publications have been produced 
by commercial organisations, which provide opinion and insight on the 
vulnerability discovery system (Ablon et al., 2014; Frei, 2013a, 2013b; Lewis 
and Baker, 2013; Miller, 2007; O’Gorman, Gavin McDonald, 2012). Typically 
reports of this nature are marketing and sales orientated, produced to enhance 
the image of the company, and are not peer reviewed or academic in nature. 
Nevertheless, they do provide insight into the discovery and disclosure system 
as most of the content is provided via researchers who have links into the 
community or are vulnerability researchers themselves. Furthermore, the 
introduction of commercial third parties such as vulnerability brokers provide 
first hand insight into the VDDS. Therefore, the usage of commercial reports as 
a secondary source of information is valid, with special attention given to the 
credibility of the source and any biases present.  
4.1.2 Overview of Collected Qualitative Datasets 
Within this research the total data corpus consists of seven distinct types of 
qualitative and quantitative data. For example, within the social media dataset 
there are in total 364 data items, 1413 data extracts, from 1998 unique actors, 
complemented with 2,746 emails published by the full disclosure email archive.  
For the purposes of this research data items are defined as discrete social 
media posts (including comments), commercial reports, interviews, blogs, 
emails or news articles. All data items were exhaustively read, and re-read as to 
gain the most accurate meaning and context from the data.  
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The initial step within the analysis phase was to first choose which of the 
identified data sources to use, whilst being pragmatic on how much data can be 
collected and processed. Yin (1994, p.17) advocates collecting data from the 
widest range of sources, yet being practical, thus providing confidence in the 
validity of the collected data corpus and analysis undertaken. By embracing this 
concept of pragmatic wideness, the collected data was acquired from as wide 
and extensive range of sources, whilst being realistic on the availability of data 
and the time available to collect it. An overview of the data sources is provided 
in Table 9 below. 
Data Source  Description and Bias 
1.Blog posts from security community Vulnerability discovery is covered heavily by both security 
commentators and vulnerability researchers themselves. As such 
a large volume of data is available around the actors and 
relationship that are involved within discovery system. 
Typical Data Item Description 
Blog posts are generally considered a new phenomenon and are a product of the web 2.0 paradigm. They are 
published via personal or corporate mechanisms, and therefore can be in most cases considered a primary source 
of evidence, unless they are re-posting opinion from other sources. The blogs that have been selected are from 
known vulnerability research organisations or individuals. Where credibility cannot be independently confirmed, this 
is nonetheless considered as researchers may not be affiliated to a commercial organisation, as the blog poster may 
have considerable technical knowledge and experiences. Potential bias may include both marketing and sales 
pressures, feuding with rivals, posting for notoriety and untruthful posts. Validation of blog posts is difficult, unless 
peer review comments are post within the blog, this can provide a level of validation as to the authority of the author. 
 
2.Open source web forums and news 
groups  
Experiences around vulnerability discovery, and disclosure are 
regularly discussed on popular online webforums such as 
Reddit.com or 4chan.com. In addition specific hacker forums 
have been included within the evidence. 
Typical Data Item Description 
Webforums and their predecessor newsgroups are major sources of information about software vulnerability. They 
are generally used by technically literate users, and have a large user base. The popularity of newsgroups has 
declined over the past decade. Due large user base, the newer webforums can considered to be a primary source of 
information. The credibility of webforum posters is again variable, as posters may express an opinion rather than 
actually undertaking or being involved within a vulnerability discovery. Similarly the bias of posters can be heavily 
civil libertarian in nature. However, this type of post can be a good source of evidence. 
3.Interviews performed by third parties Interviews performed, and posted in blogs and webpages. 
Typical Data Item Description 
Third party interviews are Secondary sources of evidence and data. They are conducted as the interviewee has 
been validated as a person who is directly involved in vulnerability discovery, and has demonstrated their credibility. 
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These interview are unstructured as they  
 
4.Email archives  Archives of vulnerability discovery and disclosure are regularly 
posted to a open source distribution list known as ‘full-disclosure 
mailing list’ found at seclists.org. This is considered the defacto 
forum to disclose vulnerabilities.  
Typical Data Item Description 
Full disclosure email list is again a primary source of data both from a qualitative and quantitative basis. The email 
distribution list has thousands of subscribers, which allows security researchers to disclose to a large public 
distributions any vulnerabilities that they have discovered. Typically it is used as a quasi-official channel to disclose a 
vulnerability if all other avenues of resolution have been exhausted. The other way in which the distribution list is 
utilised is to ‘go-pubic’ without any prior discussion with software vendors or coordination organisations.   
5.Commercially produced vulnerability 
reports 
Vulnerability discovery and research is primarily undertaken via 
commercial organisations.   
Typical Data Item Description 
Due to the nature of cyber security and the monetarisation of vulnerability discovery a significant proportion of 
research that is undertaken is by commercial organisations. This research is generally undertaken as a marketing 
exercise and published to create hype or awareness of a current issue or trend. Ultimately this type of research is 
based upon real world observations, however must be considered in the context of the organisation that it is 
published by.  
6Third party structured interviews Several structured interviews have been used that were sourced 
directly from (Radianti, 2010b). Furthermore these interviews are 
primary sources as the interviewee is a vulnerability discovery 
and disclosure actor. 
Typical Data Item Description 
Interviews that were collected are structured in natures, and consist of email questions and responses between 
Radanti and anonymous respondents. Each data item is in the form of email, and was provided by Radianti during 
March 2015, but cited in studies from 2008 – 2010. 
7.Third party Semi-structured 
interviews 
Several interview transcripts were collected. These took the form 
of magazine articles, blog posts or videos. All interview are 
scripted, and are considered to be popular in nature.  
Typical Data Item Description 
Interviews with vulnerabilities researchers and brokers are undertaken by popular bloggers or specialist new outlets. 
These articles provide insight in to how the vulnerability discovery and disclosure system operates from different 
actor perspectives. Generally, these articles are between 200-500 words and consist of experiences within the 
system.  
Table 9 – Qualitative Data Items Descriptive Overview 
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4.2 Initial Analysis Steps  
The first an arguably most important steps of thematic analysis is to 
methodically read, and re-read the data items and code each item as 
demonstrated in tables 10 -15  (Braun et al., 2006; Ryan et al., 2003). This  
research has adopted an abductive approach to the investigation of the VDDS, 
which is in turn strongly links conclusions to the data.  All data was collected 
was coded over a 6-month period, and initially consisted 254 codes, which was 
sorted, arranged and categorised into a final list of 93 codes which consist of 
‘holding codes’ that describe a collection of codes, and actual code holding data 
extracts (Saldana, 2016, p.9). Codes were sorted, resorted and categorised 
when new data was added. This allows a level of flexibility within the 
categorisation and structure of the codes, whilst retaining the codes 
themselves. During the coding and reading phase initial comments or 
observations were noted, any interesting actors or obvious systemic structures. 
These were noted within the software application Nvivo, and ‘white boarded’ to 
aid in the construction of the emergent themes. Due to the exploratory nature of 
the research the structure of the codes initially took the form of a list, which was 
then transformed into a hierarchy of categories providing arrangement that 
made logical sense. However, codes that were observed, whilst arranged into 
discrete groups did not provide a rich analytic picture of interactions across 
actors and information flows.  
4.2.1 Coded VDDS Examples  
Once collected data was processed and entered the Nvivo analysis package. 
Drawn from these thematic cases a parallel activity of constructing a high-level 
overview of the data items, noting any observed structures, information flows 
and meta codes that were generated from within the analysis. For clarity, codes 
are defined as: 
“Codes identify a feature of the data (semantic content or latent) that appears 
interesting”  
(Braun et al., 2006) 
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Examples of codes, and the cases that they were drawn from is presented in 
Tables ten through fifteen. Each presented example is extracted from the main 
data corpus and provides an exemplar of generated codes that emerged from 
the data. Alongside codes, analysis of the data item is provided to add context 
to the example and any bias apparent within the source. Finally, any observed 
structures or interactions that are present between entities is also provided.  
Identified interactions are categorised in one of three ways.  For example, the 
interaction between the vulnerability discover and the online vulnerability 
community. Whilst this may not seem a strict one to one relationship, the 
community has a indirect influence on the disclosure stance taken when a 
discovery takes place. Hence interactions within the VDDS attract the following 
definitions: 
 
• Mutual relation -  Direct communication between actors occurs via 
electronic of physical means, can be unidirectional or bidirectional (e.g. 
selling of a vulnerability to a broker, soliciting advice from community or 
ethically disclosing to a software vendor) 
• Contextual – Indirect communication between entities (e.g. awareness 
of other actor’s actions and experiences) 
• Environmental – The actors are aware of indirect or direct influences on 
their behaviour (e.g. regulation or law enforcement activities) 
 
Each interaction has been chosen to demonstrate the potential influence or 
impact the interaction may have. Each interaction is in almost all cases a bi-
directional transaction between two or more entities within the VDDS. These 
cases are based upon the coding cards outlined by Massie (2015, p.66). 
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Data Item: BLOG1 – A thirst for regulation? 
Open Codes 
 
• Cyber Criminal 
Usage 
• Markets (Bug 
Bounty) 
• Markets (Broker) 
• Markets (Black) 
• Researcher (age) 
• Markets (Broker) 
• Usage (State 
Sponsored) 
Analysis 
The post was posted on slate.com website, and was created on the 16/1/2013. 
The post is written by Ryan Gallagher and is aiming to explain the actors and 
relationships within the marketplace for vulnerabilities. The Emphasis is centred 
upon altering that this market is unregulated, and around the repercussions of 
this.  Actors within the blog post are generally named as brokers (ZDI, 
Tippingpoint etc) with the occasional reference to bug bounties. One key point is 
around regulation set out under the wassenaar arrangement limiting the trade of 
0day exploit software.   
Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction with 3rd party brokers (bidirectional) 
Contextual – awareness of international regulation  
Reference: (Gallagher, 2013) 
Table 10 – Coded Example Blog 
Data Item SOC1: An ethical dilemma, with negative experiences Open Codes 
 
• Motivation 
(altruism) 
• Interaction with 
vendor 
(processes) 
• Feelings 
(uncertainty) 
• Disclosure 
Stance (full) 
• Disclosure 
Stance 
(Coordinated) 
The post this post exists on the popular reddit.com website that is used to discuss 
news, entertainment and general topics and was posted on 20/1/2011 in the 
/r/netsec/ forum there are 83 replies. The post is by member “i_didnt_do_that” 
and is seeking to understand how to disclose a serious vulnerability within a social 
networking site and what the issues are. The replies and discussion that follows 
centred around experiences in disclosing vulnerabilities to vendors, with most being 
posts being negative in nature. A further area that is discussed is the usage of the 
differing disclosure strategies (full and responsible) being used to ‘shame’ vendors 
into fixing vulnerabilities. A number of posts cite ethical dilemmas on what to do 
when a vulnerability is discovered. It is suggested that “it only takes being burned 
once to make corporate higher-ups want it to never happen again” (I_didnt_do_that, 
2011) The users repeatedly mention that the users should suffer not from a 
vulnerability that wasn’t their fault, and if customers knew the company maybe 
shamed into fixing things.  
Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Contextual – Research discussion with community (bidirectional) 
Contextual – Ethical consideration of disclosure strategies (unidirectional) 
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Environmental – Sentiment towards software originators drawn from social media (unidirectional) 
Reference :(I_didnt_do_that, 2011)  
Table 11 – Coded Example Social Media 
Case COM1: Symantec – The Elderwood Project Open Codes 
 
• Discovery 
Techniques  
• Cyber Criminal 
Usage 
• 0day vulnerability 
usage 
 
This report was published by Symantec, well known global security organisation  in 
Sept 2012. It is a technical marketing document, that’s outlines the usage of 0day 
vulnerabilities by cyber criminals within malware. This was one of the first 
documented usage of malware using 0day exploits in both an organised and 
repeated manner. Alongside this, it showed that that potential transactions are 
taking place as different malware samples were analysed what we’re using the 
same vulnerabilities but for very difference purposes. This could indicate a level of 
organisation and communication between vulnerabilities researchers.  
 
Credibility, validity and bias  
As this is clearly a report that was created by a corporate security organisation 
interested in selling its products, one must keep this in mind when reading it. 
However, the researchers that wrote the main analysis section of the report seem 
to be credible, as offer technical insight into the usage or 0days within malware. 
Therefore this analysis could be used in conjunction with the other reports to 
estimate the structure of the cybercriminal vulnerability involvement. 
Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Contextual – Research discussion with community (bidirectional) 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction with cyber criminals (bidirectional) 
Reference (O’Gorman & McDonald, 2012) 
Table 12 – Coded Example Commercial Report 
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Case EMAIL1: Finding Vulnerabilities? Open Codes 
 
• Vulnerability 
Discovery Tools 
• Discovery 
(techniques) 
• Researcher 
(experience and 
skills) 
• Tools (fuzzing) 
• Market 
Penetration 
• Researcher 
(Kudos) 
• Motivation 
(altruism) 
This is an email trail from the distribution list ‘Vulnerability Development’, managed 
by seclists.org. The initial email was sent on the 5/5/2002, by a user known as 
kaipower@subdimension.com and there are 20 replies. The user is looking to 
establish known techniques for finding vulnerabilities within software. Long and 
comprehensive replies from the community are given ranging from the types of 
general tools, techniques and the level of education and experience required. In 
general the replies are position and helpful and suggest a way forward in a 
nurturing and community based manner.  
 Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Contextual – Experience and skills of discovery process (unidirectional) 
Contextual – Tools to discovery vulnerabilities (bidirectional) 
Contextual – community pressure for discovery and disclosure practices 
Reference : (Kaipower, 2002) 
Table 13 – Coded Example Email 
Case INT1: Benjamin Kunz Mejri Interview Softpedia Open Codes 
 
• Emotion (Anger) 
• Emotion (Love) 
• Motivation 
(altruism) 
• Disclosure 
Stance (full) 
• Disclosure 
Stance 
(Coordinated) 
This interview was published on the website “vulnerability magazine” on the 
21/10/2011. It is centred on the issues that are around the security industry, 
specifically vulnerability disclosure. The interviewee explains the methods and 
targets for vulnerability discovery, the rationale for doing so and why they release 
the data publically. Two major theme throughout this are the altruistic nature of what 
they do and the interactions with both other researchers and software vendors.  
Credibility, validity and bias  
The interviewee is the founder of a major vulnerability discovery organisation and 
has been researching vulnerabilities with his teams for around 5 years, making the 
interviewee a credible source. The validity of his claims are also of high value due to 
the nature of experiences. However, he can considered to be slightly bias due to the 
altruistic nature of his work as they give any all findings for free. 
Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction with 3rd Party broker platform (bidirectional) 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction with software originator (bidirectional) 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction authorities (bidirectional 
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Reference: (Eduard Kovacs, 2011)  
Table 14 – Coded Example Unstructured Interview 
Case STR1: Interview on Vulnerability Markets: A white hat perspective Open Codes 
 
• Disclosure 
Stance 
(Coordinated) 
• Motivation 
(Money) 
• 0day 
vulnerability 
usage 
• Markets (Broker) 
 
 
The interview was conducted by a researcher in (see Radianti, 2010) Norway in 
June/July 2009, discussing anonymously the emergence and usage of legal and 
black markets for vulnerabilities. The interview looks at the reasons as to why 
researcher use legal markets and why black markets could be attractive. The 
research suggests that the biggest motivation is money, and that generally 
researchers are very ethical in nature. Usage if ZDI and Tippingpoint are cited as 
models for legitimate marketplaces. The discussion then moves on to the lifetime of 
a vulnerability, which is estimated to be from 1 week to potentially years. This is 
extended to discuss the fumbling of the MS08-067 Microsoft vulnerability, The 
interviewee goes on to discuss the time to discover vulnerabilities within software, 
the conclusion is that it is a highly variable task and is dependent upon software 
quality. Finally, the interviewee discusses disclosure polies and suggests that full 
disclosure should only be used ‘as a last resort’. 
Observed Structures and Interaction Flows 
Mutual Relation - discoverer interaction with 3rd Party broker platform (bidirectional) 
 
(Radianti, 2010a, 2010b, Radianti et al., 2006, 2007a, 2009) 
Table 15 – Coded Example Structured Interview 
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4.3 VDDS Code Hierarchy  
Codes generated inductively from within the datasets were arranged to reflect 
the prominence, and perceived importance of the codes. Specifically, code 
instances were tallied to establish the frequency of occurrence. This in turn was 
used to construct a coding hierarchy, forming the initial exploration of potential 
themes and structure within the VDDS. Each level indicates a higher level of 
abstraction, providing a grouping, of clumping of codes surrounding a potential 
theme. From the social media dataset the following high level aspects were 
derived from the data: 
 
Vendors (software originators) 
• Disclosure of vulnerabilities, and the emotions and behaviours 
surrounding the disclosure such as fear, anger, hate and confusion 
pervade this grouping. Within the disclosure grouping is also the concept 
of time and the quality and experiences of interaction and disclosure of a 
vulnerability, this group alone accounts for 51.17% of all coded data 
extracts. 
• Software Quality, is a major grouping of codes, with the sub-codes of 
standards and education featuring within in the grouping. Aspects that 
are included within the group as the education level of the software 
vulnerability discoverer and education of software originators to 
understand the VDDS.  
• Interactions, communication within the VDDS, and between entities is a 
code, accounting for 1.56% of all coded data extracts. 
Market Forces 
• Including codes related to black markets, vulnerability brokers, bug 
bounties, auctions and the opinions surrounding these markets is very 
prevalent accounting for 30.15% of all coded data extracts.  
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• Motivation the aspect of recognition and altruistic kudos is very acute 
within the VDDS alongside the reward via monetarily recompense 
accounts for 6.58%. 
• Discovery Process codes include the tools that are used in the discovery 
process and security software development practices that are used, 
accounting for 1.06% of all coded data extracts. 
• Community included ages, skills and leadership within the VDDS 
community showing up in 0.14% of data extracts. 
Remaining coded extracts making up 9.34% account for lower level codes.  The 
coded map outlined in Figure 9 shows a complex set of interactions between 
entities characterised by both the movement of information flowing around the 
VDDS and resources (money, vulnerabilities, tools etc). Within Figure 9, the 
themes are highlighted as yellow rectangles, with sub themes highlighted in 
blue circles. Finally, codes and sub codes are represented by pink diamonds. 
Links and highlighted relationships derived from the data are shown as lines 
between themes and codes.  A list of raw codes is provided in Appendix A. 
4.3.1 Survey Responses 
Within the investigation a survey was conducted to illicit clarifications and 
statements from the VDDS community.  Ten responses were received, which 
add to the contextual environment of the VDDS, details of survey questions are 
available in Appendix A. One particularly interesting response was received 
around educational level, with 8 out of 10 responses citing Masters level or 
above education, with 1 N/a and 1 undergraduate. This suggested that the level 
of education that vulnerability discoverers attain is significantly above general. 
Additionally, the length of time a vulnerability discoverer has been involved in 
searching for vulnerabilities is 5 years or less, with 5 responses out of 7 (3 did 
not answer). Again, suggesting a relatively short lifespan. Furthermore, all 
discoverers worked within a team, with 7 out of 7 positive responses. 
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Figure 9 – Initial Inductively Generated Coding Hierarchy 
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Evolving (by re-reading) and categorising the coding structure yielded 
interesting and previously uncovered relationships and interactions. Key 
relationships that were not evident during the initial coding activities, but were 
apparent during the subsequent analysis steps, were centred around the 
following factors: 
 
• Relationships between disclosure stance and rewards. Initially the 
relationship was considered an interaction between discoverer and 
software originator, however there is an influencing factor known as 
‘monetary reward’ that influences the disclosure stance.  
• Time delays and Length of Interactions. Delays between both 
vulnerability discoverer and software originator are acute. Significant 
delays exist between the time that a vulnerability is discovered and the 
public disclosure of the vulnerability. Normally interactions are time 
bound by disclosure policies.  
• Experiences disclosing vulnerabilities to software vendors. 
• Emotions felt towards the software vendor and the strong tension 
between fear and ethics when disclosing.  
• The rational choices discoverers make, most if not all discoverers 
make rational and information choices about what the wish to do with the 
vulnerability details. 
Once notable aspect is centred around rewards. The reward that a vulnerability 
discoverer may gain by selling the vulnerability, therefore potentially changing 
their disclosure stance is of interest. For example, the recent popularisation of 
so called bug bounties (Hackerone, 2016) is a manifestation of economic 
incentive scheme to reward researchers for finding vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
most of the full disclosure events have been driven by the actual or perceived 
hostility to discoverers who discloses the vulnerability by the software vendor. 
This change in stance by the discoverer suggests that they may be more 
inclined to adopt a coordinated disclosure stance, or sell the vulnerability 
illegitimately. Finally, a significant area of concern is the ethical dilemmas which 
  - 108 - 
discoverers discuss and reflect upon when deciding which disclosure strategy to 
adopt.   
4.4 Identification and Structuring Candidate Themes 
Having set out the low-level codes and constructed a coding hierarchy, I will 
now turn to the consolidation and identification of themes. There are many 
techniques which may be used to identify themes derived from codes  (Ryan et 
al., 2003; Strauss, Aselem. Corbin, 1997, p.36). However, the choice is reduced 
when we take into consideration the inductive and explorative approach of this 
research. Therefore the analytical techniques used within this research are 
outlined by Ryan and Bernard (2003), who advocate analytical scrutiny around 
repetition, indigenous categories, metaphor/analogies, social conflict, status, 
control and linguistic connectors, although not all are used.  Ryan and Bernard 
(2003) also suggest several techniques to process data items and extracts into 
themes and categories.  
Ryan and Bernard (2003) outline a number of techniques that assist in the 
processing of low level code, and the production of higher level themes and 
sub-themes. The criteria used in selecting which analytical techniques to use is, 
argues Ryan dependent upon the type of data collected (Ryan et al., 2003). 
Suggested techniques range from identification of repetitions, transitions, 
similarities and differences, word frequency list and Keyword in Context, 
linguistic connectors. For a more detailed explanation of all techniques see 
(Ryan et al., 2003).  
The chosen techniques that are most appropriate for the VDDS are Keyword in 
Context, frequency lists and linguistic connectors. Frequency lists are simple to 
implement, and provide signposts toward potential themes due to the 
duplication of words, indicated by an increase in frequency. KWIC was chosen 
as it provides views of potentially complex and rich insight into linguistically 
orientated data, and is simple to implement (Culy and Lyding, 2010).  Finally, 
linguistic connectors, suggest causal or conditional relationships between 
things, or groups of things.  
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These three techniques were applied to Social media data items, email and 
interviews. Assisted by the Nvivo v10 software package Nvivo provided the 
automation of a number of these activities, such as keyword frequency lists and 
keywords in context processing. 
4.4.1 Keyword Frequency List of VDDS Corpus 
Ryan and Bernard (2003) state that the first step in exploring data is to 
construct a word frequency list. Therefore, a such a list was generated across 
the complete data corpus, essentially performing a corpus wide pre-processed 
map and structure. The map included all common English words used within 
normal everyday language such as ‘and’, ‘the’ and ‘this’ - these words were 
excluded from the analysis temporarily. Further pre-processing was undertaken, 
which resulted in a further word frequency list. The generated list was of low 
quality and included several words that required removing from the data, such 
as ‘www’ and ‘permalink’, these were also added to a stop list within Nvivo as 
they indicate metadata collected via the raw collection process. Once these pre-
processing activities had been undertaken, data was in a form appropriate for 
analysis. Words were ordered based on rank. Emerging from the frequency list 
were keywords, such as ‘days’ (No.4), ‘information’ (No.5) and ‘Market’ (No.7) 
thus indicating a frequency baseline from the entire corpus. 
To provide further insight a second frequency analysis was constructed from 
coded data items, rather than the whole corpus, which provided a focused 
comparison. The subsequent list was of improved quality, and provided 
additional insight as it showed a similar number of commonly associated VDDS 
words such as ‘vulnerability’, ‘security’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ alongside English 
common joining words. 
A final pre-processing stage was performed which yielded many nouns and 
adjectives such as ‘disclosure’ (No.2), ‘software’ (No.3), and ‘fix’ (No.4). Several 
unusual words featured highly within the coded data extracts, potentially 
suggesting a higher interest in these topics. An unusually high ranking word is 
‘time’ (No.9), which is not a typical word associated with security and 
vulnerabilities. Not included within the top 10 list is are words such as ‘people’ 
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(No.17), ‘because’ (No.20), and ‘responsible’ (No.32) due to space constraints, 
as indicated in Table 16 below. Within the analysis, words are drawn out in 
terms of uncommon or frequent use within vulnerability discourse. This word 
frequency list provided an initial point to perform further analytical techniques, 
again outlined by Ryan and Bernard (2003).  
Whilst useful, keyword frequency lists do not provide strict comparative results, 
as to how different or important identified keywords are. Consequently, to 
indicate how the generated frequency lists compare to none vulnerability related 
discourse word frequencies were generated from two well-known general word 
frequency lists from Brown and Wordlex. Worldlex, consists of 104.2M analysed 
words from Twitter and blog posts) and the Brown University Standard Corpus 
of Present-Day American English with 1.01M words (Francis, 1965; Gimenes 
and New, 2016). The results of both comparisons with Wordlex and Brown are 
provided in Table 16 below. 
 
All Sources Coded Data Items 
Corpus 
Rank 
Brown 
Rank 
Wordlex Word  Word 
Count 
Corpus 
Rank 
Brown 
Rank 
Wordlex 
Word Word 
Count 
7 1187 1205 security 7703 
6 
1187 1205 
security 316 
11 11038 11550 Vulnerability 6248 
13 
11038 11550 
vulnerability 252 
16 N/A 34997 Vulnerabilities 4241 
14 
N/A 34997 
vulnerabilities 183 
18 247 196 Days 3914 
22 
22168 7693 
Disclosure 155 
20 363 481 Information 3363 
24 
N/A 2828 
Software 166 
21 N/A 2828 Software 3661 
28 
363 481 
information 155 
28 660 663 Market 2786 
29 
46721 9350 
Vendor 152 
34 22168 7693 Disclosure 2507 
31 
26722 6769 
Vendors 147 
43 6687 1036 Computer 2310 
33 
NA 4345 
bug 146 
46 16983 11135 Bounty 2286 
35 
8697 10614 
exploit 140 
Table 16 – Keyword Frequency Ranking 
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Within Table 16 we can see that words such as ‘Disclosure’, ‘Market’ and 
‘Bounty’ score highly, with these words indicating potential themes. Alongside 
this words such as ‘Vendor’, ‘Days’ and Disclosure’ also suggest that these 
words are important within the VDDS discourse, and they may suggest themes.  
4.4.2 Keyword in Context Analysis 
Having defined and measured the frequency of occurrence within the data 
corpus, and coded data items, identified words were used within the next phase 
of analysis, the context of the most frequently identified words. The usage of 
keywords to derive contextual meaning from disparate or unrelated data has 
been used within information science for over 40 years (Parnas, 1972). 
Keyword in Context (KWIC) is a technique used within social sciences to give 
meaning and context to identified frequent words within datasets (Ryan et al., 
2003). Using the identified words from section 4.4.1 all ranked words were used 
to establish context that surround that word. This was undertaken by utilising 
both the whole of the data corpus as the search space, and specific coded 
examples. In the case of this research +/- 5 words on either side were used to 
derive a meaning or establish context.  
As expected within the coded data items the keyword ‘vulnerability’ is frequently 
seen, therefore warranted further investigation. The keyword ‘vulnerability’ is 
typically centred around three aspects; the discovery of a singular vulnerability, 
technical discussion of vulnerability characteristics or what the subsequent 
actions once found are.  This keyword is a potential anchor for further analysis, 
as exemplified by a data excerpt from a VDDS participant showing both the 
anchor keyword ‘vulnerability’ and the context of discovery, type of vulnerability, 
location, interactions and entities. 
“Back in July, I searched for and discovered a cross-site scripting vulnerability 
on facebook.com, as well as what I would describe as infrastructure flaws that 
give me the ability to steal httpOnly authentication cookies used by Facebook. 
So far I have kept all the details to myself”.                                (Facebookxss, 
2010) 
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Furthermore, keywords such as ‘disclosure’ and ‘information’ were used 
together to potentially indicate overlaps and relationships between keywords. 
Once identified contexts were sorted and named, via a technique known as 
‘cutting and sorting’ and noted within Nvivo. The technique is well documented 
as an analytical method that allows structure to be applied to processed data, 
albeit in discipline other than computer science. (Barkin et al., 1999; Braun et 
al., 2006). Using the most commonly identified words from table 16 above, a  
KWIC ‘cut and sort’ was produced that identified a number of relevant contexts. 
These contexts indicate current zeitgeist from within the VDDS, as they are 
tightly coupled with the collected data items produced by participants. For 
example, KWIC keyword ‘market’ is surrounded by the context of discoverers 
use of the black or illegitimate market, speculation of how prices of 
vulnerabilities within both legitimate and illegitimate markets have increased 
and the differing ethical considerations when selling details of a vulnerability.  
Identified contexts are presented in Table 17 below, and describe a rich set of 
contexts that exist within VDDS. 
According to Tecsh (2013) the usage of KWIC and frequency analysis allows for 
the condensation and distillation of interpretation of data (Tesch, 2013, p.139). 
This condensation provides a level of abstraction to carry forward, and look for 
linkages between contexts, drawn from the KWIC analysis. For example, 
looking at Figure 10 below a textual overlap between vulnerabilities and 
information is present. Similarly, there is overlap in context between disclosure 
and markets. These overlaps suggest that a relationship or interaction between 
concepts, and the entities that cause the interactions to occur. The derivation of 
Figure 10 from KWIC analysis provides a signpost and further evidence for the 
relationships within the VDDS.   
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Figure 10 -  Keyword in Context Overlaps. 
 
 
KWIC Keyword  Identified Contexts  
Security • Individual Researchers and soliciting advice from security community. 
• Security of software and products created by 
vendors. 
Vulnerability and Vulnerabilities • Discovery of vulnerability and reporting process. 
• Issues reporting vulnerabilities to vendor. 
• Moral issues surrounding disclosure of 
vulnerabilities. 
• Vendor process issues and communication. 
• Differences between disclosure experience 
between vendors. 
• Bug bounties and reward schemes. 
Information • How to share information between entities. • Dissemination of potentially sensitive 
vulnerability information that could cause harm 
• Usage of information that is used to exploit 
systems. 
• Ethics and responsibility around releasing 
information about vulnerabilities within 
software. 
Software • Vendor testing of software. • Quality of software once released. 
• Tools and techniques for discovery of 
vulnerabilities within software. 
• Software as an entity, constantly evolving. 
Market • Black market maturity and inevitability. • Vendor negative attitudes pushing researchers 
toward the black market. 
• Perceived size of black markets. 
• Curiosity about the market for vulnerabilities. 
• Confusion on the ethics on what to do with 
vulnerabilities (Sell/Fully Disclose/Responsible) 
• Different market models (auction/bounty/trade) 
• Discussion of market forces of supply and 
demand. 
• Implications of a open market for vulnerabilities. 
• The failure of software vendors creating good 
quality software. 
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Disclose & Disclosure • Different strategies for disclosure. • Forcing software vendors to act when 
disclosing. 
• Logical progression from coordinated 
disclosure to full disclosure due to vendor 
actions. 
• Punishment of users not software vendors. 
• Choosing the ‘best’ strategy for disclosure. 
• Usage of policy and timelines to ensure 
vulnerability is fixed. 
Computer • Entry into (computer) security field by researchers. 
Table 17 – Keyword in Context Analysis with examples  
4.5 Linguistic Connectors 
The final technique used to process data is linguistic connectors, which are a 
method to indicate causal relationships, identify connections between entities 
and nature of their interactions (Ryan et al., 2003). Words and phrases such as 
‘because’, ‘since’ and ‘as a result’ often indicate causal relationships, whereas 
time-orientated connexions may be conveyed with words such as ‘before’, ‘after’ 
or ‘next’ (Ryan et al., 2003).  Casagrande and Hale (1967) provide a useful list 
of semantic indicators between words that have a relationship or entities that 
are related. Relationships such as attributive ones, where an entity is defined in 
respect to another entity and functional relationships whereby an entity affects 
another are of particular relevance to software vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure (Casagrande et al., 1967). Two pertinent examples of the utility when 
using linguistic connectors is the usage of the causal keyword ‘because’ within 
two relevant examples. The first is an interview with Benjamin Kunz (Eduard 
Kovacs, 2011) and the second, a social media post using ‘since’ when 
discussing a vulnerability within the Nissan Leaf electrically powered car.  
Within the Kunz interview a statement is made around the software originators 
stance toward software quality and vulnerability discoverers. Kunz uses the 
keyword because twice to signify the strong causality between the software 
originator, and discoverer as a dual relationship. This duality is evident in the 
fact that Kunz characterises the connection as love/hate relationship as the 
originator does not wish to see their own flaws, yet when flaws are uncovered 
they are reluctantly indebted to the discoverer. The preceding words, ‘hate’ and 
‘us’ signifies a group of people, and a very strong emotional experience that has 
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clearly impacted Kunz previously. This is typical of the type of language that is 
used when software discoverers discuss the process of disclosure.  
“There are 2 options for the product vendor ... he hates us because he can not 
[sic] see his own flaws/mistakes/fails ... or he loves us because he can now see 
his flaws/mistakes/fails” (Eduard Kovacs, 2011). [emphasis added by author] 
In the Nissan example, a social media contributor Mikestew, is discussing a 
vulnerability that has been uncovered within the Nissan Leaf electric car 
(Nissan, 2017). Mikestew, suggests that the rational for locking down (i.e. 
ensuring there can be no inspection of the code) is due to the poor state of the 
software. This causal relationship between obfuscation and poor code, is 
evident within the final part of the post, whereby Mikestew ends with a 
proposition that legal action may occur if vulnerabilities are uncovered within the 
Nissan Leaf software. This example emphasises the interaction between the 
quality of software, and the potential for punitive action that may take place.  
“Car companies are terrible at making software. I'm not surprised that they want 
to lock down the ECU code, since it's probably awful and full of subtle bugs as 
well, and they don't want to get hit with tons of lawsuits when people find a bug 
in the firmware” (Mikestew, 2016).  
The power of extracting linguistic connectors from within rich narrative data is 
self-evident when we look at the above examples.  The subtlety of a single 
word, since, changes the dynamic and meaning of the discussion as it joins a 
potentially positive statement to a negative sentiment - ‘full of bugs’ 
4.5.1 Time Influences 
Time is a crucial part of the VDDS that has been identified throughout both 
coding and frequency analysis. Time is suggested to influence all the entities 
within the VDDS and importantly influence the outcomes that are produced from 
interaction within the system. An example of the impact of time on a specific 
outcome is the stance which a vulnerability discoverer may take once a 
vulnerability has been uncovered. The influencing factors derived from the data 
suggest that both the disclosure stance and adopted policy for disclosure are 
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influenced by both the quality of interaction between discoverer and software 
originator. Crucially, the time it takes to perform actions such as recognition, 
payment or patching are as impactful. Moreover, this seemingly central role of 
time evidenced in recent policy decisions by large software and technology 
organisations that within which a strict time period is adhered to once a 
vulnerability is discovered and importantly reported (Apple, 2017; Google, 2017; 
Microsoft, 2017; Oracle, 2017). 
When considering the role of time within the VDDS, it is also necessary to 
consider the impact of the perception of time passing, rather than the absolute 
passage of time. The perception of time passing within the VDDS, is influenced 
by the way in which vulnerability discoverers, software originators or other third 
parties are treated. If treated badly, or communication is stunted or poorly 
managed the passage of time is perceived to be slow, and resumption of a 
possibly harmful disclosure stance may resume. If the disclosure process 
occurs smoothly with minimal delays, or if delays occur and they are 
communicated and explained to discoverers then perception of time moves 
quickly, thus resulting in a more coordinated disclosure. 
A major source of information of both the quality of the interactions between 
VDDS entities and the passage of time between specific interactions is the 
email distribution list, full disclosure. Full disclosure is a public email distribution 
list that has been in existence for over 15 years, and originally provided for the 
use of vulnerability discoverers who felt (either philosophically, or otherwise) the 
need to make vulnerability details public without consultation. However, the role 
of the full disclosure email list has now joined with an information dissemination 
channel, with the full disclosure of vulnerability details. An interesting addition to 
the full disclosure email list was a standardisation of, how to disclose 
vulnerability detail, as opposed to why. This is important when discussing the 
wider VDDS and influences upon the sentiment of software originators as it 
provides valuable information on the process of disclosure that discoverers take 
part in.  
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4.5.2 Section summary 
Whilst methodological in nature, this section outlines the process and 
techniques of how themes were derived from collected data. The next section 
sets out the process that were followed to extract meaning from codes, 
frequency analysis, KWIC and candidate themes. Coding data and extracting 
meaningful insights from the data corpus, whilst invaluable, is the first stage of 
organising the data, to go further we must seek linkages, meaning and themes 
from within the data. Using the differentiating factors outlined by Ryan and 
Bernard (2003) to test the validity of identified themes we can build upon 
identified codes, and increase the confidence in any themes emerging from the 
data. Factors such as repetition, metaphor and analogy, linguistic connectors 
and syntax are again suggested to be useful in uncovering both higher 
abstractive codes and themes (Ryan et al., 2003).  As stated in chapter three 
the inductive coding paradigm was adopted, whereby the data analyst reads 
and re-reads all data items, and codes emerge from the data and assigned as 
appropriate. During the coding process data is not differentiated by source of 
data or topic as not to bias subsequent findings, as the generation of cross 
cutting phenomenological themes is the primary focus of the analysis (Ryan et 
al., 2003). Using the coded data extracts, and contextual information about the 
themes we can see that several casual relationships exist, which are outlined 
and explored in the next section. 
4.6 Analysis of Candidate Themes 
Building upon the analysis derived from section 4.5, the focus now moves to a 
refinement stage for candidate themes. Refinement of themes provides both 
confidence and validity, and is based upon the judgement on the part of the 
investigator (Ryan et al., 2003). As such further synthesis and mapping was 
undertaken, providing a level of abstraction and consolidation of the identified 
themes. This consolidation is in part to assist in the mapping of themes and sub 
themes, so theory constructed using identified themes are useful and intuitive. 
Consequently, the consolidated candidate themes are presented, along with 
sub-themes and narrative.  
  - 118 - 
4.6.1 Thematic map of the VDDS 
As we are looking for how the VDDS behaves, specifically structures and 
interactions within the system, combining codes into similar groups or patterns 
is an important step (Murtaza et al., 2016). Using the nomenclature outlined in 
(Braun et al., 2006) an initial thematic map was created by grouping codes 
together, utilising contextual information gathered by KWIC analysis, frequency 
rank and identified linguistic connectors.  In its unrefined form, the thematic 
map, whilst comprehensive does not highlight the central tenets of the VDDS. 
Therefore, integration of concepts and refinement is required to draw out the 
key themes through a process of consolidation and evidential review (Braun et 
al., 2006).  This refinement process provides a supplementary step to collapse 
and combine the initially identified theme and sub-themes, such as ‘emotions’, 
‘discovery tools’ or ‘behaviours’. These themes collapse into a collection of sub 
themes and major-themes. The resultant thematic map allows for a sense of 
significance within the analysis to develop, and pragmatic sense checking to 
take place. For example, two identified candidate themes ‘software’ and 
‘discovery of vulnerabilities’ feature less prominently within the analysis, than 
the ethical or moral decisions discoverers take when a vulnerability is 
discovered. Conversely, the importance of the interaction between the 
vulnerability discoverer and the software vendor who owns the software is 
extremely important, both in a positive and negative way. Therefore, ranking 
and consolidating themes was undertaken. 
4.6.2 Refined and Developed Thematic Map 
Braun and Clarke (2006) advocate two levels of review when considering 
refined and developed thematic maps. This review takes the form of returning 
back to the level of initial codes, and secondly at the level of the entire dataset 
(Braun et al., 2006). Thus, the developed thematic map contains reviewed, 
consolidated and analysed themes which after both returning to the raw data 
provide and using high analysis provide a clear internal consistency. By re-
reading the data codes, and identifying clear distinctions we can reduce and 
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promote candidate themes, and add further context from codes and data items 
listed in Figure 9. 
These consolidatory process steps provide a clearer overview of the key 
themes within the discovery and disclosure system. These process steps in turn 
provide a potential hierocracy and grouping of themes, derived from codes 
arranged and sorted previously, in Figure 9. Within Figure 11 a consolidated 
grouping of themes is presented. The consolidated thematic map is a result of 
moving between the coded extracts, and the entire data corpus, enriched with 
the analysis techniques, and contexts. The mapping shows a number of 
different aspects from within the VDDS. Specifically, themes are linked between 
previously unknown concepts, for example the relationship between the 
perception of punishment and the stance a discoverer takes when this 
perception of punishment is high. Furthermore, the transmission of these 
experiences, via historic social media or other communication channels is again 
a significant factor when choosing how to disclose. Finally, the link between 
new vulnerability markets, and the ethical considerations discoverers undertake 
is significant as it again influences the stance of the discoverer. 
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Figure 11 - Developed Thematic Map. 
 
4.6.3 Candidate Theme 1 - Perception of Punishment  
Throughout collected data and analysis is the repeated concepts of punishment 
and fear of punishment, specifically around actions of disclosure. Words and 
phrases such as “nasty”, “threat”, “repercussion”, “hate” and “That could turn 
nasty…” are examples of the way in which vulnerability discoverers or members 
of the community describe disclosure interactions.  Using the social media 
dataset the most common code that is associated with this theme is Emotion 
(fear), consisting of data items representing fear of reprisal from disclosing a 
vulnerability to a vendor, which accounts for 46% of all instances within the 
punishment theme. The is followed by anger, 38% and hate 10%. 
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In one example icambridge comments on a post titled ‘what to do when a 
company refuses to fix a vulnerability I disclosed to them’, posted on the social 
media platform Reddit.  
 “That could turn real nasty, real quick. They could see it as a threat, 
report it to law enforcement claiming you're threatening to release”. 
(Enoughalready and Icambridge, 2012) 
Repeating words and phrases such as “nasty”, “threat”, “threatening” suggest 
an adversarial punitive relationship between both discloser and the recipient of 
the vulnerability information. This is further evidenced by a comment of a 
participant known as enoughalready discussing previous experiences when 
disclosing a vulnerability: 
“I was able to get in touch with a VP in IT, but I was unhappy with the 
results. I contacted a lawyer, and it basically came down to it's best to 
just drop the whole thing”. (Enoughalready et al., 2012) 
Furthermore, in a different forum Jessaustin comments upon the probable 
course of action within a corporate environment whereby legal consequences 
are brought to bear:  
“It seems likely that there was good-faith negotiation between the 
researchers and some reasonable people at FireEye. Then some 
dumbass executive (general counsel, perhaps?) got wind of the 
proceedings and decided to blow shit up”. (Jessaustin, 2012) 
Jessaustin suggests a possible dissonance between initial organisational 
members that are tasked with receiving vulnerability reports and acting upon 
them, and policy governance within the organisation. Phrases such as like “blow 
sh*t [sic] up” signify an escalation toward a punitive stance toward the discloser, 
possibly in an almost accidental manner:  
“There are 2 options for the product vendor ... he hates us because he 
can not see his own flaws/mistakes/fails ... or he loves us because he 
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can now see his flaws/mistakes/fails. Nothing between” (Eduard Kovacs, 
2011). [Benjamin Kunz-Mejr Interview] 
Using the data items that were coded under the Researcher (Vendor Hostility) 
code the top five frequently identified keywords (highlighted) are inform, site, 
care, fix and users. These keywords were used in the context of discussing the 
way in which vendors deal with a disclosure event. It is interesting that in the 
context of informing the vendor, discoverers refer to vendors as ‘they’ in 
context. 
“Alright, so what do I do here? I want to inform the developers, however I've 
been through this before, and it didn't go that well. They didn't inform the users. 
They didn't care. Just fix the flaw and move on, as if nothing had happened” 
(I_didnt_do_that, 2011). 
A detailed example analysed using linguistic connectors of the type of narrative 
that surrounds the disclosure of a software vulnerability is via a user known as 
Pak from Hackernews.com, with the context of a 0day vulnerability being 
disclosed to American Express with no response from the company, and 
subsequent releasing of the vulnerability via the full disclosure stance in the 
final paragraph of Pak’s post: 
“Sure, none of you (1) should be thrilled (2) about the situation because as 
technically-oriented people with generous motives (3) the system is not set up 
to serve you. But that's not a failure (4) of the system, except maybe from your 
own individual perspective. Believe me, AmEx has done (5) the cost-benefit 
analysis and they (6) are saving boatloads of money by having those rare well-
intentioned hackers (7) listen to some hold music, because it is too expensive 
(8) to sort you out from the thousands of loonies that got a phishing email. 
Security breaches are an acknowledged risk and they are already prepared to 
absorb (9) their effects on multiple levels” (Pak, 2011) [numbers added for 
analysis] 
(1) & (6) The use of the word “you” indicates a perceived separation or 
grouping between entities within the system. In conjunction with 6, the 
word “they” also suggests a separation between groups, this is almost 
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certainly suggesting an adversarial relationship between two groups 
within the system, most probably between ‘discoverers’ and ‘software 
vendors’. 
(2) & (3) & (4) Being “thrilled” at the situation is a behaviour or action that is 
associated with the preceding action of full disclosure. The descriptive 
nature of the text in 3 and 4 posit the emotional investment which people 
are perceived to make within the system and the seemingly disingenuous 
perceived actions by software vendors.  
(5) “Has done” indicates actions that have been taken, in this case 
undertaken an assessment of cost vs benefit. 
(6) & (8) & (9) Actions again surrounding the activities within the system. 
4.6.3.1 Analysis 
What emerges from the data, in particular the notion that discoverers, 
researchers and hackers are not taken seriously by software originators, or 
when they are listened too the normal course of action is generally punitive in 
nature. Furthermore, there seems to be a distinct division between discoverer 
entities within the system, specifically an adversarial relationship between 
ethical and supposed unethical discoverers. An overarching feeling of 
persecution and lack of control seems to be present from within the VDDS, in 
particular when discoverers have tried to reach out in good faith. Moreover, 
there is an emerging theme that researchers who disclose vulnerabilities to 
software originators do, or more importantly did so for the right reasons, but as 
the level of perceived persecution has increased this ethical stance has been 
eroded over time.   
The software vulnerability discovery community is as diverse as it is distributed 
across the globe. This is primarily due to the ubiquitous nature of the software 
that is under scrutiny. It is however still predominately a technical endeavour, 
with the need to understand how the software works, and the tools that allow 
the software to be investigated a significant part of the system. The knowledge 
and tools that are used for discovery are generally available to all and 
accessible by all who look for them. Tools are distributed via open hacker 
  - 124 - 
forums or closed membership only forms which provide the user with limited 
instruction how to operate them. The ability to comprehend the knowledge and 
operate tools is a different matter altogether. The community, is a distinct 
meritocracy which rewards ability with kudos and praise. This in turn has 
created a paradoxical relationship between the need to do the right thing, and 
the need to survive in the real world. For example, the ethical aspects of the 
treatment of researchers is a key consideration in this. This is especially 
relevant when those researchers who have discovered a vulnerability, but have 
been badly treated by a software vendor subsequently change their ethical 
stance to a more negative position. 
The perception of punishment impacts the sentiment that is felt toward the 
software originators, and exists throughout the discourse of the VDDS. This 
discourse resides upon social media platforms, where it is readily discussed 
and crucially archived for future use and citation by discoverers.  
4.6.4 Candidate Theme 2 - Software Originator Interactions 
Disclosure of vulnerabilities is closely linked to the interactions between the 
discoverer and software originator. A key finding is that the communication 
between originators and discoverers has been significantly overlooked 
previously, and in most cases can be considered to be negative. The interaction 
between these two entities is typically initiated by the discoverer, and motivated 
by the release of the vulnerability details. Once released a significant process 
ensues with delays and miscommunication pervasive through it. This is evident 
within a post from 2011:  
 
“The initial conversation went very well with them and they took the 
matter seriously. However, they are just dragging their feet now and are 
no longer returning my emails for status updates”. (Sarphim, 2011) 
 
The processes in place for informing software originators that the vulnerability 
exists within software are typically little more than a general support telephone 
number or email address. This is taken by discoverers as an important 
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statement about the importance software originators treat vulnerabilities within 
their software. Frequently, frustration is cited as from within the process details 
about the vulnerability becomes lost within organisational bureaucracy, with little 
or delayed external communication to the vulnerability discoverer. One example 
is a dialogue with a software originator known as Bullhorn, stretching between 
March 2014 and October 2014, a total of 7 months. The discoverer here is 
looking to disclose a vulnerability within a software portal, yet is met with delays: 
 
“October 23, 2014 - After months without hearing a word in response, I 
decide to ping them again. This actually got the attention of their director 
of support”. (Arciszewski, 2015) 
 
This is an example illustrating the lack of communication and dismissal of the 
discoverer and is example amongst hundreds. This has led to a feeling of 
resentment amongst the vulnerability discoverers and the VDDS community. 
This has in turn furthered an adoption of different disclosure stances or, in some 
cases caused an adoption of a different strategy all together (i.e. selling the 
vulnerability for profit). Evidence also shows that on several occasions a 
vulnerability has been disclosed to the vendor and this has been met with legal 
instruments such as cease and desist orders or threatening emails explaining 
that the researcher is in violation of a legal statute. Furthermore, law 
enforcement has been informed and have visited the researcher in question. 
Punishment stance has fostered an atmosphere of resentment and anger 
toward software originators, causing friction between discoverers and software 
originators. 
 
However, recently these issues have become are less pronounced due to new 
disclosure initiatives created by large vendors such as Microsoft, Oracle and 
Google. However, historical negative examples are still cited to provide 
justification for a disclosure stance, typically full disclosure. Experiences whilst 
disclosing a vulnerability range on the one hand from a happy surprise 
(Damontoo, 2012) to disappointment and disillusionment because of the 
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conduct of the software vendor (Sarphim, 2011). These experiences are also 
magnified by the time within which vulnerabilities are removed from the 
software, and timeframes are constantly discussed to how much time should be 
given to the vendor to fix the issue. These range from no time at all to almost 
twelve months in some cases (Sintonen, 2017). Dependent upon which 
disclosure stance is taken the time frames are dramatically different, but 
crucially if the communication is good, and previous experiences are positive 
these deadlines imposed by the discovers are quite flexible (Sintonen, 2017). 
4.6.5  
4.6.6 Candidate Theme 3 - Ethics and Disclosure Stance 
Disclosure of vulnerabilities within the VDDS are categorised into two main 
groups, full and coordinated, with polarising effects upon the participants of the 
VDDS. Proponents of full disclosures point to the fact that software vendors 
have a duty of care to customers of their software and they cannot be trusted to 
remove the vulnerability without being forced to do so via attacks or customer 
and monetary pressures (Damontoo, 2012; Eduard Kovacs, 2011; Matt4077, 
2016). This is further amplified by the by negative stories that are distributed via 
social media and online fora. 
As with most psychosocial systems the emotional state of a vulnerability 
discoverer and the social constructs that surround them is a critical factor in 
establishing the course of action the researcher may take. For example, when 
researchers consider which disclosure stance to take - either full or coordinated 
- this choice is directly influenced by either personal experience or, more 
commonly, via reflecting on community experiences published within social 
media whilst soliciting advice (I_didnt_do_that, 2011). Many examples of 
emotional states influencing the disclosure stance exist, such as fear, anger and 
uncertainty both initially and during the process of disclosing a vulnerability. The 
historical record of lived experiences during vulnerability disclosure is used and 
referred to, time and time again (Kdobb, 2012; Stormehh, 2012). There are 
isolated incidences whereby the discoverer has approached software 
originators directly, and been welcomed and in some cases rewarded, however 
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these were few and far between. However, with the advent of such schemes as 
HackerOne and Bugcrowd, these cases are becoming more commonplace, 
albeit via a coordinated, paid vulnerability-as-a-service offering.   
The choice as to which disclosure stance the researcher takes is strongly 
related to the software originator actions, previous experiences (both personally 
and community) and personal ethics. There is evidence showing the solicitation 
of advice from the community because of previous bad experiences is 
influential. The evidence shows that during the initial time period of the 
vulnerability discovery movement (1998 – 2004) there was a sense of ‘doing the 
right thing’ with pressure being brought to bear upon researchers if they decide 
to ‘cash in’. Recent cases have been documented around researchers and 
organisations being ostracised from the community due to this continuing 
ethical stance, however this is changing rapidly. One example form 2012 is from 
Cody Brocious, discussing the repercussions of full disclosure: 
 
“!'ve taken significant flak from the security community and others for my 
lack of adherence to Responsible Disclosure. Hopefully this post will 
show that that's not always the responsible approach”. 
(Brocious, 2015) 
 
The ethical motivation of what to do when a vulnerability is discovered is a hotly 
debated topic, with no clear majority. However, there is an indication that a 
preference to disclose responsibly (aka coordinated) at first, then move to a 
aggressive full disclosure stance if vendors are unresponsive or have a history 
of inaction. 
 
Significant discussion surrounds the ethical considerations the vulnerability 
discloser considers when details of a vulnerability is uncovered. This shows that 
whilst vulnerability research is demonised in popular media as unethical or 
embracing anarchy, in general careful consideration is given to disclosure. 
When discoverers choose to divulge the details of the vulnerability they have 
uncovered, typically discoverers try to do the right thing. This attitude is widely 
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prevalent within the community and is generally accepted as the social norm. 
This is however changing rapidly with new economic rewards being introduced 
by software originators, third parties and accepted norms.  
The vulnerability discovery community is motivated by ethics and continues to 
be so. As such the discourse that takes place within the VDDS when a new 
method of working or motivation for disclosure is introduced is instant and in 
some cases visceral. However, many participants within the community still 
believe that the right thing to do is to disclose vulnerability details ethically in a 
coordinated manner and do so for no reward other than the recognition of 
discovery alone. This approach is pervasive as it is seen to provide leadership 
and a sense of purpose other than just monetary reward. Examples of this 
altruistic behaviour are frequent, and in most cases do not provide anything 
other than recognition.  
Moreover, there is an element of community pressure to show that they are not 
just a ‘bunch of black hats’ that provide valuable services to both the 
community, and end users in discovering vulnerabilities. An example of ethical 
standards upon which the VDDS holds itself to account is from a blog post from 
Martin (2000) discussing the responsibilities of how and when to disclose the 
details of a vulnerability: 
“The adoption of Full Disclosure is an ethic, our responsibility and the 
duty of every security professional is to disclose the facts. How and when 
we disclose the facts is on the other hand the most crucial part of full 
disclosure. Many factors come into play, the seriousness and 
implications of the bug, how long has it been since it was discovered, 
how responsive is the vendor and how dependant are we on the vendor 
for a patch”. (Martin, 2000b) 
The level of sophistication that is apparent here is startling, as software 
vulnerability discoverers have been characterised as reckless, with a disposition 
to favour anarchy than harbour a sense of social responsibility. Most striking 
within the data extract is the use of the word duty:  
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“…our responsibility and the duty of every security professional is to disclose 
the facts”.                                                                                      (Martin, 2000b) 
If we take the literal meaning of duty to mean ‘moral or legal obligation’, then the 
deontological context of the statement is laid bare  (Ostler and Swannell, 1983). 
That is to say that by starting the vulnerability discovery process you are duty 
bound and obligated to share information about a uncovered vulnerability, 
potentially for the greater good. Again, this sentiment is evident when a level of 
self-regulation within VDDS around the right thing to do when discussing 
vulnerability disclosure: 
“This is kind of lame. You sound like a real tool. First, you demand to talk 
to a company that you aren’t paying in the medium of YOUR choice as 
opposed to the numerous methods they provided for you, and then post 
a hack that could directly harm people. I’m not 100% sure about the 
legality of posting something like this, but my uncle will, so I’ll be sure to 
forward it to him in the amex legal department. I do know damn well that 
it isn’t very ethical. I hope you’re proud of yourself”. (Dan, 2011) 
Here we see the context of a vulnerability being disclosed in a full and 
uncoordinated manner, with sentiments such are ‘harm’ and explicit comments 
on the ethical nature of the disclosure. This level of self-regulation is again 
startling, yet considered routine.  
This level of self-regulation is considered to be pervasive, and provided the 
basis for adoption of policy statements as individuals and organisations 
approach disclosure – crucially with caveats on time limits and reversion to full 
disclosure (CERT, 2017; Initiative, 2017; Neff, 2016). This inclusion of policy 
within choice, again suggests a level of sophistication that is not widely cast 
within the public populist mind-set. There are however exceptions to this 
detailed consideration as the focus of this research is focused on the legitimate 
VDDS. It is inevitable that the vulnerabilities that are disclosed by discovers and 
subsequently patched by software originators will be used for malicious 
purposes (Bashar et al., 1997; Ritchey, 2011).  
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The evolution of both self-regulation and ethical sophistication within the VDDS 
has occurred over a long period of time in relative terms. The first recorded use 
of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy was by the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) Software Engineering Institute, based at Carnegie-
Mellon University in 2000 (CERT, 2017). The policy, which is largely unchanged 
today clearly states the conditions once details of a vulnerability have been 
disclosed – and importantly the penalties for non-compliance of these 
conditions. 
4.6.7 Candidate Theme 4 - Motivation for Discovery 
Turning to the process for uncovering vulnerabilities within software, there is 
suggestion that significant correlation between competency and the number 
vulnerabilities that are discovered exists. The process generally starts with the 
creation of the software, and unless the researcher is internal to the software 
originator the first time that vulnerabilities can be discovered within the software 
is at the time of release. Prior to the release of the software significant 
speculation occurs within the community specifically around the severity, 
quantity and ease of discovery this version will hold. Alongside this new tools 
that are developed are circulated and used to discover new vulnerabilities. The 
discovery of vulnerabilities is undertaken by individuals who use tools to 
uncover flaws in the code. This is either via analysis of source code (white box 
testing) or by injecting data into the software and observing a response (black 
box testing). Black box testing is typically used to identify vulnerabilities within 
software by external discoverers due to the unavailability of the underlying 
source code. Discussion and discourse around tools and techniques used by 
researchers is, as one would expect, a highly complex and technical topic. This 
discourse takes place primarily online, within educational settings or at physical 
meetings where researchers exchange information on new techniques of tools, 
for example DEFCON (Egelman et al., 2013).   
 
Within the concept of motivation, the quality of software is an important 
consideration, often discussed by entities within the system. There is a 
  - 131 - 
pervasive sentiment from specific groups of entities, that of end users and 
discoverers. The sentiment is centred on the ideal that more could and should 
be done around removing software vulnerabilities within the software 
development process, rather than post release.  Discussions centre on the 
costs which increases in software quality would bring adapted through to the 
creation of markets. Furthermore, potential use of standards is also a topic that 
is frequently discussed with narratives around the incentives that are used to 
entice software vendors to secure software, to development standards. 
Software vendors are considered to be ultimately responsible for the software 
which they produce, therefore are responsible for the removal of vulnerabilities 
from the software. To do this post release requires the vendor to communicate 
with the security researcher (assuming the discovery was not made in house) to 
establish the details of the vulnerability and ultimately remove the issue from the 
software.  
 
The motivation for discovery is linked to theme three, ethics and disclosure 
stance, and theme five, vulnerability markets. Both themes provide motivation to 
the discoverer, yet what is apparent is the dissonance between the reward for 
altruistic behaviours, and economic reward. This dissonance is discussed in the 
next section 4.6.7. 
4.6.8 Candidate Theme 5 - Emergence of New Vulnerability Markets 
The economics of vulnerability discovery is intertwined with all other themes 
that are present within the system, and arguably the concept that drives all 
other interactions. The economic forces that drive the system are a recent 
phenomenon and are manifest in the formation of three distinct market 
approaches to coordinated vulnerability disclosure rewards. These approaches 
are classified as bounties, third party brokers and auctions. Each market 
rewards the vulnerability discoverer with money, and in some cases marketing 
merchandise, but recognition of finding the vulnerability is mandatory in all 
cases.  
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The act of selling vulnerability, as stated previously is met in some 
circumstances with hostility. In each approach the level of contention occurring 
within the VDDS differs dependent upon the perceived piousness, or 
ethicalness of the market. This ranges from what are considered the most 
ethical, bug bounties through to the least ethical, third party brokers.  Bug 
bounties are a recent phenomenon, where software originators challenge 
discoverers to find, and exploit their software for a reward. The second, 
vulnerability auctions have for the most part, given way to other markets, largely 
due to the success of bug bounty schemes such as Pwn20wn and Google 
ProjectZero (Google, 2017; Portnoy, 2010). Ozment (2007) first codified the 
vulnerability auction, with specific reference to a type known as a reverse Dutch 
auction with both perfect and imperfect information, guiding the bidders. 
Auctions are considered to forebears of bug bounties, and are now rarely used. 
Finally, third party brokers are considered to be the least ethical of the markets 
as they exist only to find vulnerabilities and sell them to the highest bidder 
(Radianti et al., 2006, 2007b). Each reward mechanism is perceived to have 
created a schism between vulnerability discoverers and software originators, as 
some feel that discoverers should be rewarded for the skills, effort and 
resources they have used to uncover the vulnerability, not money. Typified by 
this example from 2013: 
 
“Lesson learned: Find a security hole, report it to Facebook, and they 
don't respond after two attempts? Sell it as a zero day. Incentives matter. 
And there is always money to be had somewhere else”.  
(Toomuchtodo, 2013) 
 
Within the VDDS the advent of new market forces, coupled with the 
overwhelming perception to adopt an ethical stance when disclosing 
vulnerability details created a need for a new approach. These factors have 
shaped and influenced the creation of a so called ‘alt-market’ environment, and 
provided an alternative to underground black-markets.  Auctions have been a 
feature of the free market model of vulnerability discovery since the formation of 
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the market itself and can take various forms. The auctions are regarded as a 
necessary part of the market and enable vulnerability researchers to get a 
market clearing price. This price is in most cases disseminated to other 
participants within the market, showing what the potential rewards are for 
vulnerability discovery. The converse of the auction is the bounty whereby a 
fixed price is offered for the vulnerability, and are typically put in place by the 
software vendor. In most cases these types of bounty offer a gradation of 
rewards for different types of severity, and the ability to bypass security 
controls.  
 
A recent addition to the vulnerability market of the legitimate brokering entities 
that provided middle man and escrow services between the researcher and the 
vendor, or in some case nation states or defence contractors. Notable examples 
of brokers are the Zerodayinitative, Endgame and Zerodium (Endgame, 2017; 
ZDI, 2017; Zerodium, 2017). These types of brokers perform two functions that 
of providing anonymity and negotiation for a price for the vulnerability. This 
process allows the brokers to also extract value from the vulnerability process 
by producing threat intelligence on vulnerabilities. The role of brokers within 
software vulnerability discovery is again a polarising one, with arguments for the 
continued support and the abolition of them rife within the community.  An 
example of a positive role for brokers comes from raw interview data from 
Radianti (2010b): 
 
“I would rather see a hundred researchers selling to legal markets than 
having to see anyone to sell on dark markets just because they run out of 
money”. 
 
Whereas, others see the profiteering of potential brokers, selling the details of 
vulnerabilities to the highest bidder unethical and potentially dangerous, with 
this blog extract citing concerns: 
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“Companies have sprung-up to reap the benefits of the money being 
poured into the exploits market with a business model around finding 
exploits and then sending them to the highest bidder (often intelligence 
agencies)”. 
 
(Borgen, 2013) 
 
Brokers also exist in the black market where cyber criminals purchase and use 
vulnerabilities to infect and steal money from users via malware. As the creation 
of grey market brokers is a relatively recent one, the discussion around black 
market brokers is generally seen in a negative light, and could constitute the 
reason the community does not like brokerage for profit. The use of 
vulnerabilities, or more specifically the conversion of the vulnerability into an 
application that can be used to defeat a security control, a process known as 
weaponisation is a known nuanced and difficult debate (Bradbury, 2015; Fidler, 
2014). The use of vulnerabilities was traditionally perceived to be by cyber 
criminals to steal private information such as credit card details or private 
personal information (Anderson et al., 2013). However, whilst this still maybe 
the case, the use of vulnerabilities is now no longer the privy of the 
cybercriminal as both law enforcement and government intelligence agencies 
now utilise the benefits of information system exploitation (Schneier, 2015, 
pp.146–150; Schwartz et al., 2016). An example of potential usage of a 
vulnerability for malicious reasons is from Borgan, who explains: 
 
“If DarthBorgen is a “black hat” hacker he may use that exploit to steal 
from the company himself or he may sell it to a rival company what would 
use it in some illegal corporate espionage” (Borgen, 2013) 
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Finally, the value of a vulnerability is a significant factor that is discussed at 
length within the VDDS. The ability to sell a vulnerability in a legitimate manner 
is a recent phenomenon, with the first auction site known as WabiSabiLabi 
being launched in 2007 (Bradbury, 2007). The discourse around selling 
vulnerability details is polarised, as some feel that as the effort has been 
expended you must be rewarded as time could be spent on other things, with 
this anonymous example from the raw data provided from Radianti (2010b): 
“We agree that more and more researchers are interested. I would 
estimate that the biggest reason in selling to legal markets is that even 
researchers need to bring food to the table and since one vulnerability 
can be worth severals [sic] months pay there are several interested in it”.  
 
On the other hand, people feel very strongly about the perception of profiteering 
from vulnerabilities as it is felt that a civil duty should be upheld, suggesting the 
kudos is a better motivator than money: 
 
“A 0day pat on the head from 4chan is pretty solid nerd cred for the CV”. 
 
(JonnieCache, 2014) 
 
The introduction of vulnerability disclosure platforms such as Hackone.com, 
Openbugbounty.org and Bugcrowd have provided both an ethically perceived 
alternative to the brokers, and the uncertainty of the auction. This new type of 
market instrument seems to be increasing the flow of vulnerabilities, in a 
controlled and rewarding manner.  
 
An additional phenomenon that has recently sparked debate is the purchasing 
of vulnerabilities, specifically zero day vulnerabilities by nation states for 
assumed offensive means. A significant number of alleged brokers have cited 
occasions when they have been contacted by ‘friendly’ and hostile nation states 
to sell vulnerabilities affecting well-known software products. This has been 
further compounded by the rationalisation of an arms control treaty known as 
the Wassenaar arrangement, effectively putting vulnerabilities in the same 
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category as nuclear enrichment technology (Wassenaar, 2015, p.74). Moreover, 
with the recent outbreak of the WannaCry ransomware which purported to use 
an NSA derived vulnerability known as ETERNALBLUE, weaponised for 
criminal intent this issue may start to become more acute (Goodin, 2017b).  
4.6.9 Cross Cutting Theme - Time and Delays 
Within the VDDS the concept of elapsed time is a significant factor on all that is 
undertaken - from the amount of time that vulnerability discovery takes, through 
to the delays that exist when communicating with software originators to 
disclose vulnerability details. Consequentially, the time that elapses between 
steps makes up a complete interaction between entities, and forms a 
fundamental element of the discourse within the VDDS. Two principle delays 
occur within the VDDS, discovery delays and disclosure delays. 
Within both delays, vulnerability discovery is situated within the initial stages of 
the VDDS. Initial delays occur due to the labour intensive nature, and technical 
expertise that is required (Holm et al., 2013; Sommestad et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is postulated that the time that is required to attain a level of 
understanding and competence to discover a single vulnerability is interrelated 
to the number of vulnerabilities that can be found alongside entry into the 
VDDS. In addition to delays associated with vulnerability discovery, disclosure 
delays make up a large proportion discourse within the VDDS.  Disclosure delay 
occurs toward the end of the VDDS process, however is not linear in nature. 
This initial delay - which is defined as the delay that occurs when a vulnerability 
discoverer chooses to make the details of the vulnerability public is significant. 
These types of delay are dependent upon the disclosure stance that is adopted. 
However, in the case where the discoverer chooses to make the vulnerability 
public without informing the software originator, known as full disclosure, there 
is no delay. This is due to fact the discoverer has numerous communication 
channels that are open to them, ranging from globally available email 
distribution lists, through to blogs and social media. The impact of full disclosure 
upon software originators, end users and other entities within the VDDS has 
been studied at length (Huang et al., 2016; Joh et al., 2014; Ozment, 2007; 
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Sutton et al., 2007; Woo et al., 2011). Full disclosure is, and continues to be the 
last step in efforts to communicate and improve the security posture of a piece 
of software.  
4.6.9.1 Coordinated Disclosure Time Delays  
Diametrically opposed to full disclosure is coordinated disclosure. Delays within 
the coordinated disclosure stance are centred on the altruistic or direct method 
of disclosure. This is opposed to the paid coordination modes, for example via 
Hackerone or the ZeroDayInitiative. Significant delays occur around the 
interactions between the software originator, vulnerability discoverers and in 
some cases, national government organisations. These delays occur when the 
vulnerability discoverer chooses to disclose details of the vulnerability within a 
direct coordinated disclosure route, and is met with organisational bureaucracy. 
Delays within the paid mode, do exist however as there is a monetary 
transaction occurring, expectations on all sides are different, and therefore 
delays are minimised. 
The usage of coordinated disclosure is underpinned by the notion that if the 
coordinated process does not complete successfully, the right to disclosure in 
an uncoordinated and full way is retained. This is also the policy of large 
disclosure platforms such as Hackerone, Bugcrowd and Google Project Zero 
(BugCrowd Homepage, 2017; Google, 2017; Hackerone, 2016).  
4.7 Collated Disclosure Process Steps 
The process of vulnerability discovery and disclosure is not a linear or simple 
process, particularly if we take the disclosure process in isolation from the rest 
of the VDDS. Nevertheless, the ability to visualise key processes that make up 
the VDDS is important. Consequently, an abstraction of the steps and flows that 
make up the disclosure process has been mapped, shown in Figure 12 below 
has been constructed from the thematic analysis and models. The mapping in 
centred around three entities involved within the VDDS, Vulnerability 
Discoverer, Software Originator and Disclosure Platform (inclusive of brokers 
and bug bounties). The process is mapped from the perspective of the 
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vulnerability discoverer, and initiated in the top left, with the discovery of 
vulnerability.  
Step 1: Initially a decision point to choose a disclosure approach, full or 
coordinated. Depending upon which approach is chosen dramatically reduces 
the time that the information is released. If a full disclosure approach is taken, 
then after an internal process of documenting the technical details of the 
vulnerability is released via public blog or email distribution list such as full 
disclosure.  
Step 2: If the discoverer chooses coordinated disclosure, a second choice on 
the part of the vulnerability discoverer is required to disclosure altruistically or 
via a paid route. Again, depending upon which route is taken, an initial 
interaction occurs between the vulnerability discoverer and either the software 
originator – in the case of the altruistic – or vulnerability platform in the case of 
paid coordinated disclosure. The initial interaction is fraught delay, especially 
the direct disclosure choice. Many examples exist whereby the discoverer tries 
to disclose details of the vulnerability to the software originators, yet is met with 
salience or worse, dismissed.  Typically, 3-4 iterations occur with discoverers 
trying to make contact with the originator, with the resultant failure to establish 
dialogue ending in full disclosure. Furthermore, the elapsed time that is 
experienced can take in some cases weeks, and months from initial contact.  
Step 3: Once initial contact has been made, the steps to verify the technical 
details of the vulnerability take place. This verification step is important to both 
the paid for and direct disclosure choices as the ability to reproduce the under 
controlled conditions within the disclosure platform test environments, or 
software originator environments. If the conditions are not met to assure the 
vulnerability is legitimate, the process stops, with these conditions being set by 
the originator and disclosure platform. Yet, if the vulnerability is considered to 
be important by the discoverer, then they may wish to revert to full disclosure or 
attempt to sell the vulnerability to a different disclosure platform and restart the 
process.  
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Step 4: Once the validity of the vulnerability is confirmed, the next step is 
establishing the time scale for disclosure to the public. The establishment of 
vulnerability disclosure policies to assist in this is now commonplace, and 
therefore from initial contact, should be known. Although depending upon the 
severity and technical details of the vulnerability this may be changed. One key 
factor in the determination of timescales and possible enlargement of them, is a 
communication feedback loop. This loop is constructed around the constant 
flow of information between the discoverer and software originator, in the case 
of direct disclosure, or between originator, disclosure platform and discoverer.   
Step 5: If accepted, both the originator and the disclosure platform follow 
broadly similar steps with the requesting of vulnerabilities disclosure policies, 
and the assessment of the probably timescales to fix the vulnerability. On the 
part of the discoverer this is where most delays occur, and the most frustrating 
as communication with the software originator is generally infrequent and 
content free. On the other hand, if the paid disclosure path has been taken the 
disclosure platform can move this process along on behalf of the discoverer and 
facilitate communication between the two entities.  Again, if the discoverer feels 
that the communication is not appropriate or the fix is taking too long, the right 
of full disclosure is reserved.  
Step 6: Once the vulnerability has been remediated, then the task of 
remuneration, in the case of paid coordination occurs. This is done via the 
vulnerability platform, with the software originator not being involved unless the 
monies flow directly from them.  
Step 7: Vulnerability patches are released, and acknowledgements are made 
public along with any patched software. 
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There are a significant number of delays that may occur within the disclosure 
process with multiple communication loops in existence, the potential for them 
to be elongated or for the process to go off track. As such the involvement of 3rd 
parties within the process is a welcome one. However, even with disclosure 
platforms involved within the process things still and can go wrong and the 
potential for time delays increases significantly.  The main aspects of the delays 
are: 
1. Initiation of communication with the Software Originator; 
2. Vulnerability validation; 
3. Patch creation; 
4. Communication on agreement of disclosure; 
5. Acknowledgement of discoverer agreements. 
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Figure 12 - Discoverer / Software Originator Interaction Process Diagram 
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4.8 Chapter Summary  
Vulnerability discovery has been perceived to be a secret and malevolent act 
since this discovery of the first vulnerability within Sendmail (Stoll, 1989, p.391). 
It is argued that this discovery act gave birth to the modern malware movement 
we see today, with this single vulnerability inspiring a generation of hackers, 
crackers and criminals to search for vulnerabilities within software (Orman, 
2003, p.7; Stoll, 1989, p.392). Alongside this vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure has been characterised as harmful for a number of years due to the 
prominence and criminal motivation of Blackhat researchers, and the Whitehat 
researcher looking to reduce the attack surface of a system or software (Ablon 
et al., 2014; Rescorla, 2005). Consequentially, this perception has led to the 
demonization of vulnerability discoverers by large organisations and 
governments, so when legitimately disclosed, discoverers are met with hostility.  
 
However, this hostility has been replaced in some part, and  the act of discovery 
is now seen in a more positive light, with in-house testing, the rise of white hat 
careers and vulnerability disclosure programmes, such as hackerone and 
google project zero (Google, 2016; Hackerone, 2016). Yet, given the nature of 
vulnerabilities most software vendors still wish to keep the issue confidential 
and do not wish to disclose detail (Bradbury, 2015). Indeed there have been 
cases where global organisations have come to metaphorical blows over the 
disclosure stance the other has taken (Chirgwin, 2017). Hence as a 
consequence of this secrecy a significant amount of the data that is available for 
analysis is hidden within software originators, vulnerability disclosure platforms 
and kept under non-disclosure agreements (Anderson et al., 2013; Bradbury, 
2015). However, evidence is available in the public domain providing insight into 
the processes, interactions, actors and discourse that make up the legitimate 
vulnerability discovery system. Data that is publicly available is typically located 
in hacker forums, email or social media platforms or bespoke disclosure 
platforms.  
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There are aspects of the system that are in juxtaposition with each other. This is 
evident in the ethical considerations that exist within the VDDS, which are highly 
dynamic and change quickly. For example, the level of self-regulation within the 
VDDS is a major finding, as discoverers in most circumstances prefer to 
coordinate the discovery of vulnerabilities with software originators, only opting 
for a full disclosure stance as a last resort. Moreover, the overwhelming majority 
of sentiment that exists within the VDDS is superficially positive, coupled with a 
high level of sophistication when considering the moral issues when disclosing 
a vulnerability. Alongside this, new market structures and instruments have 
come into existence to facilitate ethical disclosure, and incentivise it. For 
example the creation of Hackerone, which is seen as the preeminent place to 
disclose ethically, and with recompense.   
Additionally, negative factors influence current and potential future vulnerability 
discoverers to potentially adopt a ‘full disclosure’ posture, or if motivated to do 
so, seek monetary compensation for details of the vulnerability from either a 3rd 
party broker, vendor or in extreme cases the black market. These negative 
experiences cluster around traditional IT organisations, for example Cisco, 
Symantec and Hewlett Packard. Conversely, a small number of internet savvy 
organisations such as etsy.com and Google have been praised for clear 
vulnerability policies, communication and are held up by the community as 
exemplars. Past Experiences and emotion are key when choosing which path to 
take. The structures that exist within the VDDS are centred around four main 
entities, with the most important being the vulnerability discoverer themselves. 
The discoverer is the centre of all vulnerability discovery events, and if it did not 
exist then the vulnerability discovery system itself would not exist.  
A key aspect of the VDDS is the level of asymmetry between entities and 
interactions, whereby the power of disclosure resides with the vulnerability 
discoverer. This is synonymous with the asymmetry of cyberspace (Geers, 
2010; Moore et al., 2010). Therefore, the disclosure of vulnerabilities in a 
coordinated manner is preferable from the perspective of the software 
originator. However, almost half of the direct interactions between vulnerability 
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discoverers and software originators have some level of acrimony, with full 
disclosure taking place in some circumstances.  
Vulnerabilities tend to follow a specific lifecycle whereby the vulnerability is 
created by the software vendor, the vulnerability is then latent within the 
software for a period of time, then it is discovered. Once discovered then an 
ethical choice is made, to either profit from the vulnerability (legally or illegally) 
or responsibly disclose the vulnerability to the software vendor. Once this 
decision has been made then the role of the vulnerability research effectively 
comes to an end, other than attracting notoriety of Kudos for the act of 
discovery. The final stages of the vulnerability are dependent upon the ethical 
choice which is made. If the vulnerability is disclosed responsibly then the 
software vendor will fix the vulnerability after a certain period of time, and 
release this to the software users. If a less ethical choice is made to sell the 
vulnerability to a broker or cybercriminal then exploits that use the vulnerability 
can be created and used within malicious software.  
From a qualitative perspective, the VDDS, structures, interactions and 
dynamism have been characterised. This qualitative foundation provides a solid 
position to construct a quantitative model upon it. Therefore, in the following 
chapter several quantitative datasets have been collected to explore identified 
themes, and add numerical fidelity to them. Behaviours of both entities within 
the VDDS and the parameter space of the interactions between them will be 
investigated. Quantitative datasets have been collected, by using a set of 
techniques known as exploratory data analysis (EDA) explored and 
characterised.  
EDA was first cited as a distinct framework in Tukeys’ seminal work, where he 
proposed a philosophical approach to quantitative data analysis (Tukey,1977). 
Turkey provided an approach to allow the researcher to explore the data and 
utilise the techniques laid down in the EDA framework (probability plots, 
descriptive statistics and outliers etc). These techniques provide descriptive 
statistics about the data that has been collected and allow several techniques to 
be deployed on the data.  
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5 Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis  
The identification of key themes drawn from the data is crucially important; 
nevertheless, it is only part of the investigation as to which factors contribute to 
the growth of software vulnerabilities. By building upon the previous Thematic 
Analysis this chapter presents an exploration of the numerical aspects of 
identified themes and concepts. This exploration is presented as a set of state 
variables, which are used to provide the basis for the construction and ultimate 
simulation of the VDDS theory and model. The EDA framework was used to 
investigate identified state variables, and to determine whether the themes 
derived from the previous analysis represent the VDDS accurately. Techniques 
from within the EDA framework were used to establish a historical feel and 
shape of collected data.  EDA as a technique emphasises using visual aids and 
descriptive statistical methods to explore the data, and used previously as a 
technique to provide rigor to the analytical process used to derive System 
Dynamic models (Saunders et al., 2009, p.428).  
The primary focus of this chapter is to establish the initial conditions of the 
identified state variables, and characterise their behaviour over time. Once 
considered, the systemic behaviour and potential interactions between state 
variables can be mapped. To do this, measurements such as arithmetic 
location, spread and shape of any probability distributions were completed to 
understand what if any parameters should initialise any simulations. For clarity, 
arithmetic location is defined as the point where the distribution is ‘anchored’, or 
which set of values best describe the entire set of values, shown by mean, 
median and mode statistics (Hartwig and Dearing, 1979, p.13). Spread is 
defined as the variability or dispersion of values throughout the observed 
values, shown by standard deviation statistics. (Hartwig et al., 1979, p.13) 
Finally, shape is defined as the distribution, modality, measure of skewness and 
outliers (Hartwig et al., 1979, p.13). All data is presented as historical reference 
modes, which show the behaviour of that state variable over a given time 
period.  
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5.1 Data Collection and Data Limitations  
A range of data sources, discussed in chapters 3 and 4 have been used to 
construct key reference modes.  All raw data were processed using a 
combination of data analysis tools MySQL 5.4.11 community server, Mathworks 
Matlab 2016b, Python 2.7.13 and R – Statistical computing.  
During the quantitative data collection process three key limitations were 
observed about the data. These limitations include incomplete data, methods of 
data collection at source and source bias. In the first instance data that has 
been collected is almost certainly incomplete, hence the abductive nature of this 
research with incomplete data is a regrettable feature within the sciences, more 
so when undertaking an exploratory investigation of an online phenomenon 
such as vulnerability discovery and disclosure. It is however possible to 
compensate for the lack of complete data by imputing, or calculating any 
missing data with approximate replacement values.  
The second limitation is centred on the collection methods and quality 
assurance that is used by third parties when collecting data from end users (e.g. 
ExploitDB). These methods are unknown and therefore must be viewed with an 
appropriate level of confidence. Again, it is possible to compensate for issues 
that arise from insufficient quality control of collected data. Where possible data 
that is used to inform state variable construction has been compared with at 
least one other similar dataset, and checked for consistency. Where this has not 
been possible, this is highlighted. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that 
third parties have made every effort to correct and deal with omissions and 
errors, and the quality of the data that has been collected from third parties is of 
reasonable quality.  
Finally, a general limitation to all collected quantitative data used is the nature of 
the phenomena under investigation - it is globally distributed and opaque.  As 
such, data sources that have been selected are the most prevalent, or popular, 
and therefore taken as the most representative of the feature that is being 
observed.  For example, data representing sentiment toward software 
originators was collected from social media platforms such as Hackernews.com 
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and Reddit.com as this is where the richest data was located. Other sources of 
data exist, however are potentially less concentrated or not publicly available. 
Where data is missing or there is a potential bias or error within the data, 
statistical techniques that are used to compensate for these issues are noted. 
The data sources that have been collected are outlined below in Table 18, 
along with sources, associated variables and online location. 
Table 18 outlines several properties about data that is used within the EDA 
framework. Variable name represents the descriptive aspect of the behaviour, 
and is a direct link to previous themes. Data source, lists the name of any 
locations of raw data, and appropriate detail. Location is the online web URL, 
and date accessed shows the time the data was collected and processed.  
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Variable Name Data Source Location Dates Accessed or 
Collected 
Variable A: Researcher 
sentiment  
Hackernews.com; 
Reddit.com; Online blogs 
(See chapter 4 for details) 
Online November 2014 – 
April 2016 
Variable B: Number of 
Vulnerability Discoverers 
within System 
ExploitDB.com www.exploitDB.com  December 2016 
Variable C: Vulnerability 
Removal Rate 
National Vulnerability 
Database 
https://nvd.nist.gov/ December 2016 
Variable D: Full 
disclosure and 
Coordinated Disclosure 
Ratios 
Open bug bounty trading 
platform 
www.openbugbounty.org 
 
Sept 2015 -Jan 2017 
Variable E: Time to fix 
vulnerability from 
coordinated disclosure 
Multiple academic studies 
Full Disclosure Email 
Archive  
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ 
 
February 2015 – 
February  2017 
Variable F: Monitory 
reward 
Hacker One 
Bug Crowd 
www.hackerone.com 
www.bugcrowd.com 
January 2014 - 
December 2016  
Variable G: Number of 
Bug Bounty Schemes 
Hacker One 
Bug Crowd 
www.hackerone.com 
www.bugcrowd.com 
November 2013 – 
Apr 2017 
Variable H: Vulnerability 
Discoverer Participant 
Activity 
ExploitDB 
Open bug bounty reporting 
platform 
www.exploitdb.com 
www.openbugbounty.org 
January 2017 
Variable I: Software 
Originator Market Share 
W3Cschools 
Wikimedia Foundation  
Statcounter 
http://gs.statcounter.com/ 
www.w3cschools.com 
https://analytics.wikimedia.org/d
ashboards/browsers/ 
 
March 2017 
Meta Variable: Time and 
Delays 
Full disclosure email 
distribution list 
Vulnerability Policies 
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ Multiple  
Table 18 – Data Collection Sources and Locations 
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5.1.1 State Variable Selection from Themes 
The System Dynamics modelling process requires the identification of key state 
variables that represent the phenomena under investigation. Therefore, 
extracting representative variables from the identified themes that best 
describes the VDDS is a critical step in completeness of theory and models. 
The pulling out of variables which numerically express the state of a system or 
sub-system is known as state variable exposition. State variables are used to 
describe the state of a system at a specific time, or over a defined period of time 
(Palm, 2010, p.229). Within System Dynamics these behaviours are known as 
reference modes, and describe how the state variable changes over time 
(Sterman, 2000, p.90). Variables, and therefore reference modes, are drawn 
from within the five themes identified previously (Perception of Punishment, 
Disclosure Stance, Vendor Interactions, Motivation for Discovery, Emergence of 
Markets) and are a direct representation of the structure of the VDDS and 
relationships within it. The Identified themes also provide a rich narrative upon 
which to both base dynamic changes of the VDDS and build the structure of the 
model (Coyle, 1996, p.26; Morecroft, 2015, p.60).  
State variables were selected based upon identified themes, with three key 
criteria influencing the choice; necessity, aggregation and directionality (Albin et 
al., 2001, p.10). Each state variable characterises factors within each theme as 
it impacts the VDDS. For example, in the case of vulnerability interaction time, 
this variable has a direct causal link to the sentiment within the VDDS. 
Furthermore, a key factor within the VDDS is time. Time is represented as a 
both an intrinsic aspect of the variables (i.e. the behaviour is mapped to elapsed 
time) and within variables themselves. Thus time represents how the theme 
evolves, and is represented by relationships and a number of processes steps 
as opposed to state variables. Variables such as number of quantity of 
vulnerabilities, the disclosure route that is taken and quantity of active 
discoverer are all provided as level of activity, initialisation parameters and 
associated rates of those activities. A mapping of identified themes and derived 
state variables is given in Figure 13. 
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  Figure 13 - Systemic Themes and Variable Grouping. 
5.2 Reference Mode Identification and Construction 
The System Dynamics approach provides several techniques that allows for the 
construction and exploration of complex models, which express systemic 
behaviours over time. However, to begin the process reference modes of key 
variables must be defined. Sterman (2000) states that a reference mode is a  
“set of graphs and other descriptive data showing the development of the 
problem over time” (Sterman, 2000, p.90).  
Building upon this Saeed (1998) characterises a reference mode as an 
abstraction of problematic behaviour that is qualitative, intuitive and shows 
tendencies that a system exhibits. Typically any sufficiently complex problem 
expressed as a reference mode will have multiple modalities and will need to be 
‘sliced’ to show these differing behaviours (Saeed, 1992, 1998; Sterman, 2000). 
This method of slicing the problem space into different partitions, or in our case 
themes and state variables is useful as it allows for meaningful separation and 
consolidation phases to be undertaken. Saeed (1998) argues that reference 
modes, whilst incorporating the historical aspects of the variable under scrutiny 
should not solely rely upon historical observations; they must also incorporate 
both the past and abstract concepts (Saeed, 1998). 
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5.2.1 Initial conditions  
A key step in the creation of an empirically based model is the definition of the 
initial conditions that are used to initiate the model. In the case of the VDDS the 
conditions and parameters such as number of participants entering the system, 
elapsed time and participant sentiment are all part of the initial conditions of the 
system. Furthermore, the parameter space (e.g. minimum and maximum 
values) of variables within the system is also important. By undertaking 
statistical investigation in the form of descriptive statistical calculations a more 
complete understanding can made of the VDDS.  
5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Total System Reference Mode  
Sterman (2000) states that to gain a base understanding of the system under 
investigation, an overview of the entire system is required. In the context of this 
research, this is known as a total vulnerability discovery and disclosure 
reference mode. To construct the reference mode, a basic technique from 
within the EDA toolkit, run sequence plot is used. Run sequence plots are 
defined as a way to summarise a univariate dataset over time (Chambers, 
1983, p.95; NIST, 2012).  
Initially, the total reference mode provides an orientation as to how the increase 
in vulnerability growth has behaved historically, and what if any patterns are 
present. Previously single software application growth curves have been 
examined via run sequence plots, using cumulative frequency techniques. 
(Alhazmi, 2006; Alhazmi et al., 2005, 2007, Kim et al., 2007, 2016; Lewis et al., 
2015; Woo et al., 2011). Present within these studies are types of both 
sigmoidal and exponential growth curves that are well-known phenomena within 
the physical sciences. System Dynamics texts suggest that in some cases 
common system archetypes and feedback processes are responsible for these 
types of behaviours (Cash, 2005; Sterman, 2000, pp.264–290).   
Construction of the total system reference mode uses the standard repository  
for vulnerability recording, the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). NVD 
holds 79249 unique vulnerabilities (as of Dec 4th 2016) with the total number of 
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entries within the database increasing from the initial recorded vulnerability in 
Jan 1998 to 79249 vulnerabilities, a period of 18 years. Table 19 provides 
descriptive statistics for the total vulnerability reference mode, and constructed 
reference mode based upon this number of vulnerabilities disclosed and 
recorded publicly across all software globally, within Figure 14. The mean 
number of vulnerabilities within the total system reference mode is 4364, with 
the median value of 5063. The standard deviation of the total system is 2189, 
with population standard deviation calculated using the following formula: 
! = 	 1% ('( − *),-(./  
Equation 3 – Standard Deviation 
There is a general upward trend of vulnerability discovery since data started to 
be collected in 1998, with a mean increase of 285 vulnerabilities year on year. 
Furthermore, there have been an above average number of vulnerabilities from 
2007 onwards, with one exception 2011 which was only marginally above the 
mean. There is also a large spread, denoted by the standard deviation figure of 
2189. Inspecting the data we can see that 2006, 2007, 2014 and 2015, an 
abnormally high number of vulnerability disclosures in those years were 
recorded.  
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Figure 14 – Vulnerability Trend 1998 – 2017 
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Number of Disclosed 
Vulnerabilities 1998 –2016 
 
Mean (μ) over all years 4364 
Median 5063 
Standard Deviation (σ)  2189 
Total Number of disclosed 
vulnerabilities (N) 
79249 
Table 19 – Total system reference mode Summary Statistics 
 
To characterise the VDDS, Table 20 below shows that in 2006 an unusually 
high number of vulnerabilities from Microsoft and Oracle were present, with 
Microsoft accounting for 3.95% of all vulnerabilities that year and oracle 2.21%. 
The Microsoft percentage decreased to 3.73% in 2007, with Apple replacing 
Oracle with 3.15%. A similar pattern is also present for 2014 and 2015 with IBM 
accounting for 5.68% of total vulnerabilities in 2014, and Apple accounting for 
9.3% of total vulnerabilities in 2015. Comparing Microsoft across all 4 years we 
can see that the proportion of total number of vulnerabilities increased from 
3.95% in 2006 to 8.00% in 2015 despite similar totals previous years. Indeed, 
the top 30 software originators represented in Table 20 below account for 
24.96% (2006), 29.68% (2007), 43.38% (2014) and 65.41% (2015) of all 
disclosed vulnerabilities respectively.  
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 2006 (Total No. 6659) 2007 (Total No. 6594) 2014 (Total No. 7946) 2015 (Total No. 6588) 
 'microsoft' 3.95% 'microsoft' 3.73% 'ibm' 5.68% 'apple' 9.30% 
1 'oracle' 2.21% 'apple' 3.15% 'oracle' 4.72% 'microsoft' 8.00% 
2 'apple' 2.07% 'ibm' 2.00% 'cisco' 4.59% 'cisco' 7.44% 
3 'mozilla' 1.77% 'oracle' 1.88% 'microsoft' 4.40% 'adobe' 7.33% 
4 'ibm' 1.35% 'sun' 1.74% 'apple' 3.33% 'oracle' 7.16% 
5 'linux' 1.34% 'php' 1.71% 'google' 1.91% 'ibm' 4.74% 
6 'sun' 1.16% 'cisco' 1.70% 'adobe' 1.72% 'google' 4.22% 
7 'cisco' 1.04% ''ipswitch” 1.21% 'redhat' 1.56% 'mozilla' 2.81% 
8 'joomla' 0.77% 'mozilla' 1.18% 'mozilla' 1.48% ''abe” 1.52% 
9 'mybulletinboard' 0.63% 'hp' 0.97% 'linux' 1.47% 'hp' 1.52% 
10 'novell' 0.63% 'linux' 0.94% 'hp' 1.27% 'emc' 1.17% 
11 'php' 0.63% 'joomla' 0.85% 'apache' 1.10% 'linux' 0.97% 
12 'hp' 0.59% 'ca' 0.76% 'sap' 1.04% 'sap' 0.93% 
13 'drupal' 0.56% 'wordpress' 0.73% ''abe” 1.00% 'apache' 0.88% 
14 'symantec' 0.53% 'apache' 0.67% 'emc' 0.77% 'redhat' 0.83% 
15 'adobe' 0.47% 'bea' 0.67% 'openstack' 0.69% 'siemens' 0.55% 
16 'xerox' 0.47% 'symantec' 0.59% 'owncloud' 0.67% 'mediawiki' 0.50% 
17 'bea' 0.42% 'hitachi' 0.56% 'juniper' 0.59% 'symantec' 0.50% 
18 'invision_power_se
rvices' 
0.42% 'drupal' 0.55% 'moodle' 0.59% 'wireshark' 0.50% 
19 'phpbb_group' 0.42% 'adobe' 0.53% 'magzter' 0.57% 'juniper' 0.49% 
20 'freebsd' 0.38% 'web-app.org' 0.47% 'gnu' 0.56% 'openssl' 0.49% 
21 'mambo' 0.35% 'redhat' 0.44% 'plone' 0.50% 'ffmpeg' 0.44% 
22 'gnu' 0.33% 'novell' 0.39% 'qemu' 0.45% 'fortinet' 0.44% 
23 'ca' 0.27% 'xoops' 0.39% 'drupal' 0.44% 'gnu' 0.43% 
24 'netbsd' 0.27% 'vmware' 0.38% 'siemens' 0.41% 'xen' 0.43% 
25 'apache' 0.24% 'wireshark' 0.32% 'debian' 0.39% 'gehealthcare' 0.39% 
26 'woltlab' 0.24% 'clam_anti-virus' 0.30% 'mcafee' 0.39% 'moodle' 0.38% 
27 'wordpress' 0.24% 'trend_micro' 0.30% 'xen' 0.37% 'mcafee' 0.36% 
28 'deluxebb' 0.23% 'alstrasoft' 0.29% 'symantec' 0.36% 'openstack' 0.35% 
29 ipswitch' 0.23% 'asterisk' 0.26% 'wireshark' 0.36% 'owncloud' 0.34 
30 'jelsoft' 0.23% 'gnu' 0.26% 'php' 0.34% 'php' 0.033 
Table 20 – Vendor Percentage Variation in 2006, 2007, 2014 and 2015 
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What is striking about these figures is that it suggests that if vulnerabilities were 
addressed quickly, or prior to the release of the software, then a large portion of 
risk that organisations face could be mitigated. This indicates that most 
vulnerability discoverers may concentrate upon the most vulnerability prone or 
available software. What motivates, or causes vulnerabilities to be discovered 
within these software applications is outlined within chapter four. Figure 15 
shows a comparative change in the percentage over time for the top seven 
software originators. 
 
Figure 15 - Percentage Change in Discovered Vulnerabilities 2006 – 2015 
5.3.1 Three Key Inferred Futures 
As stated by (Saeed, 1998) to be useful, reference mode illustrations must take 
the concrete historical record alongside potentially hidden abstractions of the 
constituent parts of the problem, in our case the themes uncovered within the 
thematic analysis (Saeed, 1998). Accordingly, identified themes are used to 
infer potential future trends and patterns giving rise to possible modes of 
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behaviour of a long period. Therefore, three probable futures of the total 
vulnerability reference mode are presented, all of which take place after March 
2017, which is denoted by the vertical black line. A detailed quantification of the 
range numbers associated with these possible scenarios is given in chapter six, 
whereas a qualification is given here. The three inferred futures are shown in 
Figure 16 below. 
The first future that is hypothesised to occur is flat. This future exists where the 
number of recorded vulnerability disclosures and therefore number of 
discovered vulnerabilities found decreases to zero.  This assumes several 
things: a) The perfect debug of all new vulnerabilities upstream within the 
development process and removal of vulnerabilities within software; b) once a 
vulnerability is removed from the software ecosystem, it is not reintroduced and 
that no new vulnerabilities are introduced via new software versions; and c) this 
future is denoted by the bold red line.   
Second future is the continued increase of vulnerability at steady rate of 
discovery and subsequent disclosure events, albeit at an increased rate than 
the previous rate. This scenario assumes that: a) new vulnerabilities are 
discovered in existing software, but improved software practices reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities with new software; b) the vulnerability discovery 
system continues to add new vulnerability opportunities to sell or receive 
bounties and; c) the number of participants increases. This future is denoted by 
the bold magenta line.   
The third future is the exponential increase in vulnerability discovery and 
disclosures. The assumption here is that: a) new vulnerabilities are introduced 
to new software and software practices are not significantly improved from 
today’s levels; b) the number of participants within the system increases 
significantly; c) opportunities to sell vulnerabilities increases significantly and; d) 
the desire for vulnerabilities increases. The resultant historical trend shows a 
clear increase in the cumulative number of vulnerabilities that have been 
discovered over the past 31 years.   
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Within each future, there are characteristics which drive the growth of 
vulnerabilities within software. These characteristics are borne out of the policy 
decision that are made by software originators and discoverers alike, and 
contribute to the growth. As such it is suggested that growth in vulnerabilities is 
influenced by such policies, and therefore can be changed.  
5.3.2 VDDS Time Epochs 
The behaviour of the VDDS can be seen to split into specific time boxed or 
epochs. The initial VDDS epoch is a period of uncontrolled and unconstrained 
growth of vulnerabilities. The time span of this epoch runs from the mid 1990’s 
through to approximately 2009-10, with the defining characteristic of epoch one 
as the demonization of the vulnerability discoverer. Furthermore, this 
characterisation included the increased dependence of society upon potentially 
vulnerable information systems used to conduct commerce and 
communications. Epoch two, commences around 2010 with the advancement of 
vulnerability disclosure platforms, and changes in perception towards 
vulnerability discoverers together with software originator market rewards. The 
defining characteristic of epoch two is the emergence of new markets for 
vulnerabilities and associated rewards. Epoch two is currently underway now. 
Epoch three, is speculative and almost certainly consists of new markets and 
services, with an acknowledgement that vulnerabilities are central to the risk 
mitigation process. Epoch three is allied with the inferred futures and may take 
the form of one of the three possible, flat, steady or exponential dependent 
upon the conditions, and policies the VDDS adheres to at that time. 
 
 
  - 159 - 
 
Figure 16 - Total system reference mode Inferred Futures  
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5.4 State Variable Exploration and Analysis 
Regarding the total vulnerability discovery and disclosure reference mode, we 
can see that there is sigmoidal S-shaped growth exhibited. The VDDS is a 
system that can be extrapolated to show sets of interactions and variables that 
represents a real-world phenomenon (Giordano, 2009, p.53). Therefore, 
extracted from the five identified themes are nine state variables that represent 
the behaviours of a sub-system within the VDDS. The nine variables range from 
sentiment of vulnerability discoverer and they feel toward vendors, to the 
potential reward for discovering and disclosing vulnerability. In keeping with the 
exploratory stance of this research the variables were explored and 
characterised in both time and space. This exploration draws on several 
statistical techniques and shows the descriptive statistics of collected data, such 
as mean, variance and shape.  
5.4.1 State Variable A - Researcher sentiment  
As outlined previously there are specific points within the disclosure process 
where vulnerability discoverers must make a choice between full, direct 
coordinated or paid-coordinated disclosure. These choices are influenced by 
both the personal philosophy of the discoverer and previous lived, or more 
importantly recited, experiences of disclosure. The recited experiences are 
documented and cited when discoverers solicit advice from the community on 
which disclosure approach to take. This advice is recorded within social media 
platforms or forums and provides insight into the attitudes, experiences and 
outcomes of disclosures. Sentiment is represented by a positive or negative 
number and is based upon the words and the context they used when engaging 
in a discussion about a topic (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010).  In the context of the 
VDDS discourse ranges from what the best course of action is, to how vendors 
treat discoverers once a vulnerability has been uncovered.  
A range of techniques and tools exist to analyse text, however online discourse 
is unique and therefore requires a particular analysis technique (Baccianella et 
al., 2010; Esuli and Sebastiani, 2006). The chosen analytical method to produce 
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measures of sentiment that exists within the VDDS is the widely used online 
technique known as Sensistrength  (Thelwall et al., 2010, 2012; Thelwall and 
Buckley, 2013).  Sensistrength is an opinion mining, or sentiment classification 
technique, in which a large number of training words have been scored with 
numbers denoting either a positive, or negative sentiment score. Negative 
sentiment is scored between -1 and -5 with -1 being not negative, and -5 being 
very negative. Conversely for positive sentiment, +1 is mildly positive, and +5 is 
extremely positive (Thelwall et al., 2010). Scores are provided at the end of the 
assessed sentences within the analysed text, and scores are summed to show 
an overall score. The version of Sensistrength that is used is v2.2, an example 
of Sensistrength output is shown in Figure 17 below. 
 
Figure 17 – Sensistrength example output 
5.4.1.1 Descriptive Sentiment Analysis Statistics 
The data used to generate the descriptive sentiment statistics was extracted 
from the main Nvivo corpus, and is centred on the social media datasets. 
Specifically, the social media and full disclosure email archive datasets were 
used and data were categorised into calendar years, to allow for comparison. 
However, due to the varying size of datasets a meaningful basis for comparison 
was impossible to calculate. This variation is due to the large variation of 
collected sentences within data items discussing disclosure experiences with 
vendors. Consequently, normalised average scores were calculated and 
analysis performed via Matlab 2016a processing raw sentiment data.  
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Year Lines Analysed Raw Sentiment 
Score 
Normalised Average 
Score 
2010 2257 -112 -0.04 
2011 2645 -476 -0.17 
2012 4283 -403 -0.09 
2013 4463 -698 -0.15 
2014 8639 -1301 -0.15 
2015 9292 -113 -0.01 
2016 5893 -581 -0.09 
Table 21 - Data Population, Raw and Processed Sentiment Scores 
Table 21 above reveals that there has been significant fluctuation in sentiment 
toward with the VDDS, with sentiment being negative in all years. Starting in 
2010, the normalised average score starts at -0.04, which relative to the rest of 
the scores is second highest. Sentiment in the following years of 2011, 2012 
and 2013 drops in 2011 recording the lowest score with -0.17, recovering in 
2012 to -0.09 and falling again in 2013 with -0.15. Sentiment holds steady in 
2014 with a score of -0.15, with a rapid recovery in 2015 to 0.01 and 0.09 in 
2016.  The sentiment exhibited by vulnerability discoverer is, and continues to 
be negative. The trend of the data suggests that despite efforts from vendors 
and 3rd parties to introduce new process and incentives to change the 
perception of vulnerabilities within software this may not have had the desired 
affects. As such the sentiment toward vendors is consistently negative, despite 
a shift into almost positive territory in 2015.  
5.4.1.2 Reference Mode and Analysis 
The sentiment within the VDDS ranges from -0.17 to -0.01, and includes 
sentiment exhibited by both vulnerability discoverers and interested third 
parties. Whilst not directly involved within the mechanics of finding 
vulnerabilities within software, third parties do have an influencing impact upon 
the discourse that takes part around the system. At present the strength of this 
influence upon the decision that discoverers take when a vulnerability is found 
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is unknown. Alongside the range of values which the data exhibits is the shape, 
or distribution of the data. The shape of the standardised data is difficult to 
classify using standard normal distributions; however, it is possible to plot 
values to gain a visual overview of the behaviour. Therefore, the parameter 
space is taken to be in the range −0.01…− 0.17  outlined in Figure 18 below. 
 
Figure 18 - Reference mode for Sentiment for years between 2010 – 2016 (Normalised Average Scores) 
The reference mode shows a constant negative sentiment toward software 
originators and toward vulnerability discovery in general. As such we can 
assume that most if not all aspects within the VDDS are negative, or are 
perceived to be negative. There is a striking exception to this in 2015, where 
there is almost a neutral level of sentiment -0.01, suggesting that an event 
occurred to moderate the negative sentiment. At present the cause of this is 
unknown. 
5.4.2 State Variable B - Number of Vulnerability Discoverers within 
VDDS 
As identified in the previous chapters the vulnerability discovery and disclosure 
system is a sociotechnical system characterised by the activities of people 
using technology to discovery vulnerabilities. Therefore, we can assume that 
the number of discoverers that are within the VDDS at any given time is a proxy 
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measurement of the potential number of vulnerability discoverers within the 
VDDS that exist. However, there are data source that track the number of 
submissions whereby vulnerabilities and subsequent exploits are collected and 
reported. One such aggregation place is a well-known online database known 
as ExploitDB.com  (ExploitDB, 2017). ExploitDB.com is an archive of software 
exploits created by vulnerability discoverers which accompany vulnerability 
details typically to prove that the vulnerability exists and can be activated. 
Alongside the vulnerability and exploit details, the recorded published date of 
the exploit and crucially author is included within a freely downloadable archive 
of exploits.  
Bringing data of author and submission date together provides a valuable 
source of data that indicates both the level of activity, as vulnerabilities 
discoverers may publish more than one exploit proof, and the frequency of 
those publications.  
5.4.2.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
The ExploitDB.com data archive was downloaded and processed on 21st 
December 2016, and contains 36904 distinct entries. The archive runs between 
the initial entry and last entry, which are 1st August 1988 and 19th Dec 2016, 13 
years and 8 months respectively. The seemingly long and counter intuitive 
duration of recorded exploits within ExploitDB.com is due to the retrospective 
addition of historically significant vulnerabilities and exploits. For example 
details of the first recorded internet worm which exploited a vulnerability within 
Sendmail has been included (Orman, 2003). However, meaningful publication 
of exploits was recorded from April 2003, the establishment date of the platform. 
Initially data pre-processing was undertaken to clean and to allow statistics to 
be calculated. To ascertain the number of unique vulnerability researchers 
which exist within the VDDS duplicates entries were removed from the data, 
with recorded data of the first published exploit noted. With the removal of 
duplicate entries (exploit authors) this was reduced to 7843 unique authors.  
Table 22 below gives a summary of the descriptive statistics for the entry of 
vulnerability researchers into the VDDS.  
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Statistic Values 
Total Number of unique vulnerability 
researchers  
7843 (as of December 2016) 
Total Number of Exploit Publications  36904 
Date Range  Aug 1998 – Dec 2016 
Mean exploits Published (Per day) 2 (1.5 rounded up) 
Median exploit Published (Per Day) 2  
Mode Entries Published (Per Day) 1 
Table 22 - Summary Descriptive Statistics: Variable B 
To investigate the historical behaviour of the state variable a cumulative 
frequency graph was plotted.  Inspecting Figure 19 we can see that the number 
of recorded researchers starts slowly then starts to accelerate around January 
2002, prior to the setup of ExploitDB.com. The acceleration continues linearly 
until Feb 2011 where a slowdown begins to occur. The rate of researchers 
registering and submitting exploits to ExploitDB.com ranges initially from 6.2 per 
week, rising to 10.3 during the linear phase then reduces to 6.0 per week. Given 
the large number of users submitting in the linear phase, the data tends to be 
skewed in a positive manner toward the end of the time with a value of 0.183. 
Clearly this is only a snapshot into the potential number of vulnerability 
researchers that exist, and can potentially have a significant bias within it. 
However, this gives us a good indication of the number of vulnerability 
researchers that have reported vulnerabilities and exist on the ExploitDB.com 
platform. It is therefore reasonable to use this measure as a proxy.  
The mean number of entries per day was calculated to show that 2 entries per 
day are added to ExploitDB.com, with the maximum number submitted on one 
day as 19. The median value is again 2 per day, with the mode, or most 
common number is a single researcher entering the market per day. 
Participants enter the VDDS at a mean rate of 2 per week (rounded up from 
1.9). This rate is not constant and varies over the dataset with extreme values 
of 19 and 15 being recorded in Sept and Dec 2004 respectively.  
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Figure 19 - Cumulative Frequency Curve and Histogram for New Discoverers Entering into the VDDS 
Vulnerability researchers enter the VDDS and submit vulnerabilities and exploits 
to ExploitDB.com at a mean rate of 2 per week. Figure 20 below shows a bar 
plot with a steady progression and increase of new entrants into the VDDS 
peaking between Aug (228 entrants) and Nov (226 entrants) 2006 and again in 
Jan 2010 (283 entrants). Entrants then reduce in number rapidly to 39 at the 
end of the collected data in Dec 2016. The behaviour of entrants into the VDDS 
show an increase and then decrease of discoverers over a period of 15 years. 
There are potentially two processes resulting in the behaviour observed within 
Figure 20, new entrants onto the ExploitDB.com platform, and existing users of 
the platform. Activity of the vulnerability is explored further within section 5.4.8 – 
discoverer activity. 
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Figure 20 - Reference Mode Plot for New Discoverers Entering the VDDS 
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5.4.3 State Variable C - Vulnerability Removal Rate 
Removal of vulnerabilities from software is analogous to the software debugging 
process that is used to remove non-security related bugs (Klein, 2011, p.5). The 
debugging process comes in two distinct yet related forms, perfect and 
imperfect debugging (Pham, 2000, p.120). As previously discussed many 
studies state that the number of vulnerabilities that have been discovered and 
disclosed within software follows a sigmoidal growth pattern (Alhazmi et al., 
2005, 2007; Woo et al., 2011). Therefore we can conclude that the number of 
vulnerabilities that can be discovered within the software declines over the 
lifetime of the software (Woo et al., 2011). In the seminal work published by 
Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) they state that the perfect removal of vulnerabilities 
from within software systems is the key issue within software development 
(Alhazmi et al., 2005). Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) go on to define a measure to 
assess the removal rate of vulnerabilities from within software as a 
measurement of vulnerability density. Vulnerability density is measured over 
time and calculated as the number of vulnerabilities per unit size of code, made 
up of 3 parts; Known Vulnerability Density (VKD), size of the software (S), 
measured in lines of code and reported vulnerabilities within the system (VK) 
(Alhazmi et al., 2005). Known vulnerability density is a simply calculated and 
given by:  
!"# 	= 	!"&  
Equation 4 - Known vulnerability density (Alhazmi et al., 2005) 
The equation above assumes that the size of the code with the example, 
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, cited in Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) is static. Initially 
the number of known (reported) vulnerabilities within the software at time 0 
(zero) is 0 (zero) as no vulnerabilities are known. This initial state however does 
not take into consideration internal quality assurance processes, and removal of 
known vulnerability prior to release. From time 0 (zero) the number of known 
vulnerabilities increases, and therefore the known vulnerability density (!"#	)	for 
the total software package rises accordingly. Plotting the time of occurrence of 
  - 169 - 
discrete !"# events allows us to build a picture of the increasing, and eventual 
decreasing vulnerability attack surface of Windows NT 4.0   
5.4.3.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
Figure 21 below shows vulnerability discovery as density per month, showing 
individual density events (i.e. vulnerabilities being discovered per month) over a 
13-year period. The density events are assumed to incorporate the removal of 
vulnerabilities from the software, and in our case the software used to illustrate 
the concept Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. 
 
Figure 21 – Observed Vulnerability Discovery Density over Time Windows NT 4.0 
Consequently, an estimate of the number of vulnerabilities that are still present 
within a software system can be calculated. To estimate the quantity of 
vulnerabilities residing within software we can employ an approach that is used 
within software and reliability engineering. Known as survival analysis this 
technique is used to identify the occurrence and timing of events (Allison., 2010, 
p.1) and is used to understand data that is both censored, and time dependant 
(Allison., 2010, p.4). We can therefore use survival analysis techniques to both 
estimate the quantity of vulnerabilities that remain within the software and 
0
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estimate when this may occur. The survivor function is defined below where T is 
the time of an event: & ( = Pr + > ( = 1 − /(()   
Equation 5 – Survivor Function (Allison., 2010, p.15) 
In the case of Windows NT 4.0 the data is right censored from Jan 2010 when 
recording of vulnerabilities disclosures stopped and Microsoft declared 
Windows NT 4.0 end of life.  Survival curves, or more accurately in our case, 
vulnerability discovery curves are calculated by observing the time of failure ( , 
number of failures at time 1 , and the estimated number of remaining 
vulnerabilities 3 . The probability of detection & ( 	is calculated as the inverse 
function of the hazard rate (number of vulnerabilities detected). For example, at 
time (4, the hazard rate for windows NT 4.0 is defined as: &((4) = 	1 − 5675489  = 0.989 
Equation 6 – Survivor Calculation for Windows NT 4.0 
Showing that at time (4 the probability of vulnerability detection is 0.989 or there 
is a 98.9% chance of a vulnerability being detected within Windows NT 4.0. 
Table 23 below shows the probability of finding vulnerability within Windows NT 
4.0 during the course of the software lifespan.  
Using Windows NT 4.0 as an example of survival function applied to software 
vulnerability we can calculate the following information. At the midpoint of the 
software lifetime (2795 weeks), we can calculate that the probability of 
vulnerability occurrence is Pr(0.52), showing that there is a 52% chance of 
discovery of a further vulnerability being detected. Alongside this we can also 
see that within quartile 1 (0 and 1504 days) there is between 100% and 81% 
chance of discovering vulnerability. Within Quartile 2 (1504 and 4020 days) 
there is between 81% an 17% chance of discovery, and finally within quartile 3 
(4020 and 5499 days) there is between 17% and 0% chance of vulnerability 
discovery. All values also attract a 95% confidence bound, see Figure 22.  
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 Time 
(weeks) 
Number of Detection 
Vulnerabilities :  Number of Estimated Remaining 
Vulnerabilities ;  Probability of Vulnerability Detection <(=) 
1 0 1 1224 1 
2 458 16 1208 0.989 
3 498 1 1207 0.978 
4 526 1 1206 0.967 
5 562 4 1202 0.956 
… … 
  
… 
89 4678 21 82 0.053 
90 4709 34 61 0.043 
91 4731 14 27 0.021 
92 4768 13 13 0.010 
93 5499 21 0 0 
Table 23 - Life Table for Windows NT 4.0 (Source: Author) 
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Figure 22 - Reference Mode Windows NT 4.0 Probability of Detection Curve S(t) with 95% confidence bounds 
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5.4.4 State Variable D - Full disclosure and Coordinated Disclosure 
Ratio 
As stated specific choices are required throughout the discovery and disclosure 
process, from choosing to find a vulnerability to which disclosure route to take. 
The route of disclosure is a higher order variable, linked to both the disclosure 
sentiment and the monies that one may earn if the paid coordinated disclosure 
route is chosen. Given the stark difference in these choices, an understanding 
of the current ratio between full disclosure verses coordinated disclosure is an 
important indicator of how sentiment and rewards are regarded. The 
measurement of this ratio can also provide a weighting as to which choice, or 
which is the more probable disclosure route than the other to be chosen that 
can be included in any subsequent model. 
To ascertain the ratio of full verses coordinated disclosures a measurement of 
the quantities that have been disclosed via one or the other route is required. To 
calculate the ratios data was collected from the openbugbounty.org repository 
(OpenBugBounty, 2017) platform between 7th Sept 2015 and 3rd Jan 2017. 
Openbugbounty.org is a community operated platform for submission of web 
application based vulnerabilities where vulnerability discoverers can choose to 
disclose vulnerabilities in one of the previously discussed methods. 
Openbugbounty.org has made available the number of vulnerabilities that have 
been submitted to the platform and the number of full vs coordinated 
disclosures - Table 24 below shows an overview of the collected data. 
It is worth noting that a discrepancy exists between the officially recorded 
vulnerabilities from the NVD and the reported vulnerabilities from 
Openbugbounty.org. This is due to the fact that vulnerabilities reported on NVD 
are major issues that have significant impact, whereas Openbugbounty.org 
vulnerabilities are focussed upon web applications, and platforms. However, the 
ratio of full vs coordinated disclosure is still a valuable proxy for the state 
variable. 
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Date coordinated Full Total Raw Ratio 
(Coord:Full) 
Percentage of 
Coordinated 
Percentage of 
Full  
07-09-15 1930 29250 31180 2:30	 1930/31180 = 
0.061 (6%) 
29250/31180 = 
0.938 (94%) 
03-11-15 5223 37182 42405 17:124	 12.3% 87.7% 
07-02-16 14779 55306 70085 148:553	 21.1% 78.9% 
06-03-16 13607 59617 73224 136:596	 18.6% 81.4% 
19-03-16 12123 63079 75202 121:630	 16.1% 83.9% 
11-05-16 7440 75290 82730 8:75	 9.0% 91.0% 
18-05-16 9662 75898 85560 48:380	 11.3% 88.7% 
03-06-16 10094 77919 88013 100:780	 11.5% 88.5% 
05-06-16 10220 78107 88327 102:780	 11.6% 88.4% 
20-06-16 10377 79630 90007 103:796	 11.5% 88.5% 
12-08-16 38121 93103 131224 381:931	 29.1% 70.9% 
Table 24– Coordinated vs Full Disclosure Ratios From Openbugbounty 
N.B.The vulnerabilities totals vary between data points due to vulnerabilities being moved status from vulnerability 
disclosure choices at the request of the researcher, normally due to inaction of software vendor.  
5.4.4.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
The total number of vulnerabilities that were disclosed via the 
Openbugbounty.org platform was 131224 over a 11 month period, between 
September 2015 and August 2016. The number of vulnerabilities that were 
disclosed via the two differing routes is significantly biased toward the full 
disclosure route. This could be due to a number of factors including the 
disclosure posture of the membership of Openbugbounty.org, i.e. it is an open 
platform with no monetary reward operated by the Community of discovers. The 
discoverers who chose to disclose on the platform do so for kudos therefore 
have no incentives to coordinate disclosure other than for good ethical reasons.  
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Figure 23 below shows a comparison between full and coordinated disclosure. 
We can see the distinct bias toward full disclosure with a 15 to 1 ratio in Sept 
2015, however this ratio begins to close toward the end of the data collection 
period. 
  
Figure 23 – Ratio of Full Disclosure Vulnerability Vs Coordinated Vulnerability  
5.4.4.1.1 Analysis and Data Limitations 
Inspecting Figure 23, we can see that the ratio of vulnerability disclosures 
between full and coordinated is heavily dominated by full disclosures, with 
percentages of over 75% consistently disclosed via the full disclosure route. 
This is suggested to be predominantly a feature of both the platform, and the 
nature of the vulnerabilities that are being disclosed. Openbugbounty.org is a 
specialist web vulnerability disclosure platform, and as web vulnerabilities are 
suggested to be ubiquitous and of low value they are disclosed freely open 
(OpenBugBounty, 2017). However, we can use the ratio as an indicator of the 
propensity for discoverers to disclose in a full or coordinated way. One 
significant limitation of the data that has been collected during a small time 
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period, 11 months. This is due data not being readily available in a public and 
complete form. However, simple inferences can be drawn from the vulnerability 
ratio, and extrapolated within the VDDS model.  
5.4.5 State Variable E - Vulnerability Disclosure Interaction Time 
Vulnerabilities are critical to the risk profile of any organisation. Nevertheless 
any impact which may result from vulnerabilities is not realised until exploited by 
a threat actor (Marconato et al., 2012). As such, the time that is taken between 
the details of the vulnerability being disclosed and a patch or mitigation being 
created is critical. The time that is taken to fix a vulnerability is linked to the 
identified meta theme of time, influencing the behaviour of the VDDS as a 
whole. Coordinated disclosure encompasses both the giving vulnerability 
information to the vendor freely and the paid version, known as paid for 
coordinated disclosure. Each approach provides time to software vendors to 
produce a fix to the issue within the software, and typically a policy outlining any 
constraints accompanies the disclosure. These polices in general state that if 
there is inaction on the part of the software originator then the details of the 
vulnerability will revert to full disclosure and details will be published. 
Source  Data Source (Academic 
Journal, Blog, Commercial 
Report, Book, Broker Platform) 
Mean Time for Patch 
Availability (days) 
(Arora et al., 2010) 
Academic Journal 168 
(Arora et al., 2005) 
Academic Journal 51 
(Li et al., 2007) 
Academic Journal 52 
(Marconato et al., 2012) 
Academic Journal 107 
(Neff, 2016) 
Blog 113 
(Beattie et al., 2002) 
Academic Journal 64 
(Moore et al., 2010, p.94) 
Book 44 
(Manzuik et al., 2007, 
p.7) 
Book 120 
Table 25 – Literature Time Delays Sources 
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The figures given in Table 25 above show a wide range of interaction lengths, 
with the weighted mean number of days across all sources calculated as 88.5, 
with the minimum time reports as 1 and max being 3904 days (Arora et al., 
2010). The Figure of 88.5 days provides a measure of the time Microsoft takes 
to create a fix, and the interaction between software originator and discoverer. It 
also provides a time period for the vulnerability to transit the vulnerability 
process from discovered to patch creation and removal of the vulnerability 
5.4.5.1 Reference Mode Analysis 
In addition to the descriptive statistics gathered from academic papers, 
empirical data was collected from the HackerOne vulnerability broker platform 
and the full disclosure email archive (Hackerone, 2016; Seclists.org, 2002). In 
the case of HackerOne entries indicate the length of time that has elapsed from 
initial submission of the vulnerability details, to the public and coordinated 
disclosure of that vulnerability. In the case of the full disclosure email archive, 
process steps and the date they occurred are also included within the data 
describing the interaction steps with the software originator.  
HackerOne vulnerability disclosure data collected between 6th Nov 2013 and 
24th Nov 2015. The range of time it takes the vulnerability disclosure process to 
complete (the public release of vulnerability details) ranges from 0 day to 619 
days. The mean duration (indicated by the red diamond) for a vulnerability to 
transit the process is 77.4 days, with 0 days being the most frequent 
occurrence, indicating that a relatively large percentage of 5.04% (33 
occurrences) was fixed and publicly disclosed on the same day. When 
compared to the mean value, the median value of 39 days shows that the data 
is very positively skewed with a value of +2.49. 
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Table 26 – Descriptive Statistics for HackerOne Duration (Left) 
Figure 24 – Boxplot Showing Descriptive Statistics (Right) 
Given the heavy positive skewness (+2.49) of the data we can calculate that 
almost half 47% (308) the vulnerabilities total number (654) of the vulnerability 
disclosures that are disclosed via the disclosure platform HackerOne are dealt 
with quickly and within the HackerOne policy standard of 30 days (HackerOne, 
2017). 
 
Figure 25 - Skewness of HackerOne Disclosure Time 
5.4.5.2 Full Disclosure Email Archive  
Additionally, 2745 emails were processed between 18th Feb 2015 – 17th March 
2017 processed into 998 entries. The duration of the vulnerability disclosure 
Sample size 654 
Mean 77.4 
Median 39 
Mode 0 
Range 0 - 619 
Standard Deviation 102.8 
Skewness +2.49 
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process (the public release of vulnerability details) ranges from 0 days to 1612 
days. The mean duration (indicated by the red diamond) for a vulnerability to 
transit the process is 98.2 days, with the median value of 30 days shown in 
Figures 26 and 27. The duration of 30 days corresponds to an adopted policy 
from the users of the full disclosure email list for full public disclosure to occur if 
inaction or unsatisfactory events occur.  
     
Figure 26 (Left) - Discrete Process Steps (Email Archive) Figure 27 (Right) – Elapsed Time (Email Archive) 
The median value of 30 days shows that the data is positively skewed with a 
value of +4.39, showing that the majority of the data points are clustered around 
the 30 day point. Alongside this, a number of outliers exist which show a longtail 
of durations. Given the heavy positive skewness of the data we can calculate 
that over half of the data 72.1% is located to the left of the mean (98.2 days), 
and that 38.0% the vulnerabilities disclosed via the full disclosure mail list are 
dealt within industry standard of 30 days. As shown in Figures 27 and 28 
several outliers exist, however the quantity is relatively small in comparison to 
the rest of the data.  
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Table 27 – Descriptive Statistics for Duration   Figure 28 - Number of Disclosure Steps  
In addition, a useful metric is the number of interaction steps it takes for the 
vulnerability disclosure process to complete the transaction - the public release 
of vulnerability details. The number of steps ranges from 1 to 39, with the mean 
number of steps (indicated by the red diamond) for a vulnerability to transit the 
process is 4 steps, with the median value of 4 days being the most frequent 
occurrence. When compared to the mean the median value of 4 days indicates 
that the data is positively skewed with a value of +2.58, showing that a typical 
transition through the disclosure process takes 4 interaction steps. Given the 
positive skewness of the data we can calculate that over half of the data 67.6% 
is located to the left of the mean (4 steps), and that vulnerabilities disclosed via 
the full disclosure mail list are dealt with in 4 interaction steps of less. The large 
peak shown in Figure 28 indicating one step is the use of the full disclosure 
route, with one step – the announcement of the vulnerability to the public.  
 
 
 
Disclosure Duration Process Steps 
Sample size 998 Sample 
size 
998 
Mean 98.2 Mean 4 
Median 30 Median 4 
Mode 0 Mode 1 
Range 0 - 1612 Range 1 - 39 
Standard 
Deviation 
193.6 Standard 
Deviation 
3.79 
Skewness +4.39 Skewness +2.58 
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5.4.6 State Variable F - Monitory reward 
A recent phenomenon that has impacted the VDDS is the creation and adoption 
of schemes that allow discoverers to sell and receive recompense in the form of 
a gift or money for responsibly disclosing vulnerabilities (Bradbury, 2007; 
BugCrowd Homepage, 2017; Hackerone, 2016; OpenBugBounty, 2017; ZDI, 
2017; Zerodium, 2017).  The ability to receive recompense for the effort that has 
been expended is an artefact within the identified themes, and features heavily 
in the discourse that surrounds the VDDS. At present there are two preeminent 
open vulnerability platforms that operate alongside corporately run schemes 
from Oracle, Microsoft and Google (Google, 2017; Microsoft, 2017; Oracle, 
2017) known as Bugcrowd and HackerOne. Each of these platforms allows 
discoverers to submit vulnerabilities into disclosure programs and dependent 
upon the nature and criticality of the vulnerability, monetary rewards are 
presented to the discoverer. Unfortunately statistics on monetary reward are not 
made public by Bugcrowd, therefore only data from HackerOne was collected. 
Data was downloaded from HackerOne.com on the 17th December 2016 and 
processed using Matlab 2016a. The average cost for a vulnerability which is 
recorded via the Bug Bounty programme with for all software and companies 
registered on HackerOne is $1012.97, with a standard deviation of $2160.10 
outlined in Table 28 below. 
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Reward Count Percent 
 
Summary Statistics Cost (USD) 
  500 328 23.03% 
Mean  $1012.97 
100 196 13.76% Min / Max $1 – $20,000 
1000 110 7.72% Median $500 
50 82 5.76% Mode $500 
250 82 5.76% Standard Deviation $2166.10 
150 65 4.56% 
 
1500 43 3.02% 
200 41 2.88% 
300 40 2.81% 
3000 33 2.32% 
.. .. .. 
2750 1 0.07% 
3137 1 0.07% 
3500 1 0.07% 
3705 1 0.07% 
5040 1 0.07% 
5500 1 0.07% 
6000 1 0.07% 
6500 1 0.07% 
9000 1 0.07% 
12500 1 0.07% 
Table 28 - Table Ranked by Most Frequent Rewards Sum 
5.4.6.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
The median value of a vulnerability traded on the HackerOne platform is $500 
with mode also calculated as $500. The skewness of the data is heavily 
positive, with a skewness of +5.04, showing that most of the bounties paid are 
equal to or below $1000 accounting for of 1172 of 1424 entries (82.3%).  
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Figure 29 – Frequency of Rewards From Hackerone 
5.4.6.2 Microsoft Bounty Hunters: The Honour Roll 
In addition to HackerOne data Microsoft publish a partially complete list of 
bounties that have been paid to vulnerabilities discoverers known as the Honor 
[sic] roll, and is compiled on a quarterly basis (Microsoft, 2017). Data was 
accessed from the Microsoft website on the 2nd March 2017. The data contains 
61 entries with a price range of $500 to $125,000, median of $7,500 and 
standard deviation of $27,839.90.  
Summary Statistics Cost (USD) 
N = 61 
 
Mean 2013 $29,838  
Mean 2014 $75,000.00  
Mean 2015 $20,786  
Mean 2016 $15,741.38  
Mean 2017 $10,000.00  
Mean (All years) $20109.83 
Median (all years) $7,500 
Mode (all years) $1,500 
Standard Deviation $27,839.90 
Min / Max $500 - $75,000 
Table 29 – Descriptive Statistics for Payments 
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5.4.6.3 The illegitimate Black Market 
Alongside the legitimate market where discoverers are paid for disclosure, a 
black market also exists in parallel to the VDDS (Radianti et al., 2006). The 
black market is characterised as a place that is used to trade vulnerabilities for 
illegal purposes and is an unregulated market (Radianti, 2010a). Whilst this 
research does not consider deeply the mechanisms that exist within the 
vulnerability black market, we must however consider the influence the market 
has upon the wider VDDs. Consequently, we cannot completely dismiss the 
existence of the black market but include any known values that are placed on 
vulnerabilities within the black market into the construction of the system 
dynamic model. Many studies have considered the market price for illegally 
traded vulnerabilities and have provided estimates of those prices (Borgen, 
2013; Egelman et al., 2013; Malaiya, 2014; Miller, 2007; Radianti, 2010a; 
Radianti et al., 2006, 2007a, 2009; Siegel, 2013).  
To go further than merely writing about the black-market, one needs to observe 
the activities within areas of the so called dark web. As such data was gathered 
from a dark web site known as ‘The Real Deal’. The real deal is a vulnerability 
trading website that provides 0day vulnerabilities for use. The Real Deal is an 
openly accessible dark web site that requires no credentials and does not 
require authentication therefore is an open resource and falls within the ethical 
approval of this research. The Real Deal website was closed in 2016, however 
archive screenshots were collected on 17th Aug 2015 and show the value of 
vulnerabilities on sale at that time.  Vulnerability prices range from $466 to over 
$70K for issue that are present in Windows, Linux and Apple software, outlined 
in table 30 below. Raw data is available in Appendix A. 
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Vulnerability Type Advertised Cost 
(Bitcoin) 
Cost (US 
Dollar)  
SQL Injection (OSCommerce) 4.85619985  $1131.49 
Microsoft Office 0Day  91.053722836 $21215.51 
Adobe Flash 0day 60.70248558 $14143.67 
OsCommerce (Sql Injection)  150.000000 $349500.00 
Mailbird 0Day (Race Condition) 15.0000000 $3495.00 
1Linux 3.13.0-48 (Kernel Panic) 2.00000000 $466.00 
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 35.0000000 $8155.00 
Android Webview 0day (Remote code execution) 35.5000000 $8271.50 
Wordpress MU (Remote code execution) 4.50000000 $1048.50 
Microsoft Word  40.0000000 $9320.00 
Firebird 4.85619885 $1131.49 
OsCommerce (Sql Injection) 6.07024856 $1414.36 
Windows LPE 12.0000000 $2796.00 
Microsoft Internet Information Server (remote code 
execution) 
303.51242792 $70718.39 
Netis Core Router (Remote code execution) 6.00000000 $1398.00 
 
Table 30 – ‘the real deal’ black-market costs for vulnerabilities * (BTC to US Dollar was $233 Aug 2015 therefore 
final conversion is +/- $0.3 due to exchange fluctuations) 
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5.4.7 State Variable G - Number of Bug Bounty Programmes 
Coupled with the value of vulnerability the potential number of markets, of 
programmes available to vulnerability discoverers is a key part of the VDDS. As 
stated third party platforms exist to facilitate between vulnerability discoverer 
and software originator, some like HackerOne are open and transparent, others 
for example the ZeroDayInitiative do not provide details of their vulnerabilities 
other than to disclose once a predetermined time has elapsed. As such private 
initiatives, ran by the companies themselves have been established, and in 
some cases, monetary rewards. According to Vulnerability Lab, as of 3rd Apr 
2017, 495 discrete Bug Bounty programmes exist, each with their specific 
reward programme (Lab, 2017). Of the 495, 157 offer money for details of a 
verified vulnerability. Alongside this, low value gifts and public 
acknowledgement of the discovery is offered.  
5.4.7.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
Again, we turn to the HackerOne data for indicating new Bug Bounty 
programmes entering into the VDDS. Raw data was collected between 7th 
November 2013 and 31st Mar 2017, with a total of 3424 entries collected and 
transformed using the Python language to remove duplicates. The transformed 
raw data resulted in 176 unique programmes in existence on the HackerOne 
disclosure platform. The platform has recorded a new programme entry into the 
platform on average every 1.1 weeks. Each programme typically offers a bounty 
range for differing classification and severity of vulnerabilities. For example, the 
Uber disclosure policy states that it is interested in: 
 “Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Cross-site Request Forgery, Server-Side Request 
Forgery (SSRF), SQL Injection, Server-side Remote Code Execution (RCE), 
XML External Entity Attacks (XXE), Access Control Issues (Insecure Direct 
Object Reference issues, etc), Exposed Administrative Panels that don't require 
login credentials, Directory Traversal Issues, Local File Disclosure (LFD)” (Uber, 
2017).  
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Alongside this bounties of up to $10,000 are paid for critical issues (Uber, 
2017). This increase in programmes allows for the increase of coordinated 
disclosures to happened, illustrated within Figure 30. 
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Figure 30 – New Bug Bounty Schemes Timeline
  - 189 - 
5.4.8 State Variable H - Discoverer Vulnerability Activity 
Linked closely to the number of vulnerability discoverers within the VDDS are 
the discovery activities of the discoverers. To discover a vulnerability, one must 
expend effort to do so, and have a level of technical competency. The effort that 
is expended to find a faults and vulnerabilities within software has been 
extensively studied, with vulnerability discovery effort being considered to be 
analogous to the testing effort that is needed to test and debug software 
systems (Alhazmi, 2006; Alhazmi et al., 2005; Holm et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 
2016; Pham, 2006; Rescorla, 2005; Sommestad et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014; 
Woo et al., 2011). Pham (2006) defines two resources that direct the pace of 
testing, manpower, including failure and correction identification personnel, and 
computer time  (Pham, 2006, p.482). Consequently, identification and fault 
correction can therefore be considered to be analogous to vulnerability 
discovery and vulnerability patching.  
To estimate the effort a discoverer expends to uncover a vulnerability we must 
calculate the frequency of discovery per individual and the time that is taken.  A 
conservative estimate is that a period of 3 months is required to find one 
vulnerability, whereas other estimates state range 1.5	 … 		3  days dependent 
upon experience. (Holm et al., 2013; Nom, 2015; Sommestad et al., 2012). An 
effort model can be considered as a six stage process, with four distinct 
categories of discoverer, expert, intermediate, beginner and novice, each 
attracting a number of days to develop a vulnerability and exploit (McQueen et 
al., 2006). The mean time to discovery for the categories of discoverer range 0…122  days for expert, range 0…165  days for intermediate, and in excess 
of 200 days for beginner and novice  (McQueen et al., 2006).  
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Study / Evidence Effort Expended (Days) 
(Sommestad et al., 2012) 
{1.5 … 3} 
(McQueen et al., 2006) (Expert) 
{0 … 122} 
(McQueen et al., 2006) (Intermediate) 
{0 … 165} 
(Nom, 2015) 
120 
Table 31– Summary of Effort Ranges 
Given the wide range of recorded durations to discover a vulnerability the 
assumption is made that only expert and intermediate discoverers will be 
considered from the McQueen et al., 2006 study.  
5.4.8.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
As we are looking to derive the shape and behaviour of key variables from 
within the VDDS, two key aspects, the rate vulnerabilities are disclosed by 
researchers, and inter arrival rate are important. The importance of these is 
highlighted as System Dynamics models aim to show the flows of information or 
resources around the system, and accurately representing these within the 
model is key. By understanding the rate which vulnerabilities enter into and exit 
the VDDS allows the flow of vulnerabilities and disclosure choices to be made. 
Typically, the process of arrival is described as a queueing system, and specific 
notation known as Kendall notation is used (Ibe, 2011, p.64). As such we will 
adopt the same nomenclature, however this is for descriptive purposes only. 
Arrival rate is defined as per the number of occurrences per unit time, (Ibe, 
2011, p.31) and inter-arrival time as the time between occurrences. The unit of 
time is disclosures per calendar month, 30 days. 
Gaining a reliable figure on the number of vulnerability researchers that are 
within the system and active is difficult, but not insurmountable. As stated 
achieving a reliable figure on the number of vulnerability researchers that are 
active within the system is difficult, but not insurmountable. Again, we return to 
ExploitDB.com dataset which records the submission name and date of the 
discovered vulnerability. Utilising ExploitDB.com provides a reasonable 
indication of the number of vulnerability researchers that are active that have 
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reported vulnerabilities on the ExploitDB.com platform.  The activity of 
vulnerability researchers is a key indicator relating to the number of 
vulnerabilities that are eventually disclosed. As such the shape of the data is 
characterised as a series of disclosures, indicating the flow of vulnerabilities 
within the VDDS. Statistics were calculated showing the mean number of days 
participants took to discover a vulnerability, which was derived looking at 
published reports within on the vulnerability database ExploitDB.com. The 
calculated mean is 256 days, with the median value of 1 day, outlined in Table 
32 below. Therefore, the most common type of submitter only discloses one 
vulnerability to the ExploitDB.com platform in their lifetime, with this category 
accounting for 61.6% of all submitted reports. Inspecting the data, we can see 
that there is a heavy positive skew of +4.09, suggesting that the median value 
of 204 days is a more representative figure for the number of days a researcher 
is actively discovering vulnerabilities when we normalised and remove the 
single discoverer records skewing the data. 
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 Vulnerability Discoverer 
Name1 
First 
submission 
Last 
Submission 
Days 
active 
Frequency Current 
Probable State 
1 Metasploit 16-06-08 21-11-16 3080 1450 Active 
2 Google_Security_Research 04-04-13 20-12-16 1356 416 Active 
3 Luigi_Auriemma 17-12-02 29-06-12 3482 416 Inactive 
4 High_Tech_Bridge_SA 13-04-10 29-04-16 2208 409 Active 
5 anonymous 01-08-88 13-04-15 9751 359 Active 
6 LiquidWorm 22-07-08 16-12-16 3069 353 Active 
7 rgod 21-05-05 11-12-13 3126 333 Inactive 
8 indoushka 23-12-09 08-05-14 1597 294 Inactive 
9 r0t 23-03-03 14-03-10 2548 257 Inactive 
10 ZoRLu 17-02-08 24-09-14 2411 221 Inactive 
11 ajann 26-05-06 15-01-09 965 204 Inactive 
12 Lostmon 20-05-03 28-03-12 3235 188 Inactive 
13 shinnai 11-12-06 23-11-16 3635 176 Active 
14 Moudi 07-01-09 10-09-10 611 170 Inactive 
15 laurent_gaffie 15-09-06 09-11-16 3708 161 Inactive 
16 GoLd_M 07-01-07 10-08-12 2042 152 Inactive 
17 Kacper 12-05-06 15-06-09 1130 149 Inactive 
18 Stack 17-01-08 22-01-10 736 147 Inactive 
19 S@BUN 22-01-08 25-11-09 2411 143 Inactive 
20 cr4wl3r 03-08-09 24-12-13 1604 130 Inactive 
Table 32 – Vulnerability Disclosure Activity Timeline 
                                            
1	Groups of researchers exist within the dataset, for example Metasploit, High_Tech_Bridge_SA and 
Google_Security_Research. These groups are highlighted 	
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            Figure 31 - Amended Frequency of Activity Duration of VDDS Participants (Left)                                      Figure 32 - Amended Frequency of Activity Boxplot (Right)        
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Using the amended data mean lifetime of a vulnerability discoverer is 1,258 days, 
with a median of 866 days. Using the frequency of discovery, we can calculate the 
most prolific vulnerability discoverers find between 416 and 130 vulnerabilities during 
the active lifecycle. Table 33 below outlines the top 20 vulnerability durations with 
relative rank, frequency counts, active days and percentage accounted. 
 
All Data Single Discover Removed 
Rank Days Active 
on platform 
Frequency 
Count 
Percentage 
(%) 
Days Active 
 
 
Frequency 
Count 
 
Percentage 
(%) 
 
1 1 4830 61.61 2 50 1.66 
2 2 50 0.63 3 40 1.33 
3 3 40 0.51 11 38 1.26 
4 11 38 0.48 4 34 1.13 
5 4 34 0.43 21 34 1.13 
6 21 34 0.43 5 30 0.99 
7 5 30 0.38 6 30 0.99 
8 6 30 0.38 7 25 0.83 
9 7 25 0.31 111 23 0.76 
10 111 23 0.29 13 21 0.69 
11 13 21 0.26 14 20 0.66 
12 14 20 0.25 12 19 0.63 
13 12 19 0.24 9 18 0.59 
14 9 18 0.22 31 18 0.59 
15 31 18 0.22 8 17 0.56 
16 8 17 0.21 23 15 0.49 
17 23 15 0.19 15 14 0.46 
18 15 14 0.17 41 14 0.46 
19 41 14 0.17 51 14 0.46 
20 51 14 0.17 113 14 0.46 
Table 33  - Top 20 vulnerability discoverers with relative rank, frequency counts, active days and percentage 
accounted 
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5.4.9 State Variable I - Market Share 
Alongside the desirability of the vulnerability, the potential attack surface that is 
subject to exploitation is important (Alhazmi 2005). In the context of the VDDS, this 
can be expressed as market share of the software, or installed units. As the scope of 
this research considers operating system vulnerabilities, the collection of operating 
system specific datasets was carried out, namely Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X 
and Linux. More specifically, data were collected from three main sources, 
W3Schools, StatCounter and Wikimedia Foundation and compared to assess the 
accuracy of the data for the three collected categories of operating system. Data 
were collected between dates outlined in Table 34 below, and represents the 
percentage of market the software is used globally.  
 
Dataset Date Range Start (%) End (%) 
W3CSchools (Windows) Jan – 2008 - Feb 
2017 
82.8 77.50 
W3CSchools (Linux) 3.60 5.70 
W3CSchools (Apple OSX) 4.40 10.50 
Wikimedia Foundation (Microsoft Windows) Apr – 2009 – Feb 
2017 
89.50 39.40 
Wikimedia Foundation (Linux) 1.49 24.89 
Wikimedia Foundation (Apple OSX) 6.05 5.07 
Statscounter (Microsoft Windows) Jan 2009 – Apr 
2017 
94.42 84.01 
Statscounter (Linux) 0.64 1.65 
Statscounter (Apple OS X) 3.68 11.32 
Table 34 – Market Share Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.9.1 Reference Mode and Analysis 
Market share data represents the three most popular software products that are 
used globally. As such, they represent a significant attack surface of the software 
that is deployed, and per Alhazmi et al., (2005) the most desirable for software 
discoverers (Alhazmi et al., 2005). Given this assumption, we use market share as 
proxy of desire to discover, the larger the market share the large the attack surface 
and desirability. All datasets show a decline in the market share of Microsoft 
Windows software, from 82.2% to 77.5% for W3Cschools, 89.5% to 39.4% for 
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Wikimedia foundation and 94.4% to 84.01% for Statscounter over an 8 year time 
period. Whilst W3CSchools and Statscounter broadly agree (+/- 5%) the Wikimedia 
data set significantly differs from both W3Cschools and Statscounter. At present the 
reason for this deviation is unknown. Conversely, both Linux and Apple OSX show 
an increase over the same time period for all datasets, increasing between 2% and 
20% for all datasets over the same time period, 8 years, shown in Figures 33, 34 and 
35. Marketshare within the VDDS is a driver of the perceived importance of the 
vulnerability, and probable attack surface that can be exploited. This therefore has a 
potential baring on the price that the vulnerability is assessed to attract – the larger 
the market share, the more valuable the vulnerability.  
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Figure 33 – Windows Market Share 2008 - 2017
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Figure 34 – Apple OS X Market Share 2008 - 2017 
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Figure 35 -  Linux Market Share 2008 – 2017  
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5.5 Delays and Time within the VDDS 
Delays within the VDDS as stated in wider systems theory are a critical source 
of dynamic behaviour within a complex system (Coyle, 1977, p.34; Sterman, 
2000, p.409; Wolstenholme, 1996, p.15). It is evident that within the VDDS 
there are several areas which are both shaped by delays, influence the natural 
order of events, or fundamentally change how the system behaves. Four areas 
are discovery lag, disclosure submission, and confirmation of vulnerability 
details between vulnerability discoverer and software originator and the creation 
of a fix. Moreover, given the importance of the delays within the VDDS an 
accurate measurement of the magnitude of delays within the VDDS is crucial in 
understanding their influence.   
Delays within System Dynamics are characterised as either material, where a 
physical or logical exchange takes place (i.e. money) or informational where 
perceptions or beliefs are adjusted (i.e. sentiment) (Sterman, 2000, pp.411–
412). Consequentially, identified delays have been drawn from the thematic 
analysis, and paired with variables A through I in Table 35 below. Sterman 
(2000, p.412) states that to characterise the delay structure and behaviour, two 
principle questions must be answered; what is the average delay? What is the 
distribution of the average time delay? 
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Characteristic Delay Type Related Variable  Weighted Mean 
Delay 
Delay 1 Vulnerability Discoverer Skills and 
Discovery 
Informational Variable H 10.7 Days 
Delay 2 Coordinated Disclosure 
Communications (Platform) 
 
Material Variable E 
(Section 1) 
77.4 Days 
Delay 3 Coordinated Disclosure 
Communications (Direct to Originator) 
Material Variable E 
(Section 2) 
98.2Days 
Delay 4 Vulnerability Fix Creation Material Variable E & H Incorporate 
within Delay 2 & 
3 
Delay 5 Vulnerability Fix Dissemination and 
Communication 
Informational Variable E Assumed to be 5 
Days 
Delay 6 Awareness of Vulnerability Rewards Informational Variables F & G 10 Days 
(Estimated) 
Delay 7 Software Quality Informational N/a Unknown 
Table 35 – Delays and Variable Mapping within the VDDS 
Delays surrounding the initial discovery of a vulnerability is extremely variable 
and ranges from 1.5 days to 165 days and is highly subjective in nature 
(McQueen et al., 2006; Nom, 2015; Sommestad et al., 2012). Given the 
uncertainty and potential inaccuracies of the data we must therefore estimate 
the average time it takes a vulnerability discoverer to uncover a vulnerability 
using the empirical data collected and outlined in sections 5.4.5 – 5.4.5.1 
above, specifically Tables 25 and 26. The calculated mean days to discover a 
vulnerability in a piece of software is 10.7 days per vulnerability per piece of 
software. The choice upon which discoverers make their decision to disclosure 
via the full disclosure, or the coordinated route is influenced by both incentives, 
and the sentiment toward the software originator. As such the time delay 
associated with this decision is hard to quantify. Therefore, an estimated value 
of 5 days has been provided, derived from qualitative observations of the 
VDDS. The more pernicious delay that exists within the VDDS is the time lag 
between the disclosure of the vulnerability to either the software originator 
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directly, or via a third-party vulnerability disclosure platform. Specifically, delays 
2, 3, 4 and 5 are subject to prolonged interaction steps and delay, with the 
mean elapsed time of 77.4 days and 98.2 days respectively.  
Alongside the delay associated with reporting and confirming the vulnerabilities 
existence, the production of a software fix that corrects the  vulnerability is a 
further delay. This production is normally undertaken in parallel to the disclosure 
process, as the aim is to disclose the details of the vulnerability publicly, but 
cause no harm to end users. Subsequently, the production of a fix to the 
uncovered issue can be considered contributory to the delay which is 
experienced.  Dissemination of the details as to how the vulnerability can be 
mitigated is largely an automated process with the downloading and patching of 
software undertaken without user intervention. However, Resorla (2003) 
suggests that after 15 days 60% of affected software is patched, however 
significant improvements have occurred since the publication of this paper 
(Rescorla, 2003).  
Therefore, an estimated value of 5 days is provided. The receipt of rewards 
from third party disclosure platforms is imputed from available data as a single 
day as this is the final step in the interaction between software originator and 
vulnerability discover. The final set of delays 6 & 7 are ‘meta delays’, and 
influence all aspects of the VDDS insofar as the awareness of an alternative 
disclosure stance and the sentiment change over time. Both of these values are 
estimated due to the availability of data to base an assumption on and the 
probable errors that are latent within the collection of the data. As such the 
sentiment change that is stated is chunked into annual changes, therefore the 
most appropriate value to ascribe to the change in sentiment is 365 days. 
Alongside this the rate that a vulnerability discoverer may become aware of a 
new market of paid coordinated disclosure path is given as 10 days.  
5.5.1 Delay Time Distributions 
Having addressed the first of Sterman’s questions, we now turn to the aspect of 
the distribution of values around the mean delay time (Sterman, 2000, p.411). 
Delays measure the time that is taken for information or material to be 
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processed and transition through the system processes. This is measured by 
the input time (I), transit (T) and output time (O). Each delay within the VDDS 
operates differently, with varying impacts upon the output of the delay. Simple 
non-constant delays exist when material or information is processed in a serial 
manner. This is important as the order upon then enter into the delay, known as 
first in, first out (FIFO) dictates the processing speed, and hence delay time 
(Sterman, 2000, p.416). However, delays within the VDDS are not processes in 
serial, and exhibit a range of values which can be encountered by entities within 
the system. Therefore, delays within the VDDS are subject to 1st, 2nd and order 
delays. These delays manifest as cascading, or mixed delays whereby the 
transit of information or material is dependent upon the proceeding delay and so 
forth. It is worth noting that delays 1 through 7 will undoubtedly have a 
probability distribution that surrounds the mean delay time, however evidence to 
support an accurate construction of a probability distribution. Where accurate 
measurement is not possible, Gaussian distributions have been used, and 
values estimated.  
5.5.1.1 Delay 1 - Discovery of Vulnerability 
The time that is required to discover vulnerability varies widely (See Tables 25 
and 26 above). Consequentially, a more precise measurement indicating the 
potential elapsed time the discovery process takes is needed. To gain an 
accurate set of values, the ExploitDB.com dataset was used, more specifically 
the time intervals between discovery events for the top 5 individuals throughout 
their active lifespan. Data was processed showing the elapsed time between 
the 1st, 2nd and nth discovered vulnerability and a weighted mean calculated.  
Censoring was applied to remove zero intervals from all data to show 
meaningful comparison between discoverers.    
!"($) = 	 ( exp −($ 							!-.	$	 ≥ 00																																															    
Equation 7 – Exponential Equation 
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Vulnerability 
Discoverer Name2 
Frequency Mean Censored 
Delay Interval (days) 
Mean Uncensored 
Delay Interval (days) 
Luigi_Auriemma 416 41.4 8.3 
LiquidWorm 353 29.3 8.7 
rgod 333 64.6 9.4 
indoushka 294 69.3 5.4 
r0t 257 113.2 9.9 
Weighted Mean 63.5 8.3 
Table 36 – Top Five Vulnerability Discoverers Delay Interval 
 
Both Censored and uncensored data was used, to calculate time intervals for 
the top 5 discoverers resulting in 8.3 and 63.5 days respectively. The 
distribution for both uncensored and censored data follows the exponential 
distribution for all vulnerability discoverers. The exponential distribution is a 
continuous probability distribution with the following density function  (Ayyub 
and McCuen, 1997, p.107) shown in Table 36 above. 
 
                                            
2	Groups of researchers exist within the dataset, for example Metasploit, High_Tech_Bridge_SA and 
Google_Security_Research. These groups are highlighted 	
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Figure 36 – Delay time intervals for top five vulnerability discoverers (Left) 
Figure 37 - Fitted Exponential Probability Distributions for top 5 vulnerability Discoverer (Right)
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 Vulnerability Discoverer 
Name3 
First 
submission 
Last 
Submission 
Days 
active 
Frequency Current 
Probable State 
1 Metasploit 16-06-08 21-11-16 3080 1450 Active 
2 Google_Security_Research 04-04-13 20-12-16 1356 416 Active 
3 Luigi_Auriemma 17-12-02 29-06-12 3482 416 Inactive 
4 High_Tech_Bridge_SA 13-04-10 29-04-16 2208 409 Active 
5 anonymous 01-08-88 13-04-15 9751 359 Active 
6 LiquidWorm 22-07-08 16-12-16 3069 353 Active 
7 rgod 21-05-05 11-12-13 3126 333 Inactive 
8 indoushka 23-12-09 08-05-14 1597 294 Inactive 
9 r0t 23-03-03 14-03-10 2548 257 Inactive 
10 ZoRLu 17-02-08 24-09-14 2411 221 Inactive 
11 ajann 26-05-06 15-01-09 965 204 Inactive 
12 Lostmon 20-05-03 28-03-12 3235 188 Inactive 
13 shinnai 11-12-06 23-11-16 3635 176 Active 
14 Moudi 07-01-09 10-09-10 611 170 Inactive 
15 laurent_gaffie 15-09-06 09-11-16 3708 161 Inactive 
16 GoLd_M 07-01-07 10-08-12 2042 152 Inactive 
17 Kacper 12-05-06 15-06-09 1130 149 Inactive 
18 Stack 17-01-08 22-01-10 736 147 Inactive 
19 S@BUN 22-01-08 25-11-09 2411 143 Inactive 
20 cr4wl3r 03-08-09 24-12-13 1604 130 Inactive 
Table 37 - Top Twenty Active and Inactive Vulnerability Discoverers compiled from ExploitDB 
5.5.1.2 Delays 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7   
Delays that include the interaction between the software originator and the 
vulnerability discoverer are outlined in section 6.3.2.1 within chapter 6. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that the probability distribution that fits the data is again exponential. 
The exponential probability distributed was fitted to both the HackerOne and Full 
Disclosure email archive.  
                                            
3	Groups of researchers exist within the dataset, for example Metasploit, High_Tech_Bridge_SA and 
Google_Security_Research. These groups are highlighted 	
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Figure 38 - Interaction Delay Time Plot (Left)                                                                                             Figure 39 - Fitted Exponential Probability Plot (Right) 
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Figures 38 and 39 above show the exponential probability distribution that is 
exhibited with the weighted average delay being 154.4 days for HackerOne and 
234.6 days for the full disclosure email archive, when used in a direct way.  
5.6 Chapter Summary 
To conclude this chapter has described the methods used in the investigation of 
several key variables that have been derived from qualitative thematic analysis. 
The identified key variables where characterised numerically, along with 
descriptive statistics, outlining the behaviour of the variable over time.  
Several key findings have arisen from the analysis performed in this chapter. 
Specifically centred around time delays, disclosure steps and discovery 
activities. It has been shown that the duration it takes the vulnerability 
disclosure process to complete (the public release of vulnerability details) 
ranges from 0 day to 619 days. The mean for a vulnerability to transit the 
disclosure process is 77.4 days, with 0 days being the most frequent 
occurrence with the over half of vulnerability disclosures that are disclosed via 
the disclosure platform HackerOne are dealt with quickly, within 30 days. The 
average number of disclosure steps that discoverers have to negotiate is four, 
yet this can increase to 14 if over a long-time period.  
The next chapter describes the construction of the VDDS model, drawing on the 
findings from both the thematic analysis and exploratory data analysis 
presented in chapters four and five. The exploration of the themes, state 
variable and delays within the VDDS has provided a solid foundation for the 
construction of a System Dynamics based model. This model will allow the 
examination of potential strategies for vulnerability based risk reduction policies. 
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6 Modelling the Vulnerability Discovery and Disclosure 
System 
Thus far this thesis has outlined the building blocks upon which the VDDS is 
constructed. This chapter outlines the synthesis of all these aspects to construct 
a model of the VDDS.  Having discussed the nature of the VDDS, this chapter 
builds upon the qualitative Thematic Analysis and numerical exploration of the 
historical behaviour of the system. The analysis that has been undertaken has 
established the relationships within the VDDS, representative state variables, 
historical behaviours and initial conditions.  
The VDDS is made up of entities, interactions and delays, each characterised 
by a key state variable which has been characterised and quantified. Identified 
datasets were used to construct historical reference modes to provide insight of 
how these variables behave over time. However, to move further and begin to 
understand the systemic behaviours of how the VDDS operates, and crucially 
how state variables influence each other, we must construct a model of the 
VDDS. Systems Dynamics has been chosen to build and express both the 
variables and relationships between those variables in a way that allows for 
exploration of the interactions between them.  
To model the VDDS accurately we must first adopt a specific nomenclature to 
designate the aspects of the VDDS correctly. The terminology used by Voinov 
(2008) has been adopted so that entities, relationships and interactions are 
defined. Initially we start with defining an element which is considered to be a 
building block of a system, and is considered to have both properties and 
features (Voinov, 2008, p.7). Features are a distinctive property of system 
(Peter interacts with Paul), whereas a property is an attribute (e.g. colour) of a 
feature or Interaction is defined again by Voinov by describing the type of 
relationship that may exist between elements; specifically flows of material and 
information (Voinov, 2008, p.9). 
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6.1 VDDS Problem Statements 
To model any system or process one must adopt a process to investigate the 
phenomena (Sterman, 2000, p.85). Consequently, several process steps have 
been propsed by authors outlining the steps to be followed in constructing a 
System Dynamics model. The most comprehensive is outlined by Sterman 
(2000) which brings together process steps from both Coyle (1996, p. 11) and 
Wolstenholme (1996, p. 26-19): 
 
• Step 1: Problem Articulation (Theme Selection; Key Variables; 
Time Horizon; Problem Definition) 
• Step 2: Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis (Initial Hypothesis 
Generation; Endogenous Focus; Mapping) 
• Step 3: Formulation of a Simulation Model (Specification; 
Estimation; Tests) 
• Step 4: Testing (Comparison to Reference Modes; Robustness 
Under Extreme Conditions; Sensitivity) 
• Step 5: Policy Design and Evaluation (Scenario Specification; 
Policy Design; What if...; interaction of Policies) 
Adapted from (Sterman, 2000, p.86) 
Following the process steps outlined by Sterman (2000), we can see that 
chapters 4 and chapter 5 are dedicated to the initial step, problem articulation. 
Together, both chapters provide a foundation for articulating and defining the 
problem space, identifying themes and structures within the system and 
classifying key variables. To assist in the initial phase of constructing the 
dynamic hypothesis the formation of a high level problem statement is 
suggested by Coyle (1996) as a way to critically evaluate the system and 
problematic behaviour (Coyle, 1996, p.27). Therefore, a parsed narrative based 
on the thematic analysis outlining the VDDS is given below within Table 38: 
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The Vulnerability Discovery Problem Statement. 
A	software	originator	produces	software.	The	software	which	is	produced	is	released	
after	 a	 period	 of	 time	 and	 sold	 (or	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Linux,	 supplied	 for	 free)	 to	 both	
individuals	 and	 large	organisations.	 The	 time	 to	produce	 software	 is	based	upon	 the	
requirements	 and	 features	 that	 are	 set	 by	 the	 customers	 of	 the	 software,	 and	 is	
considered	 a	 complex	 undertaking	 involving	 many	 thousands	 of	 man	 hours.	 	 The	
software	 originator	 has	 never	 been	 able	 to	 produce	 vulnerability	 free	 software,	
however	the	desired	state	of	any	software	system	is	to	be	vulnerability	free.	As	such,	
quality	assurance	of	the	software	takes	place	both	prior	to	release	of	the	software	and	
afterwards.	 The	 pre-release	 activities	 undertaken	 consisting	 of	 the	 use	 of	 a	 ‘safe’	
programming	 language,	 utilising	 a	 development	 methodology	 and	 black/white	 box	
testing.	 Alongside	 these	 quality	 assurance	 activities,	 several	 secondary	 undertakings	
are	 also	 started	 namely	 marketing	 and	 sales,	 previous	 software	 release	 retirement	
activities	 and	 support/training.	Post	 release	 the	majority	 of	 software	 testing	moves	
outside	 of	 the	 software	 originators	 control,	 and	 is	 where	 vulnerability	 discoverers	
begin	to	test	for	issues.		
Post	release	a	interrelated	set	of	factors	influence	the	discovery	of	vulnerabilities	with	
the	 	 primary	 entity	within	 the	post	 release	discovery	 process	 being	 the	 vulnerability	
discoverer.	The	rate	which	the	vulnerability	discoverer	identifies	vulnerabilities	within	
software	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	 skills,	 software	 quality,	 previous	 experiences	 and	
tools	at	 their	disposal.	 There	 is	no	way	 to	predict	with	any	 certainty	when	 the	next	
vulnerability	will	occur.	
Once	identified	the	vulnerability	discoverer	may	choose	to	disclose	the	vulnerability	to	
the	 software	 originator	 for	 altruistic	 reasons	 (known	 as	 coordinated	 disclosure).	
Other	 courses	 of	 action	 may	 result	 in	 selling	 the	 vulnerability	 on	 the	 open	 or	
underground	 vulnerability	 markets,	 (Paid	 for	 Coordinated	 Disclosure).	 Paid	 for	
disclosures	 attract	 monetary	 recompense	 in	 the	 form	 of	 currency.	 There	 are	
potentially	 significant	 delays	 that	 occur	 when	 disclosure	 happens.	 Dependent	 upon	
which	 approach	 is	 taken	 will	 influence	 potential	 future	 actions.	 	 The	 vulnerability	
discoverer	can	choose	to	be	ethical	or	unethical,	which	is	considered	to	be	a	rational	
choice.	 The	 rational	 choice	 is	 based	 upbringing,	 altruistic	 leanings	 and	 so	 on.	 The	
choice	 is	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 narrative	 and	 discourse	 that	 surrounds	 the	 VDDS,	
which	may	contain	both	positive	and	negative	influences.		
The	number	of	vulnerabilities	that	continue	to	be	discovered	and	disclosed	continues	
to	rise	and	be	exploited	by	threat	actors. 
Table 38- VDDS Problem Statement 
The problem statement shows a structure that is dynamic in nature, and has 
multiple interactions and dependencies. Furthermore, there are a number of 
identified processes and time delays that interact both from a resource 
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transformation and information transmission perspective. For example, if we 
focus upon one aspect of the problem statement, the relationship between the 
vulnerability discoverer and software originator we can see that this relationship 
has been, and continues to be problematic. Interactions between these two 
elements of the system are inconsistent, time consuming and at a high level an 
aspect of mistrust exists between them (I_didnt_do_that, 2011). Furthermore, 
the discourse that exists around this interaction has been consistently negative, 
influencing discoverers decision making as to how vulnerabilities are treated.  
Selecting the most appropriate time horizon within the modelling process 
requires careful consideration of both how long the problem has been manifest, 
and meaningful enough to describe the problem itself (Sterman, 2000, p.90). 
Furthermore, the availability of data that allows exploration of the VDDS and the 
variables that make up the VDDS are of equal importance. Hence the time 
horizon that has been selected to model and simulate the VDDS is the time 
period between 1st Jan 1990 and present day (in the case of this research data 
collection stopped on 16th Dec 2016). The basis for the selection is threefold. 
Firstly, to gain the fullest understanding of the VDDS all possible and 
appropriate data must be included within the simulation and model. Secondly, a 
system as complex as the VDDS may exhibit behaviours that originate from 
simple interactions or delays from timeframes outside of the simulation windows 
in data is truncated.  Thirdly, all features, such as the introduction of new 
markets for vulnerability disclosure, ethical considerations and the emergence 
of the internet occurred in this time. Where data is not available to quantify 
aspects of the VDDS values have been imputed or, in the case of delays 
qualitative observations have been deconstructed to provide a reasonable 
approximation. 
6.2 Dynamic Hypothesis Formulation 
To begin with a dynamic hypothesis was constructed from the thematic and 
exploratory analysis to form a contextual and environmental evidence base to 
work from (Sterman, 2000, p.95). A dynamic hypothesis is considered a 
‘working’ hypothesis that initially guides and reduces a complex problem to 
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allow the formation of a theory of how the system operates (Morecroft, 2015, 
p.111). It is a widely held view that a number of fundamental modes of structure 
account for a large proportion of observed behaviours, and therefore can be 
explained using System Dynamic techniques (Forrester, 1958; Morecroft, 2015, 
p.111; Sterman, 2000, pp.118–132). Previous studies have indicated complex 
behaviour containing differing interactions between system elements 
characterised by feedback loops, delays and transformation rates may cause 
unexpected behaviours. These interactions are characterised by defined 
structures, which create patterns of behaviour and recur throughout nature and 
complex systems – commonly known as system archetypes (Senge, 1990, 
p.94).  
To construct our dynamic hypothesis, we must revisit the earlier chapter – 
thematic analysis – and the identified themes. To recap the identified themes 
were Perception of Punishment. Vendor Interactions, Disclosure Stance and 
Ethical Discourse; Motivation for Discovery and Disclosure Emergence of New 
Vulnerability Markets. These themes represent the ground truths that have 
emerged from empirical observation which indicate the structure of the VDDS. 
Coupling the phenomena under investigation (vulnerability growth) with 
identified variables and behaviours provides the necessary components to 
assemble an initial model.  
Considering the problem statement and thematic analysis together a number of 
key entities have been identified within the VDDS: 
• Software Discoverer;  
• Software Originator (Vendor);  
• Software Vulnerability Brokers (Paid);  
• Software Vulnerability Disclosure Platform;  
• Cyber Criminals;  
• End User; 
• National Governments;  
• Standards Bodies; 
• Law Enforcement; 
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6.2.1 Description of Entities of the VDDS 
Primary elements are those which are directly involved in the production, or 
discovery of software vulnerabilities and directly affect the behaviour of the 
VDDS.  The two primary elements within the VDDS are Vulnerability Discoverer 
and Software Originator. Both elements are fundamental to the VDDS as 
without them the system would simply not exist. As such these elements are 
characterised as central, and interactions with these elements produces the 
most behavioural change within the VDDS. 
Vulnerability	 Discoverer	 (VD)	 searches	 for	 vulnerabilities	within	 software.	 	 It	 is	 an	 active	 entity	which	ascertains	the	existence	of	the	vulnerability	by	drawing	upon	skills,	resources	and	tools	at	its	disposal.	The	vulnerability	discoverer	can	be	ethically	characterised	as	‘black’,	where	the	intention	is	to	provide	the	discovery	of	a	new	vulnerability	to	a	cyber-criminal	(CC)	on	the	black	market.	The	other	 is	 ‘white’	 where	 the	 intention	 is	 to	 provide	 the	 discovery	 to	 the	 software	 vendor	 (SV)	 for	fixing	and	dissemination.	A	third	course	of	action	also	exists	where	the	discovery	event	is	reported	to	a	vulnerability	broker	(VB)	or	vulnerability	platform	(VP)	where	both	the	CC	and	SV	actors	may	bid	or	pay	for	the	vulnerability.		
Entity	 Interactions:	 Cyber	 Criminal	 (CC),	 Software	 Vendor	 (SV),	 Vulnerability	 Broker	 (VB),	vulnerability	Disclosure	Platform.(VDP)	
 
 Software	 Originator	 (SO)	 creates,	 markets	 and	 supports	 the	 software	 which	 has	 the	 discovered	vulnerability	within	 it.	 It	 is	an	active	entity	which	creates	software	for	end	users,	and	relies	upon	the	 skill	 and	 resources	 of	 its	 employees	 to	 produce	 vulnerability	 free	 software.	 The	 software	originator	may	interact	with	Vulnerability	Discoverers	(VD),	National	Governments	(NG),	Standards	Bodies	(SB),	Vulnerability	Platforms	(VP)	and	Vulnerability	Brokers	(VB)	as	each	may	influence	the	production	of	good	quality	code.	The	software	originator	will	also	provide	patches	and	updates	to	the	software	once	a	vulnerability	has	been	discovered.		Software	Originators	are	considered	 to	be	 the	externally	 facing	aspect	of	 the	software	originator.	The	 software	 vendor	 is	 responsible	 for	 functions	 that	 are	 not	 undertaken	 by	 the	 software	originator,	for	example	sales	and	marketing	or	liaison	with	vulnerability	brokers.		
Entity	Interactions:	Vulnerability	Discoverers	(VD),	National	Governments	(NG),	Standards	Bodies	(SB),	Vulnerability	Platforms	and	Vulnerability	Brokers	(VB)	
 
Secondary entities are defined as those who have direct contact with software 
systems, but do not have a direct impact or influence on the production of 
vulnerabilities within the system. Secondary actors may influence the rate of 
discovery via policy or actions upon the primary actors. 
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Cyber	 Criminal	 (CC),	 creates	 and	 deploys	 the	 software	 vulnerability	within	 an	 attack	 vector	 (e.g	malware).	The	attack	vector	is	normally	targeted	at	end	users	of	the	software,	providing	a		level	of	risk.	 The	 cyber-criminal	 may	 interact	 with	 both	 the	 Vulnerability	 Discoverer	 and	 Vulnerability	Broker	to	obtain	vulnerabilities	for	their	use.	Both	National	Government	and	Law	Enforcement	will	interact	with	the	Cyber-Criminal	primarily	via	intelligence	gathering	or	enforcement	activities.	
Entity	 Interactions:	 Vulnerability	 Discoverer	 (VD),	 Vulnerability	 Broker	 (VB),	 National	Government	(NG),	Law	enforcement	(LE)	
 
 
 Vulnerability	 Disclosure	 Platform	 (VDP);	 interact	 with	 the	 Software	 Originator	 (SO)	 and	vulnerability	 discoverer	 (VD)	 to	 provide	 a	 service	 that	 provides	 post	 release	 security	 assurance,	and	 potential	 rewards	 to	 discoverers.	 The	 service	 that	 is	 provided	 is	 a	 typical	 broker	 service,	however	more	transparent,	and	provide	a	 level	of	control	 to	the	vulnerability	discoverers	as	they	adhere	to	full	disclosure	principles.		
Entity	 Interactions	 Software	 Originators	 (SO),	 Vulnerability	 Discoverers	 (VD)	 Vulnerability	Brokers	(VB)	
 
 
 Vulnerability	 Brokers	 (VB),	 is	 an	 intermediary	 between	 the	 Vulnerability	 Discoverer	 and	 the	software	 vendor	 or	 Cyber-Criminal.	 The	 broker	 purchases	 vulnerabilities	 and	provides	 a	 conduit	for	the	marketplace	that	exists	for	the	buyers	of	vulnerabilities.		
Entity	 Interactions:	 Software	 Vendor	 (VB),	 Cyber	 Criminal	 (CC),	 Vulnerability	 Discoverer	 (VD),	Software	Originator	(SO)	
 
Tertiary actors can be described as the actors who take part in the system but 
their effects are negligible, or there is significant delay in their policy decisions 
being felt upon primary or secondary actors. Additionally, the boundary between 
secondary and tertiary actors can be porous and may change rapidly.   
VDDS	Participants	
Entity	 Interactions	 VDDS	 participants	 are	 classed	 as	 entities	 that	 add	 to	 the	 discourse	 that	surrounds	the	VDDS,	yet	do	not	discover	or	disclose	a	vulnerability,	yet	impact	upon	the	sentiment	that	 exists	 within	 the	 VDDS.	 VDDS	 participants	 influence	 the	 software	 discoverer	 as	 they	 offer	opinion	or	experience	in	the	discoverer	and	disclosure	processes.		
 End	User	(EU),	receives	and	operates	the	software	that	has	been	produced.	The	end	user	is	directly	affected	by	the	vulnerabilities	that	are	present	within	the	software	as	they	may	be	used	to	subvert	security	 controls.	 Each	 end	 user	 will	 have	 a	 relationship	 with	 the	 software	 originator,	 either	directly	or	via	a	patching	dissemination	mechanism.	The	burden	of	risk	is	present	in	this	entity	as	they	are	utilising	potentially	vulnerable	software.	End	users	may	also	be	 involved	with	standards	bodies	 if	 they	are	 sufficiently	 concerned	around	 the	production	and	maintenance	of	 secure	 code.	The	end	user	also	controls	the	market	share	of	the	software	originators	product.	
Entity	Interactions:	Software	Vendor,	Standards	Bodies.	
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 National	 Governments	 (NG),	 provide	 governance,	 policy	 and	 regulation	 of	 the	 vulnerability	environment.	NG	also	provide	resources	that	may	influence	all	actors	involved	in	the	vulnerability	discovery	process.	NGs	may	interact	with	standards	bodies,	law	enforcement,	software	originators,	end	users	via	governance	and	policy	transactions	Security	 Information	 Provider	 (SIP),	 provides	 information	 on	 their	 current	 state	 of	 ‘active’	vulnerabilities	that	are	being	reported	in	the	wild.	The	information	provider	may	also	interact	with	Vulnerability	 brokers	 to	 allow	 time	 for	 security	 vendors	 to	 provide	 code	 fixes	 to	 vulnerable	software.	
Entity	Interactions:	Cyber	Criminal	(CC),	Software	Originators	(SO),	Standards	Bodies	(SB)		Standards	Bodies	(SB),	are	responsible	for	setting	acceptable	levels	of	software	code,	and	producing	guideline	 and	 methodologies	 for	 achieving	 the	 standard.	 Normally	 at	 a	 national	 level,	 standard	bodies	can	directly	influence	the	quality	of	code	that	is	produced,	and	is	normally	made	up	of	many	actors,	primarily	Software	Originators,	National	Governments	and	End	Users.		
Entity	Interactions:	Software	Originator	(SO),	National	Government	)NG),	End	Users	(EU)		Law	Enforcement	 (LE),	 are	 responsible	 for	 enforcing	 the	 law,	 tracking	and	disrupting	 criminal	activities.	Each	national	government	has	a	law	enforcement	capability	with	varying	efficiencies.	Cyber	criminals	are	transnational	and	as	may	cross	multiple	sovereign	boundaries	very	quickly.	Therefore	 the	 disruption	 activities	 of	 law	 enforcement	 may	 not	 have	 the	 desired	 effects	 or	impacts.		
Entity	Interactions:	Cyber	Criminal	(CC),	National	Government	(NG)		
Each entity typically has a relationship with one or more of the other elements of 
the VDDS. For example, the software vulnerability discoverer interacts and 
depends upon the software originator to produce a piece of software, and for 
that software to have vulnerabilities within it (Eduard Kovacs, 2011). Likewise, 
vulnerability brokers and vulnerability disclosure platforms depend upon 
vulnerability discoverers to find vulnerabilities within software so that they can 
sell to the highest bidder. Within the VDDS, as with most systems, a hierarchy 
of sub-system, system and super system exists, with differing elements 
operating within each, or across system boundaries. Again, adopting accepted 
nomenclature, we assign levels of primacy to the elements that operate within 
the system, specifically primary, secondary and tertiary. The levels that are 
ascribed to the elements are evident as they are central to the behaviour of the 
VDDS, see Table 40. 
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Figure 40– Entity Interactions Showing Resource and Information Transfers 
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6.2.2 Linking Raw Data to Model Variables and Structure 
As with any research that constructs a model from empirical observation, the 
ability to understand the lineage between raw data and the variables 
representing the data is critical. Establishing a link to how the variable is rooted 
within the data also provides confidence that the model represents the 
phenomena under investigation.  
 
 
Figure 41 – Relationships Linking Raw data to the VDDS Model 
For example, the set of codes that represent interaction with the vendor were 
derived from the raw data, and clustered around feelings, emotions, interactions 
with software vendors and punishment. Once synthesised Theme one – Fear of 
Punishment was created representing all the coded items from within the data 
corpus. Once all themes were generated, variables to represent the theme were 
codified and explored in the case of this example Variable A – Sentiment. 
Finally, the structure and interactions of entities within the theme and variable 
was constructed using causal and stock and flow diagramming techniques to 
form the disclosure subsystem within the main VDDS model. Table 39 below 
shows the linkage between the raw data and the VDDS in addition to identified 
structural delays. 
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Linkage  
Related Themes Variable Name  Delay Reference Structure Loop IDs Primary Subsystem  
 
 
 
 
V 
D 
D 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme 1: Perception of 
Punishment 
Variable A: Researcher 
sentiment  
Delay 2, Communications (Coord) 
Delay 4, Fix Creation 
Delay 5, Fix Dissemination 
Loop A Disclosure (Coord) 
Loop H – Full Disclosure 
Disclosure Subsystem 
Theme 5 Emergence of 
new vulnerability Markets 
Variable B: Number of 
Vulnerability Discoverers 
within System 
Delay 6, Awareness of Rewards Loop G Discovery 
Loop A Disclosure (Coord) 
Loop D – Rewards 
Loop C - Discoverers 
Active Discoverers Subsystem 
Theme 2: Vendor 
Interactions 
Variable C: Vulnerability 
Removal Rate 
Delay 4, Fix Creation Loop G Discovery 
 
Discovery Subsystem  
Theme 1: Perception of 
Punishment 
Variable D: Full disclosure 
and Coordinated Disclosure 
Ratio 
Delay 2, Communications (Coord) 
Delay 3, Communications (Direct) 
Delay 4, Fix Creation 
Delay 5, Fix Dissemination 
Loop A Disclosure (Coord) 
Loop B Disclosure (Direct) 
Disclosure Subsystem 
Theme 2: Vendor 
Interactions 
Variable E: Time to fix 
vulnerability from 
Delay 2, Communications (Coord) 
Delay 3, Communications (Direct) 
Loop A Disclosure (Coord) 
Loop B Disclosure (Direct) 
Disclosure Subsystem 
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coordinated disclosure 
Delay 4, Fix Creation 
Delay 5, Fix Dissemination 
Loop H Full Disclosure  
 
V 
D 
D 
S 
Theme 4: Motivation for 
Discovery  
 
Variable F: Monitory reward Delay 6, Awareness of Rewards Loop D – Rewards 
Loop F Participants 
 Active Discoverers Subsystem 
Theme 5: Emergence of 
new vulnerability Markets 
Variable G: Number of Bug 
Bounty Schemes 
Delay 6, Awareness of Rewards Loop D – Rewards 
 
Active Discoverers Subsystem 
Theme 3: Ethics and 
Disclosure Stance 
Variable H: Participant 
Activity 
Delay 7, Software Quality  
Delay 1, Vulnerability Discovery Skills 
Loop G Discovery 
Loop A Disclosure (Coord) 
Loop B Disclosure (Direct) 
Disclosure Subsystem 
Theme 5: Emergence of 
new vulnerability Markets 
Variable I: Market Share of 
Software 
Delay 7, Software Quality Loop E – Desire to Fix Active Discoverers Subsystem 
Table 39  -  Linkage between Codes and VDDS Subsystems
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6.2.3 Model Boundary & VDDS Structure  
To model any system one must choose the appropriate scope of the system, 
(I.e. what you wish to model) and bound the system accordingly. As the VDDS 
has been characterised as a wicked problem on a global scale, choosing a 
meaningful scope is challenging. Therefore, the scope of the VDDS will not be 
bounded by geography (as the VDDS is global in nature) or time (the VDDS 
time horizon encompasses the entire time of the existence of the VDDS), but 
will be bounded by primacy of elements and fidelity. In the context of this 
research we take primacy as to mean the importance and impact of the element 
on the system, and fidelity as the amount of data and insight we have on 
selected elements.  These two aspects of the VDDS have been chosen due to 
the concept known as bounded rationality; we have limited information about 
the system in totality, and cannot process the whole of the data generated by it. 
Sterman (2000) suggests that to summarise the scope of a system, a model 
boundary chart is constructed to limit the scope of the model, and clarify which 
variables are endogenous, exogenous and excluded from the model (Sterman, 
2000, p.97).  
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Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Variable A: Researcher sentiment Technology Trends Technology Trends 
Variable B: Number of Vulnerability 
Discoverers within System 
Number of General Cyber Attacks General IT literate Population 
Variable C: Vulnerability Removal Rate Government Policies Software Testing 
Methodologies 
Variable D: Full disclosure and 
Coordinated Disclosure Ratio 
Law Enforcement Gross Domestic Product 
Variable E: Time to fix vulnerability from 
coordinated disclosure 
New Business Opportunities Software Vendor Competition 
Variable F: Monitory reward Cyber Criminal Activity General IT literacy Population 
Variable G: Number of Bug Bounty 
Schemes 
 Globalisation Retrenchment 
Variable H: Participant Activity   
Variable I: Market Share   
Table 40 – Exogenous, Excluded and Endogenous Variables 
Each category of variable that is assessed within the system plays a part in 
influencing the behaviour of it. The different aspects of both endogenous and 
exogenous is the ability to affect change upon them. Clearly government or law 
enforcement policy is important and can impact the VDDS significantly over 
time, though time to change policy is slow. Similarly, cybercriminals and 
vulnerability brokers also have impact, yet the ability to effect direct impact upon 
them is limited unless you are tasked remit to deal with them (i.e. criminal 
arrest). Therefore, the boundary of the system is sketched in Figure 42 (page 
206) with endogenous variables highlighted in blue, within the model boundary 
and exogenous highlighted in yellow. 
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6.2.4 Sub Diagrams & Basic Mechanisms 
Sub-diagrams in the context of System Dynamics provide an overall 
architecture of the model, showing flows, structure and coupling between each 
element or sub system (Sterman, 2000, p.99). Sub-diagrams have been used 
extensively to aid in the development of the dynamic hypothesis, providing a 
high level overview, and bounding the problem space (Sterman et al., 1997, 
p.38).  
Using the sub-diagram and evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 one of the key 
interactions is between the software vendor, vulnerability platform and 
vulnerability discoverer. This tripartite interaction corresponds to the accepted 
ground truth within the literature about the software vulnerability system. At a 
high level the interactions consist of: 
• creation or reintroduction of a software vulnerability within the software 
that has been created; 
• discovery of vulnerability within the software under scrutiny; 
• trade of the software vulnerability; 
• disclosure of the vulnerability to the general public and patching; 
• profiting from vulnerability knowledge. 
The interaction between the software vendor, vulnerability platform and the 
vulnerability discoverer is crucial (detailed in Chapter 5). Once the vulnerability 
has remained dormant within the software for an undetermined amount of time, 
the software vulnerability is discovered by a vulnerability discoverer. The 
vulnerability discoverer is now required to make a choice, a) report directly to 
the software vendor or, b) sell the software vulnerability to a vulnerability 
platform. The notable difference between these two choices is that selling to a 
vulnerability platform introduces the notion of monetary gain.  
The interaction between the software vendor and the vulnerability discoverer is 
generally direct, and without the use of intermediaries. For a number of years 
this was the de facto way that vulnerabilities were disclosed to, and addressed 
by, the vendor and to the community. Historically the relationship was based 
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upon mutual trust, and considered to be the proper approach, so that if a 
software vulnerability was discovered it was reported altruistically and fixed. 
However, the relationship between these two elements of the system has 
deteriorated over time and a shift from responsible disclosure to full, or brokered 
disclosure occurred. Vulnerability platforms are commercial enterprises which 
trade vulnerabilities within the VDDS extracting value from the vulnerability by 
selling detection characteristics to their customers thus providing a degree of 
protection from publicly unknown vulnerabilities. Alongside these services, 
platforms may also provide interfaces between the software vendor and 
discoverer. Two further endogenous variables exist that influence the VDDS, 
those of third party talkers and end users.  
Third-party talkers are elements of the VDDS that influence the software 
vulnerability discoverer, software originator and the end user and impact upon 
the choices those elements make. Whilst not a distinct group of actors or 
processes such as a software originator or vulnerability platform, the discourse 
produced by the talkers is disseminated via social media or specific knowledge 
exchange platforms such as closed online forums. The discourse that surrounds 
the decision-making processes, specifically the disclosure stance with respect 
to vulnerability discoverers, is generated by actors discussing, quoting, 
amplifying and potentially distorting aspects of the VDDS. In almost all cases 
talkers who discuss the VDDS are not directly involved within the primary 
process of discovery or disclosure of vulnerabilities, but discuss the process as 
a third party. Alongside the third-party talkers are the final element of the 
endogenous VDDS, end users. End users are ultimately the consumers of the 
software created by software originators and the victims of potentially exploited 
vulnerabilities uncovered by discoverers and used by exogenous elements such 
as cyber criminals. Consequentially, the end user holds significant power in the 
ability to influence the VDDS, yet rarely does so. 
The exogenous set of elements and interactions are between the software 
vulnerability broker, cyber-criminal, national government and law enforcement. 
These sets of interactions are characterised by the illegal accumulation of 
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wealth or assets in the case of Cybercriminals. Cyber criminals may task 
vulnerability discoverers to ‘look’ for vulnerabilities within well used software, 
which in turn maybe used within malware. Conversely the cybercriminal may 
approach a black or illegal software vulnerability broker for a vulnerability to 
use. Each method of obtaining a vulnerability involves payment. The 
interactions between these entities is both transient and sporadic.  Black market 
brokers act as an interface to the criminal underworld where purchased 
vulnerabilities maybe used within malicious software or used to gain 
unauthorised access to information systems. The vulnerability discoverer is the 
key entity within the triad as without it vulnerabilities within software would not 
be discovered, other than unintentionally or by mistake. Vulnerability 
discoverers can be either individuals or groups. Each of these will share 
information and tools to enhance their capability to find software vulnerabilities. 
The final tertiary set of interactions, which are excluded from the VDDS are 
general societal or economic factors and impact. Each of these interactions with 
the VDDS are subtle and wide ranging. Specifically, general literacy and 
software vendor competition processes are hard to quantify and difficult to 
predict, for example the potential retrenchment of globalisation and nationalism 
in early 2017 (Green, 2016). 
There is a third option that is worth noting, yet out of scope of this research, 
vulnerabilities that are discovered and used by nation states. The impact of the 
actions and commissioning of contractors to discover issues within software is 
unknown, yet becoming a significant issue (Ablon et al., 2017; Goodin, 2017a). 
This is particularly acute when we consider the events that led up to the 
WannaCry malware outbreak of April 2017, which was allegedly based upon a 
US government developed vulnerability (Goodin, 2017b). 
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Figure 42 - VDDS Model Boundary and Exogenous Influencing Factors,  with model scope within black rectangle
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6.3 Structural Mapping of the VDDS 
Model boundary charts, subsystem diagrams and identification of historical 
variable and reference mode behaviours provide an insight as to how the VDDS 
is bounded, however they do not express in detail the interactions that exist 
(Sterman, 2000, p.102; Wolstenholme, 1996, p.17). To adequately formulate a 
dynamic hypothesis, we must utilise both influence diagramming (or sometimes 
known causal loop diagramming) and stock and flow maps. An influence 
diagram, according Coyle show the: 
“…influences at work in the system, the interplay of which is the cause of the 
dynamic behaviour”. (Coyle, 1996, p.18) 
Influence diagrams allow the structure of the VDDS to be constructed and map 
the interactions of all elements within the system boundary. Influence diagrams 
follow a specific notation, and this research will follow the conventions outlined 
by Sterman, Coyle and Wolstenhome (Coyle, 1996, p.22; Sterman, 2000, 
p.139; Wolstenholme, 1996, pp.17–20). Influence diagrams are used to capture 
the hypotheses about dynamic behaviour and feedback loops that maybe 
apparent, and consist of variables connected via arrows indicating the direction 
of causal influence. Additionally, each causal link is accompanied by a polarity 
showing how the dependant variable changes when the previous variable 
changes. See Sterman (2000, p. 138-139) for an expansive overview of the use 
of polarity and influence diagramming. The adopted notation for constructing the 
influence diagrams for this research is outlined in Table 41.  
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Negative Causal 
Correlation 
If the cause increases, then 
the effect decreases 
 
Positive Causal 
Correlation 
If the cause increases, then 
the effect increases 
 
Positive Informational Link 
Where physical flows do not 
occur 
 
 
Reinforcing Loop 
 
 
Balancing Loop 
 
Table 41 – Influence Diagramming Notation 
 
6.3.1 Total VDDS Causal Loop Diagram 
System Dynamics uses two distinct yet related techniques for modelling 
complex systems such as the VDDS; Causal Loop Diagramming (CLD) and 
Stock and Flow Diagrams (SFD). Each technique has a set of diagrams and 
nomenclature that is used to express flows and accumulations of quantities, for 
example the quantity of vulnerabilities that maybe present within a piece of 
software. By using CLD diagramming these variables are presented as words, 
and flows between them connected via directional arrows. 
Drawing upon the overall system VDDS sub diagrams and detailed evidence 
collected in the thematic and EDA phases a series of CLD’s to describe the 
system at a high level was constructed. The CLD’s provide insight into the 
overall structures that require investigation, focusing upon the causal links or 
loops that are formed within the system. More specifically influence diagrams 
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look to establish the existence of information and resource loops that interact to 
create potentially dynamic behaviour within the system.  The approach that has 
been selected to build an influence diagram is the list extension method outlined 
by Coyle (1999, p. 31-33), as the approach lends itself well to the nature of 
collected evidence. The list extension method provides a systematic approach 
to build logically consistent and robust influence diagrams, with the exploration 
of variables of interest at the heart of the method. 
The initial variable, and arguably most important feature of the VDDS is the 
number of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, or more specifically 
the deficit between the desired state, i.e. the number of vulnerabilities (zero), 
and the recorded number. The variable Vulnerability Discrepancy can be 
considered a direct analogue of the number of vulnerabilities that are recorded 
within the national vulnerability database. The first list extension yields two 
variables Quantity of Publicly disclosed variables and Desired Number 
of Disclosed Vulnerabilities. These variables have an immediate and 
direct effect on Vulnerability Discrepancy and represent the discordance 
between the actual amount of vulnerabilities and desire to produce vulnerability 
free software. The causal link between Desired Number of Disclosed 
Vulnerabilities and vulnerability Discrepancy is positive as once a 
vulnerability is discovered urgency is needed to disclose the vulnerability due to 
malicious exploitation. This may seem counterintuitive as software originators 
may wish to keep vulnerabilities confidential however, once the vulnerability has 
been located a patch must be created to mitigate the issue. The second list 
extension shows quantity of available undiscovered vulnerabilities 
within software and quantity of discovered vulnerabilities. Both 
variables represent the total quantity of vulnerabilities within software both 
discovered and undiscovered. There is a time delay between discovered and 
undiscovered vulnerabilities which is the time taken to uncover vulnerabilities, or 
discovery time. The third and fourth list extensions include the variables 
quantity of active discoverers, Monitory Rewards and Quality of 
software. Both quantity of active discoverers and monitory rewards 
form the driving force of the system. The number of active discoverers directly 
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influence the number of vulnerabilities that are discovered as the more 
discoverers that exist, the more the possibility of discovery. The level of 
proportionality will be explored later within the subsequent simulation chapter. 
Quality of software also influences the number of vulnerabilities that are 
available for discovery. Finally, the rewards that are used to entice both 
vulnerability discovery, specifically money influences the discoverers desire to 
discover vulnerabilities for profit. Each vulnerability element is considered to be 
a product of deeper subsystems that operate at a more granular level. 
Therefore, each element of the high-level influence diagram will be 
decomposed into further influence diagrams.  
6.3.2 VDDS System Archetypes, Delays and Loop Polarity 
Within the VDDS there are several loops that are immediately obvious, and the 
corresponding flows around them. Loops within influence diagrams are 
characterised as either positive (reinforcing) or negative (balancing) and act 
upon the variables by decreasing or increasing the value (Sterman, 2000, 
p.142). The initial loop, labelled Loop A, is identified as a negative balancing 
loop between vulnerability discrepancy, quantity of publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities and quantity of discovered vulnerabilities. The loop illustrates the 
interaction that has been characterised as the coordinated (unpaid) disclosure 
movement, where vulnerabilities are shared with software originators for the 
common good. The behaviour brought under control here is the growth of 
vulnerabilities within software. Loop B is a positive reinforcing loop between 
quantity of vulnerability discoverers and quantity of discovered vulnerabilities. 
This loop is the driving force of the VDDS when coupled with variable controlling 
the number of undiscovered vulnerabilities. The behaviours here correspond to 
disclosure of vulnerabilities, feeding into the discrepancy between desired, and 
actual recorded vulnerabilities. The third loop, (Loop C) is also a positive 
reinforcing loop increasing the number of vulnerability discoverers, thus 
increasing the number of discovered vulnerabilities.  The fourth and final loop 
that is present (Loop D) is included within the high-level influence diagram as it 
plays a role in the number of discoverers that are within the system, and 
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potentially which disclosure route will be taken. The influence of this variable is 
represented as the aggregate sentiment of how the software originator is 
represented within the community. 
Two distinct system archetypes exist within the VDDS, an exponential growth 
archetype and logistic growth (Senge, 1990, pp.379–384). Both archetypes 
operate different levels within the system and differ in primacy or dominance 
over time. The logistic growth archetype consists of a balancing causal loop, as 
the number of software vulnerabilities within the software is finite, and 
uncovering the vulnerabilities within software provide limits to the exponential 
growth of the discovered vulnerabilities. 
The quantity of undiscovered vulnerabilities within software variable is 
the theoretical maximum amount of vulnerabilities that are within the software. 
The measure is difficult to calculate; however reasonable approximations can 
be made by estimating complexity of the software prior to the discovery of 
vulnerabilities and by calculating the number of vulnerabilities at the end of the 
software lifecycle.  This measure provides an asymptotic maximum to the total 
amount of possible vulnerabilities that can be found within the software. The 
better the quality the software is, the lower the number of vulnerabilities that will 
be introduced, and with a lower level of quality the higher number of 
vulnerabilities. The pre-release software quality variable is a measurement of 
the practice and procedures that are used to create the software. The quality of 
the software is measured via the proxy variable of vulnerability density which 
allows us to measure the quality of the system, which is made up of a number 
of vulnerabilities and source lines of code.  A further exponential archetype 
exists alongside and interacts directly with Loop B, which increases the number 
of vulnerability discoverers within the system, and is dependent upon the 
availability of monitory rewards for finding vulnerabilities. Within this variable is 
the concept of researcher interest governing non-monetary motivation. The 
interest is directly linked to the number of vulnerabilities discovered, as the 
researcher is the sole entity who causes a discovery event to occur. A final 
archetype is represented as a delayed and broad interaction that is reinforcing 
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and increases the number of vulnerability researchers that are present within 
the system. Finally loop E feedbacks the value of the potential rewards that 
exist by disclosing via a broker or vulnerability disclosure platform. 
6.3.2.1 Casual Loop Delays 
Within the VDDS several delays have been identified ranging from interaction 
delays between vulnerability discoverers and software originators through to 
production of software fixes. Delays within the VDDS are both resource transit, 
and informational in nature, each occurring within differing parts of the VDDS.  
Delay 1 - Vulnerability Discoverer Skills 
Vulnerability discovery is a labour intensive and highly technical activity, which 
in some cases may take several years to become proficient in uncovering 
issues. Consequentially, there is delay in gaining the requisite skills and 
experience required to enter the VDDS. As outlined in section 5.5 previously 
delays impacts upon the number of vulnerability discoverers available to find 
vulnerabilities within software. 
Delay 2 – Coordinated Disclosure Communications (Via Disclosure 
Platform) 
One of the major delays within the vulnerability disclosure process is the 
communication between software originator and vulnerability discoverer.  The 
delay is a composite delay, cascaded with Delays 3,4 & 5. This delay cascade 
is the most significant within the VDDS and in some cases, may consist of 
delays of up to 3 years. The cascading nature of the delays is also a 
consequence of the risk upon which the software originator must mitigate. This 
differs from Delay 3 as a third party exists between the software originator and 
vulnerability discoverer. Details can be found in section 5.5. 
Delay 3 – Coordinated Disclosure Communications (Direct to Originator) 
Running potentially in parallel with Delay 2 is the Delay in coordinated 
disclosure delay direct to the software originator. This delay is comparable to 
Delay 2, however does not have a third-party mediating communication or 
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rewards. In addition, delays are normally encountered internally to the software 
originator.  Details can be found in section 5.5. 
Delay 4 - Vulnerability Fix Creation 
The creation of a fix to the issue that has been uncovered is highly variable and 
there is no standard time delay. It is assumed that the processes that cause 
delay are due to the complexity of producing a fix to the vulnerability and the 
serial nature of the processes that take place within the software originator. 
Details can be found in section 5.5. 
Delay 5 - Vulnerability Fix Dissemination and Communication 
Once a fix to the disclosed vulnerability details are produced it then needs to be 
both communicated that a fix exists and disseminated to vulnerable software 
users. The communication of fix details is in most cases immediate, however 
the application of fixes to software is dependent upon local complexities and 
policy Details can be found in section 5.5. 
Delay 6 - Awareness of Vulnerability Rewards 
The usage of vulnerability disclosure platforms has increased over the past 5 
years. As such the awareness of potential rewards via disclosing to the platform 
has also increased. The delay surrounding announcing new programmes or 
schemes is considered insignificant.  
Delay 7 - Software Quality 
Once created the quality of software is considered difficult to improve without 
significant resources and time. As such the usage of standards, improved 
development practices and skilled engineers to improve the quality of the 
software can in almost all cases take years rather than months or weeks. 
Details can be found in section 5.4.3. Using nomenclature outlined in Sterman 
(2000), delays are denoted by rectangles, influences with bold arrows and 
polarity of the influence at the end of the arrow.  
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The total VDDS is shown in Figure 43 below and outlines the major delays, 
feedback loops and most importantly the interactions between variables. 
(Sterman, 2000, p.442).  
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Figure 43 - High-level Causal Loop Diagram for Total VDDS 
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6.4 Total VDDS System Causal Structure 
The VDDS is made up of interactions, loops and delays that have an impact 
upon local variables that feed the flow of vulnerabilities within their subsystem. 
However, the VDDS is not a system that can be considered in a reductionist 
manner, consequentially we must observe the whole VDDS model as a 
complete interacting system. To understand the causality of the variables and 
stock within the model we must perform a rigorous analysis upon the model 
structure and investigate the propagation of influence upon behaviours. To do 
this a technique known as causal tracing was used to trace the reason of any 
change to that variable or stock, by  construction of a tree diagram (Voinov, 
2008, p.53). 
6.4.1 Discovery Subsystem Causality 
The causal structure of the discovery subsystem is centred on the rate at which 
vulnerabilities are discovered. Inputs to this variable are highlighted in yellow, 
and consist of Discovered vulnerabilities, VDDS participants, discoverer fraction 
and undiscovered vulnerabilities. What stands out in the hierarchy is the set of 
variables that influence the rate of discovery and the interaction between them. 
For example, discovery rate feeds back upon itself, and forms part of the causal 
substructure, thus forming an integral part of the balancing and reinforcing 
feedback loops that are present.  
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Figure 44 – Discovery Rate Causal Tracing Diagram 
 
6.4.2 Disclosure Subsystem - Full Disclosure Flow Causality 
The full disclosure flow within the disclosure subsystem provides the flow to the 
end state of public disclosure, in parallel to the coordinated disclosure flow. 
Again, the primary variable, full disclosure rate forms part of the causal 
substructure of the flow, influencing both undiscovered vulnerabilities and 
discovered vulnerability variables.  
 
Figure 45 – Full Disclosure Rate Causal Tracing Diagram 
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6.4.3 Disclosure Subsystem: Coordinated Disclosure Flow Causality 
Running in parallel to the full disclosure flow the coordinated disclosure flow 
provides a process route for vulnerability disclosure to occur. Again, the primary 
variable, coordinated disclosure rate forms part of the causal substructure of the 
flow, influencing both undiscovered vulnerabilities and discovered vulnerability 
variables. This is particularly important as the number of disclosures is 
mediated by the sentiment of the VDDS toward software originators.  
 
Figure 46 – Coordinated Disclosure Rate Causal Tracing Diagram 
6.4.4 Discoverer Subsystem Causality 
The final subsystem is arguably the primary engine within VDDS alongside the 
discovery subsystem. As such the variables that directly influence the flow are 
highlighted in yellow, with secondary and tertiary variables highlighted in blue 
and green. Again, the primary variable, conversion rate forms part of the causal 
substructure of the flow, influencing both potential discoverers and variables. 
This is particularly important as the number of disclosures is mediated by the 
sentiment of the VDDS toward software originators, increase the potential 
number of vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 47 – Discover Conversion Rate Causal Tracing Diagram 
6.5 Subsystem Influence Diagrams 
Within each extension there are lower level subsystems which exist and 
generate output, which feeds into the higher-level variables, and ultimately the 
discrepancy between the desired state of the system (i.e. no vulnerabilities 
present) and the actual state of the system (number of publicly reported 
vulnerabilities). Therefore, an exploration of the subsystems that are present is 
required. Obviously, there is a level of detail that is required to ensure that the 
exploration is meaningful, yet not too reductionist as to distract from the overall 
goal of exploring the systemic behaviour.  
6.5.1 Discoverers Subsystem 
Rewards within the VDDS for discovery are a relatively new phenomenon with 
the first of the modern Bug Bounty schemes being founded in 2007 (Bradbury, 
2007). Since the inception of the first scheme in 2007, the concept of 
legitimately being paid for the discovery of vulnerabilities has pervaded the 
discourse that surrounds the VDDS. Initially, large corporate entities such as 
Apple, Google and Oracle operated internal bounty schemes specifically 
tailored to their software offerings. This trend has culminated in the 
establishment of software vulnerability trading platforms that exist to broker 
vulnerabilities uncovered by discoverers and the originators of the software 
systems. In this model originators pay the broker to run a programme that 
advertises software for test, and payments are given for discovery. The rewards 
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that are given to discoverers are in part derived from the criticality of the 
vulnerability and impact of the vulnerability  and range (Hackerone, 2017). The 
range of bounties that are given via the platform range from ‘swag’ (t-shirts, 
mugs etc), to $30,000 US dollars. Outside the platform company specific 
bounties, for example the famous pwn20wn competition hosted at the security 
conference CanSecWest can offer bounties in excess of $50,000 (Portnoy, 
2010).  
The reward system is a simple set of interactions between platform, software 
originator and vulnerability discoverer. The software originator sets the value 
parameters of the discovered vulnerability based on the variables severity 
level, impact level and factors that are internal to the software originator. 
Once set, software is advertised and if a vulnerability is uncovered this is then 
reported to the broker platform. If proven, then a bounty is awarded. This 
interaction is via the platform and may take between 1 day and 12 weeks (in 
some cases much longer). The broker interactions are also tailored to get the 
most proficient discovers to focus their attention on software originators who 
pay the most lucrative bounties for discovered vulnerabilities, therefore there is 
a propensity to increase the bounty over time. The price of the vulnerability is 
set by the software originator. The price is influenced by the variable number of 
active discoverers, and feeds back to the price of the vulnerability. The more 
discoverers there are, the lower the price, and with less discoverers the higher 
the price. This is an example of the supply/demand theory within basic 
economics, and has been applied to information security more widely 
(Anderson, 2001a; Anderson and Moore, 2006; Sloman and Smith, 2006, p.15). 
The variable vulnerability price is key to the subsystem as it sets the 
variables and influences the quantity of active discovers within the VDDS. 
The loop that is formed between the price that is set per vulnerability and the 
quantity of active discoverers is a negative balancing loop as an increase in 
discoverers lowers the price available as there is a larger pool of discoverers.  
Alongside the legitimate trade in vulnerabilities between discoverers, brokers 
and software originators is the illegal trade of vulnerabilities between cyber 
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criminals and allegedly nation states (Ablon et al., 2017). The trade of 
vulnerabilities has been studied extensively, however is out of scope of the 
VDDS due to the opaque nature of the trade, and the scope of the ethical 
approval of this research (Fidler, 2014; Miller, 2007; Radianti, 2010a). However, 
to completely ignore the illegal trade in vulnerabilities would render the VDDS 
models that have been constructed incomplete. Hence the illegal trade of 
vulnerabilities has been factored into the VDDS model in the simple form of an 
exogenous information influence via the number of vulnerability discoverers 
whom are active within the VDDS and the discourse that surround the VDDS.  
 
 
Figure 48 – Vulnerability Discoverers Subsystem Causal Loop Diagram 
6.5.2 Disclosure Subsystem 
The disclosure subsystem within the VDDS is separated into 2 flows, full 
disclosure and coordinated disclosure. To recap, full disclosure is the complete 
and immediate public disclosure of all details of a vulnerability without 
consultation or remediation. Coordinated disclosure is the gradual release of 
information about vulnerabilities either direct to the software originator or via a 
third party. Full disclosures typically have only one interaction, which is with the 
community that inhabits or surrounds the VDDS. Conversely the coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure stream is split into 4 parts; unpaid direct, paid direct; 
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unpaid indirect and paid indirect. Each disclosure path is chosen by the 
vulnerability discoverer and is based upon the personal economic and 
philosophical drivers, and influenced by influences, for example the discourse 
surrounding vulnerability disclosure and sentiment toward software originators. 
The rate at which the vulnerabilities are disclosed is based upon the number of 
undiscovered vulnerabilities within software and the incentives on offer.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 49 – Vulnerability Disclosure Subsystem 
Incentives are influenced by the sentiment toward the software originator. If the 
sentiment is positive, then there is a higher chance of an unpaid direct 
disclosure occurring, with the paid indirect occurring if sentiment is negative. 
Alongside the process of disclosure are the interactions on the price upon a 
vulnerability discoverer may be receive one disclosed via a third party directly. 
The higher the price, the more chance the vulnerability discoverer will choose 
the paid routes to disclosure. 
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Unpaid Direct 
The disclosure relationship exists directly 
between the vulnerability discoverer and the 
software originator. All interactions are on a 1-
2-1 basis. Details of the vulnerability are 
passed to the software originator without 
payment, but recognition is provided. 
 Paid Direct 
The disclosure relationship exists between the 
vulnerability discoverer and the software 
originator. The vulnerability details are checked 
for accuracy and if proven remuneration is 
provided directly to the discoverer (ie 
CanSecWest). 
Unpaid Indirect 
The disclosure relationship is brokered and 
managed via a third party platform or individual, 
and sits between the software discoverer and 
the software originator. The identity of the 
vulnerability discovered is kept confidential if 
required. Details of the vulnerability are passed 
via the broker at all times and no payment is 
provided.(Ie US DoD). 
Paid Indirect 
The disclosure relationship is brokered and 
managed via a third party platform or individual. 
The software originator pays a percentage of 
vulnerability bounty or subscription to the third 
party for services (I.e. HackerOne). 
 
 
 
Figure 50 – Four Modes of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure  
6.5.3 Software Quality Subsystem 
The final subsystem that influences the VDDS is the quality of the software that 
exists within the system. The software originator produces software with 
vulnerabilities within it, and these are in turn discovered and disclosed over 
time. However, the rational desire within software originators is to release 
software without software vulnerabilities. Therefore, the pressure to reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities is a constant influence on all aspects of the VDDS. 
This desire shapes both the disclosure process, sets the price of the 
vulnerability, the availability vulnerabilities to find and impacts on the number of 
vulnerability discoverers within the VDDS. Consequentially, the quality of the 
software that is released is of paramount importance to the VDDS, as if the 
quality is high then there are less vulnerabilities to be found, and lower 
quantities of discoverers, disclosures and monetary rewards. This subsystem 
consists or a balancing loop with a delay, as the software quality processes take 
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both time both from a design and testing perspective.  The quality of the 
software within VDDS is dependent upon the standards and engineers that 
create the software within the originator. The software engineers typically follow 
standard approaches when developing software, and use standard tools and 
development environments when developing. Alongside this, the competency of 
the software engineer is also a factor in the quality of the software that us 
produced. The interactions within the software quality subsystem are linear and 
do not contain any obvious loops or system archetypes, however there is a 
potentially significant delay in training or obtaining sufficiently competent 
software engineers to develop code. Moreover, the ability to create and adopt 
software standards also contains a time delay.  
 
Figure 51 – Software Quality Subsystem 
 
6.6 Adding Rates to the VDDS - Stock and Flow Diagrams   
The construction of Stock and Flow Diagrams (SFD) is the penultimate phase of 
investigation of modelling the VDDS.   SFDs characterise the state of the 
system, information flows around the in each time-period. Furthermore, SFDs 
allows the creation of rate equations to govern the movements of resources and 
information around the system. The initial construction of the SFD builds upon 
the series of CLDs and extends identified feedback loops, and identified 
variables. The fundamental system archetype that is central to the VDDS is the 
  - 245 - 
interaction between two feedback loops, a balancing loop increasing the 
quantity of vulnerabilities within software, and a reinforcing loop removing the 
vulnerabilities. The interaction of these two feedback loops is classed as a 
second order non-linear archetype, whereby the balancing loop initially 
dominates and few vulnerabilities are found (Sterman, 2000, p.285). Once the 
balancing loop has iterated several times, the dominance begins to give way to 
the reinforcing loop, eroding the number of vulnerabilities that are to be found. 
This erosion slows the rate of discovery, and consequentially the rate of growth 
plateaus, with an inflection point marking the shift in dominance from balancing 
to reinforcing loop.  
6.6.1 Discovery Stock and Flow Diagram 
Observing the total VDDS reference mode, we can see there is the potential for 
a fundamental pattern of behaviour exhibited by the VDDS. Alongside this 
behaviour, are two well-known archetypes, as shown by the CLD – in particular 
‘fixes that fail’ and ‘limits to growth’ (Senge, 1990, p.379 and 388). Both 
archetypes exhibit behaviour that is like the total system VDDS reference mode, 
however, as they interact with each other they can be considered a summation 
of both. The limits to growth archetype corresponds to the discoverers the sub-
system and disclosure subsystem. Fixed that fail corresponds to the quality 
subsystem and curiously, disclosure. 
Hence the investigation of the exhibited archetypes using SFDs is a critical 
component to the characterising the behaviour of the VDDS. The archetypes 
consist of two related stocks, discovered vulnerabilities and undiscovered 
vulnerabilities. The rate at which vulnerabilities are discovered is directly 
controlled by the total number of vulnerabilities within software and the 
quantity of active vulnerability discoverers. Both variables directly 
control the rate upon which vulnerability discoverers find issues within software. 
Present within the SFD are two secondary variables Rewards and Sentiment. 
Both variables influence the quantity of active discoverers by increasing the 
efficiency, or rate which vulnerabilities are discovered per unit time. Together 
these variables have been labelled as a concept notionally termed within this 
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investigation as motivation as these drive the discoverer to uncover 
vulnerabilities.  
 
 
Figure 52 – Basic VDDS Archetype 
Each motivating factor changes over time as the sentiment or rewards for a high 
severity vulnerability, drives the motivation discoverers have in uncovering 
issues. Finally, the rate of vulnerability is the conversion factor of turning 
undiscovered vulnerabilities into discovered vulnerabilities, but not disclosed. 
Alongside these variables, resources flow back to the rate of discovery insofar 
as the number of vulnerabilities that have been discovered reduces the 
available number that are available for discovery. The reduction is the product 
of the balancing loop which is dominant towards the end of the discovery time. 
Within this subsystem there are several assumptions that have been made. 
Specifically, the number of vulnerabilities that are present within the software 
remains static and once discovered are removed from the software and not 
reintroduced. This is modelled on the software reliability concept known as 
perfect repair (Lin, 2011). Moreover, all vulnerabilities are treated equally, with 
attributes such as severity being discounted. Finally, the archetype does not 
include identified delays and all vulnerabilities are processes in serial. These 
simplifying assumptions allow for the exploration of the simple vulnerability 
discovery process, and more importantly demonstrate that a simple set of 
balancing and reinforcing loops can create a complex nonlinear phenomenon.  
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6.6.1.1 Discovery Subsystem Equations 
Equation 8 shows a set of simple equations for the conversion of Undiscovered 
Vulnerabilities (U) into Discovered Vulnerabilities (D) with the flow between both 
stock is governed by the Discovery Rate (DR) equation. Vulnerabilities flow 
from Undiscovered to Discovered when a discoverer finds a vulnerability, 
increasing the stock level. This then depletes the number of available 
vulnerabilities that are to be found. Vulnerabilities are found at a specific rate, 
known as discovery rate, measured as found vulnerabilities per month, or (1 
divided by month). Thus, the undiscovered vulnerabilities generate Udr 
discoveries per month. Additionally, the probability of finding a vulnerability is 
governed by the number of total number of vulnerabilities within the software (S) 
and number of discovered vulnerabilities (D) giving D divided by S (D/S). The 
discovery rate (DR) is therefore the total number of discoveries (Udr) multiplied 
by the undiscovered vulnerabilities (U) and quantity of discovers (Q) multiplied 
by Discovered vulnerabilities over the total number of vulnerabilities in the 
software (D/S).  ! " = ! " − %" + !'	%" 
!' = )	* !+  ) " = ) " − %" + −!' 	%" * = !'(1 − .) 
Equation 8 – Discovery Subsystem Stock and Flow Equations 
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6.7 Whole System Stock and Flow Diagram  
Having defined the fundamental building block of vulnerability discovery using 
both causal loop and stock and flow diagrams, I will now move to integrate the 
remaining subsystems, discoverer, quality and disclosure into the model. The 
causal loop diagrams detailed in sections 6.5.1 – 6.5.3 show the interactions 
between variables, and balancing or reinforcing loops. Nevertheless, to explore 
the model completely stock and flow diagrams with accompanying rate 
equations will now be presented.  
6.7.1 Discoverer Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
The discoverers sub system is a 2nd order nonlinear system representing the 
number of vulnerability discoverers that are active within the VDDS. The 
subsystem acts as a catalyst in the discovery of vulnerabilities within the 
subsystem as a vulnerability cannot be discovered without an active discoverer. 
Given this importance, the rate at which potential discoverers are converted to 
active discoverers is equally important from the general VDDS population. The 
rate upon which active discoverers are generated is based upon two variables, 
Total number of participants within the VDDS and Rewards available to the 
discoverer. These variables are located within balancing and reinforcing loops 
oscillating between dominance and submissive archetypes. The initial phase of 
the conversion is dominated by a reinforcing loop that drives the conversion of 
general VDDS participants to active discoverers. This conversion takes place 
slowly at first, then accelerates toward complete conversion of all potential 
discoverers. In this phase awareness of the vulnerabilities within the software is 
low, the rewards that are available is again low therefore there is a low number 
of discoverers available. As time progresses the potential rewards that are on 
offer drive the rate of conversion forward, and the greater the potential rewards 
that are on offer. The actual rewards that have been awarded are noted in 
section 5.4.6 and give rise to new potential discoverers entering the VDDS over 
time as the motivation increases.  
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Figure 53 – Discoverers Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
6.7.1.1 Discoverers Subsystem Equations  
In a similar manner to the discovery building subsystem outlined in section 6.7.1 
the discoverer subsystem is driven by the number of available discoverers. 
Equations 9 – 11 show a simple set of equations for the conversion of VDDS 
Population (TP) to Active Discoverers (AD). The flow from VDDS participants to 
Discoverers is governed by the Conversion Rate (CR) equation, with VDDS 
participants flowing from the potential discoverers stock (PD) to the Active 
Discoverers (AD) stock. Additionally, the conversion rate is also mediated by 
the Cash on offer (CA), resulting in a fraction increasing the Perception of Cash 
Rewards (PR) and the Sentiment fraction (SF). The conversion rate is the sum 
of conversions resulting from cash rewards, and implicit word of mouth adoption 
(adoption fraction constant). The conversion rate is also based on the sentiment 
toward the software originator and perception which are again constant within 
the model. Hence conversion rate is simply: 
 0' = +1 + 2' 
Equation 9 – Conversion Rate 
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 +1 = 2!	+1 
Equation 10 – Sentiment Factor 
 
2' = 03	31	2!	3!42 	 
Equation 11 – Perception of Cash Factor 
 
Both stocks feed into the conversion rate. As indicated previously the 
dominance of the balancing feedback loop at the initial phase of the conversion 
process is in part dependent upon the low levels of rewards and knowledge of 
vulnerabilities. Given these factors a large pool of potential discoverers that can 
be converted into active discoverers, search for vulnerabilities within the 
software. This conversion continues to increase till the quantity of available 
converts approaches a level whereby the dominance moves to the reinforcing 
loop, and continues to deplete the availability of potential discoverers at a slow 
rate. In turn the increase in active discoverers impacts upon the rate of 
discovery.    
6.7.2 Software Quality Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
Numerous studies have stated that software quality metrics can be used to 
quantify the number of software vulnerabilities within software (Concas et al., 
2007; Garrison, 1993; Mohagheghi et al., 2004; Nguyen et al., 2010; Shin et al., 
2011) Moreover, studies to undercover the correlation of Complexity, Cohesion 
and Coupling (CCC) metrics (commonly known as the Chidamber-Kemerer 
(CK) object orientated metric suite) with the number of vulnerabilities within 
software have also been undertaken (Chidamber et al., 1994; Chowdhury et al., 
2011; Lewis et al., 2015; Moshtari et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2011). Given this 
relationship the number of vulnerabilities that are within software and available 
for discovery is related to the quality of the software and the desire for the 
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software originator to produce vulnerability free software (Alhazmi et al., 2005). 
Here the assumption is made that the software originator has made a rationale 
choice that there is a complete desire to reduce the quantity of vulnerabilities to 
zero. Whilst this is practically impossible to achieve, the desire to achieve this is 
not. As outlined in section 5.4.3.1 the vulnerability density of software is given 
by equation 12, calculated by using the number of reported vulnerabilities and 
the size of the software. Using vulnerability density as a proxy, quality of the 
software ranges from low quality to high quality, represented as the vulnerability 
density of the software [0-1] calculated via million source lines of code (MSLOC) 
and number of vulnerabilities publicly disclosed. 
 
 
Figure 54 – Software Quality Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
6.7.3 Software Quality Subsystem Equations 
Figure 55 below shows two flows representing the quality of software with 
vulnerabilities residing within it. Vulnerability Density (VD) of the software varies 
all of the time, with a low density towards the beginning of the life of the 
software, and increasing towards the end of the lifecycle. Hence the density is 
governed by the size of the software, measured in million lines of source code 
(MSLOC) divided by publicly disclosure vulnerabilities (PD), resulting in 
PD/MSLOC. The desire to security the software is wrapped within vulnerability 
density. 
5! = 2!6+780 
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Equation 12 - Software Quality 
Delays within the system exist between the number of discovered vulnerabilities 
and the quality of the system, and therefore the number of vulnerabilities within 
the system. The delay is caused by the desire of the software originator to fix 
issues in a controlled manner, and the rate at which vulnerabilities are 
discovered, thus impacting the perceived quality of the software.  
6.7.4 Disclosure Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
The disclosure subsystem reflects the choice which a vulnerability discoverer 
should make when deciding upon a course of action once a vulnerability is 
discovered. The disclosure subsystem within the VDDS is separated into 2 
streams, full disclosure and coordinated disclosure. To recap, full disclosure is 
the complete and immediate public disclosure of all details of a vulnerability 
without consultation or remediation. This is a 3rd order nonlinear system that 
consists of Discovered Vulnerabilities, Disclosure Platform and Publicly 
Disclosed stocks. The initial stock that receives vulnerabilities into the 
subsystem is the Discovered vulnerabilities stock. The stock is directly 
connected to the rate of both full disclosure and disclosure platform stocks via 
the flow or vulnerabilities. Both the full and Platform disclosure flows are 
mediated by the delay which is encountered. Vulnerabilities flow around the 
disclosure subsystem as discrete units, processed one at a time, however there 
can be multiple instances of the process occurring in parallel.   
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Figure 55 – Disclosure Subsystem Stock and Flow Diagram 
6.7.4.1 Full Disclosure Flow 
The full disclosure flow is connected directly to the publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities stock, which is the final stage of the disclosure process. The 
disclosure rate is ruled by the fractional rate of disclosure which consists of the 
sentiment towards the software originator. Minimal delays exist within this flow 
as the choice to disclose by the discoverer can be considered almost 
instantaneous once the decision has been made. Given the instantaneous 
nature of the flow a potentially large amount of vulnerabilities can transit directly 
from discovered to publicly disclosed quickly. The rate that vulnerabilities 
flowing from the discovered stock consists of a disclosure fraction, and again 
consists of two feedback loops consisting of a reinforcing loop and balancing 
loop. 
6.7.4.2 Full Disclosure Flow Equations  
Equation 13 shows a very simple equation for the full disclosure rate that is 
encountered when a vulnerability is disclosed via the full disclosure route. The 
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flow is governed by the full disclosure delay rate (FDD) equation, with 
vulnerabilities flowing from the discovered (D) stock directly to the publicly 
disclosed stock, measured in vulnerabilities per month. The discovers per 
month is divided by the per unit time (FDD), thus D / FDD.  
1! = !1!!	 
Equation 13 – Full Disclosure Rate 
6.7.4.3 Platform Disclosure Flow  
Coordinated disclosure is the alternative flow that takes place in the disclosure 
subsystem. The main flow of vulnerabilities exists once a vulnerability 
discoverer has decided to coordinate the disclosure of a vulnerability either via 
a vulnerability disclosure platform or directly to the software originator. Both 
choices have been expressed in the SFD as a single flow that is mediated by 
the coordinate disclosure rate and the coordinated publish rate. Both rates differ 
insofar as they exist at opposite ends of the coordinated disclosure process, 
with published rate existing at the end of the process, penultimate to the public 
disclosure stock. The rate which vulnerabilities flow is governed by the delays 
between the discovered state and the coordinated delay stock, which acts as a 
‘buffer’ and is typically located within the vulnerabilities disclosure platform or 
within the software originator processes.   
6.7.4.4 Platform Subsystem Equations 
The disclosure subsystem contains three stocks, Discovered Vulnerabilities 
(DV), Disclosure Platform Store (PS) and Publicly Disclosed (PD). Like the 
discovery subsystem, flows from the discovered stock are mediated via rate 
equations. The platform flow consists of two rate equations. Platform Disclosure 
Rate (PDR) consists of number of vulnerabilities disclosed within the D stock 
(D), divided by the average platform delay time (PDT) and importantly. Similarly, 
the Coordinated Disclosure Rate (C) is mediated by Disclosure Platform Store 
(PS) and Information Delay Time (IDT). This subsystem assumes that a 
vulnerability cannot be rediscovered once publicly disclosed. Coordinated 
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Disclosure Rate (PDR) and Platform Disclosure Rate (C), which are commonly 
known as removal rates shown in equations 14 & 15. 
2!' = !2!4 
Equation 14 – Platform Disclosure Rate 
0 = 	 2+0!4 
Equation 15 - Coordinated Disclosure Rate. 
 
Figure 56 shows the full VDDS system with all variables, relationships and flows 
in place. We can clearly see the different subsystems, and flows around the 
VDDS.  
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Figure 56 – Full VDDS Stock and Flow Diagram 
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6.7.5 End State - Public Disclosure Equation 
The ultimate end state of the VDDS is the public acknowledgement of the 
vulnerability details, which may or may not result in a fix to the vulnerability. All 
vulnerabilities that are present within the system result, albeit after a potentially 
significant delay are recorded by the National Vulnerability database or via the 
software originator. In extreme edge cases the vulnerabilities may enter the 
VDDS and may never reach the end state due to inadequacies in software 
originator process (i.e. lost communication) or discoverer disinterest. Given this, 
the end stock of publicly disclosed must be in equilibrium to the discovered 
vulnerability stock. This equilibrium may take several months and years to 
result, but will ultimately occur due to the natural draining of the VDDS.  2! " = 2! " − %" + 1!' + 2!' 	%" 
Equation 16 – Publicly Disclosed 
6.8 Model Validity and Testing   
When considering any model that has been constructed from empirical 
observation it is necessary to test the validity and robustness of that model and 
check the utility of it under extreme conditions. The VDDS model is no 
exception to this rule, and as such a suite of tests have been performed to 
ensure the efficacy of the model. The accuracy of the qualitative aspects of the 
model have been validated via chapters 4 and state variables via chapter 5, 
what now follows is a set of test to check the validity of the model. Sterman 
(2000 p.859-p.861) provides a comprehensive list of tests that can be applied to 
systems dynamic models. These tests range from model boundary adequacy to 
sensitivity analysis and provide confidence that the model under test is accurate 
and reflects reality as precisely as possible. From the list provided by Sterman a 
selection of the most applicable were chosen and is given in Table 42 below.
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Test Purpose & Checks Procedures for Checking Addressed In 
Sections 
Boundary 
Adequacy  
1. Important concepts addressed? 
2. Behaviour of model change when boundary changes? 
 
• Model boundary charts 
• Subsystem Diagrams 
• Causal,  Stock and Flow Diagrams 
6.2.4, 6.3.1 
6.4.1 – 6.7.5 
Structure 
Assessment  
1. Structure consistent with problem description? 
2. Model conform to basic physical laws? 
3. Decision rules capture behaviour of the system? 
• Causal and Stock and flow diagrams 
• Interviews, workshops, expert opinion 
• Partial model tests 
Chapter 46.4.1 – 
6.7.5 &Chapter 7 
Dimensional 
Consistency  
1. Are the equations consistent without use of parameters without real world 
meaning? 
• Direct inspection of equations 
 6.4.1 – 6.7.5 
 
Parameter 
assessment 
1. Are parameter values consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge 
of the system? 
2. Do parameters have real world counterparts? 
• Use statistical model to estimate parameters 
• Use partial models to calibrate subsystems 
• Use judgemental methods based on interviews and expert opinion 
Chapter 5 
Extreme 
Conditions 
1. Does each equation make sense when inputs are extreme? 
2. Does the model respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks and 
parameters? 
• Equation inspections 
• Test response to extreme values 
• Subject model to large shocks and extreme conditions 
• Examine conformance to basic physical laws (no inventory etc) 
6.4.1 – 6.7.5 
Chapter 7 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
1. Numerical sensitivity, do the numerical values change the behaviour of the system 
significantly when assumptions are altered? 
2. Behavioural Sensitivity, do the modes of behaviour change when assumptions are 
altered? 
3. Policy Sensitivity do policy implications change when assumptions are altered? 
• Perform univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis 
• Use analytic methods such as global stability analysis 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Behaviour 
reproduction 
1. Does the model reproduce the behaviour of the phenomena under investigation? 
2. Does it endogenously generate symptoms of difficulty motivating the study? 
3. Does the model generate the various modes of the system? 
4. Do frequencies and phase relationships among variables match the data? 
• Compute statistical measures of correspondence between model and data; 
descriptive statistics; 
• Compare model output to and data quantitatively including modes of 
behaviour, shape of variables etc. 
 
Chapter 7 
Behaviour 
Anomaly 
1. Do anomalous behaviours result when assumptions of the model are changed?  
• Replace equilibrium assumptions with disequilibrium assumptions  
 
Chapter 7 
Table 42 – Model Tests Source :Adapted from (Sterman, 2000, pp.859–891)
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Model checking and testing was performed throughout the collection of data, 
production of analysis and construction of the VDDS model in vivo. As such the 
steps that address the model tests are indicated in the rightmost column of 
Table 42 above, with references to the appropriate section. 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
Thus, far this thesis has argued that both causal loop and stock and flow 
diagrams can adequately represent the complexity of the VDDS. This chapter 
has described the methods used in this investigation and has shown the 
structure of the VDDS, interactions between entities and introduced delays 
which are analogous to delays in processing vulnerabilities. It has also shown 
the differing interactions between four subsystems and how those sub systems 
interact. A key system archetype that is prevalent throughout the VDDS was 
used to represent how the flow of vulnerabilities are mediated and governed 
throughout the VDDS. Two fundamental archetypes (Limits to Growth and fixes 
that fail) characterises the interactions of the sub systems. Within reinforcing 
loops depleting the initial stock of vulnerabilities and discoverers and passing 
these to the subsequent stocks of disclosed vulnerabilities or active discoverers. 
Furthermore, a suite of tests was provided and evidence of the robustness of 
the model given. The next chapter describes the procedures and methods to 
evaluate and test both the model and the hypotheses presented in chapter one 
– what is driving the increase of vulnerabilities with commercial off the shelf 
software.  
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7 Simulation and Analysis 
The aim of this investigation is to understand the factors that underlying the 
increase of vulnerabilities within the vulnerability discovery and disclosure 
system. This chapter now turns to exploring the numerical and policy sensitivity 
of the constructed VDDS model. To do this quantitative data was drawn from 
empirical observations (chapter five) indicating behaviour and initial parameter 
space. I will present the principle findings of both current policy decisions that 
shape the existing system and potential strategies that may improve the status 
quo. These policies do not only suggest differing values for current variables 
and rates, but new process flows and stocks to reduce vulnerability centred risk.  
To restate the main aspects of this investigation outlined in in the initial chapter: 
What are the constituent parts, dynamics and structures of the COTS legitimate 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure system? 
 And; 
What are is the potential impacts of strategies employed to reduce vulnerability 
centred risk? 
It is the latter part of this research question that is the focus of this penultimate 
chapter. To observe the behaviour of the VDDS under simulated conditions 
allows the exploration of key interactions and variables. This exploration can 
provide the basis for the development of new policies and strategies for dealing 
with vulnerability based risk going forward. Given this need the appropriate 
strategies have been selected to both test the model for real world 
comprehension, and record how changes in in key variables affect the 
simulated outcome.  
7.1 Simulation Scenarios 
The vulnerability discovery and disclosure system is influenced by endogenous 
variables alongside the exogenous variables sitting outside the system 
boundary. As such the endogenous state variables form part of the policy 
makeup, and influence the behaviour of the system. To understand how the 
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system behaves in the existing, or baseline configuration of the model real 
world values a series of initialisation values have been selected from previous 
analysis. These values are derived from empirical observation from previously 
published work, and via Chapters four and five. 
To explore the model three simulation scenarios have been chosen. These 
scenarios have been selected to represent plausible scenarios that could be 
adopted by entities whose impact on the VDDS is material. The initial simulation 
(not including the calibration and baseline simulation) is the variation of the 
rewards that are available for discovery of vulnerabilities. As stated in chapter 
four, thematic analysis, the provision of monetary rewards for details of 
vulnerabilities is a relatively recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, the advent of 
the rewards system has generated an increase in the number of discoverers 
that have entered the VDDS as active discoverers and provided resources to 
devote more effort to finding vulnerabilities. Given this increase in rewards, and 
the recompense that is on offer, it is logical to assume that the larger, or more 
readily available the rewards that are, the greater the number of vulnerabilities 
that will be discovered via the coordinated disclosure flow.  
The second scenario that has been chosen is the varying of the quality of the 
software that contains vulnerabilities. The concept under investigation within 
this scenario is the premise that the higher the quality of software that is 
produced, the lower the number of inherent vulnerabilities that are available for 
discovery and hence the lower potential risk. Thirdly, a key aspect of the VDDS 
is the social or human characteristics within it. As such the notion of sentiment 
was identified, and is us used as a proxy for theme known as perception of 
punishment (sections 4.7.3 and 5.4.1) as key to the motivation and the 
subsequent decision points within the discoverers place within the VDDS.  
Aspects under investigation are the variation and impact of both positive and 
negative sentiment upon the VDDS and the outcomes forthwith. Finally, the last 
scenario is the elongation and reduction of delays within the VDDS. As shown, 
delays in communication between software discoverers and software originators 
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are a source of frustration, and ultimately risk, as the default position of full 
disclosure is often exercised when tensions overflow (Dan, 2011).  
The VDDS can be split into 3 specific epochs when characterising the evolution 
of the system. The initial epoch can be describing as uncontrolled and 
constrained growth of vulnerabilities, with the time span running from the mid 
1990’s through to approximately 2009-10. This defining characteristic of epoch 
1 is the demonisation of the vulnerability discoverer, and increasing 
dependence of society upon a vulnerable information system to conduct 
commerce and communications. Epoch 2, commences around 2010 with the 
advancement of vulnerability disclosure platforms, and a change in perception 
towards vulnerability discoverers from software originators and rewards being 
offered. The defining characteristic of epoch 2 is the emergence of new markets 
for vulnerabilities and associated rewards. Epoch 2 is currently underway. 
Epoch 3, is speculative and almost certainly consists of new markets and 
services, with an acknowledgement that vulnerabilities are central to the risk 
mitigation process.  Epoch three may take the form of one of the three possible 
futures, flat, steady or exponential dependent upon the conditions of the system 
at that time. 
7.1.1 Simulation Tool 
The simulation tool that was chosen to construct both the CLD, SFD and 
undertake simulation runs was ISEE Systems iThink v10.0.6. iThink is an 
industry standard tool to construct system dynamic models, and undertake 
simulations to investigate the behaviour of implemented models.  
7.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
Sterman (2000, p.883) argues that all models are wrong, and so require testing 
to establish the robustness of models, and confidence in any conclusions made. 
Therefore, in addition to the comprehensive set of robustness tests outlined in 
Table 42, a set of analytical tests to characterise the sensitivity of policy and 
numerical assumptions is presented. The numerical or parameter sensitivity 
tests are performed by varying a local variable parameter and noting how the 
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behaviour changes (Hekimoglu and Barlas, 1996). Parameters in the case of 
the tests that have been used to test the VDDS model are both incremented 
within the parameter space of the variable, or drawn from observed probability 
distributions.  
7.2 Baseline Simulation 
Establishing a baseline of how the model behaves, with normal, or average 
parameters is of importance. However how the baseline reflects the reality of 
the VDDS in the real-world is of critical importance. As such values were 
selected from the exploratory data analysis thus providing an observed set of 
initial conditions upon which to explore the VDDS model.  The initial conditions 
for the baseline simulation run are presented in Table 43 below, showing values 
for all state variables. The initial values of these parameters were chosen to be 
the most representative of an average software application, in our case 
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. The values provide both an average set of values to 
explore the dynamics of the system, and to gain a comparison of future 
simulation runs. Undiscovered vulnerabilities exist within the software, and are 
latent within the code since the primary compilation of the software, therefore 
this value is set to 212, which is the total number of detected vulnerabilities 
within the Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 software application (Lewis et al., 2015). 
The desire to secure the software from the outset by the software originator is 
set at 50%, with delays corresponding to the average recorded in chapter 5, 
exploratory data analysis. The parameters to initialise the system were set at 
rewards, $1012.00 and sentiment, 50% with the caveat that rewards of any 
kind, other than good will, did not exist when the Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 
discovery period was active. The size of Windows NT 4.0 has been estimated to 
be around 11 million source lines of code. The run time for the simulation was 
set at 240 months (10 years), and delta time set to 0.25. An overview of the 
initialisation values drawn from chapter five and previously publish work is 
provided in Table 43 below. 
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Local	Variable	Name	 Initial	Value	 Units	 Section	or	Reference	Source	
Undiscovered	vulnerabilities		 212	 Vulnerabilities	 (Lewis	et	al.,	2015)	
Discovered	vulnerabilities		 1	 Vulnerabilities	 N/a	
Sentiment	(perception)	 50%	 Dimensionless	 Section	5.4.1	
Potential	Discoverers	 100	 People	 Section	5.4.2	
Discoverers	(initial	value)	 1	 People	 N/a	
Total	Number	of	VDDS	Participants	 10000	 People	 Section	5.4.2	
Rewards		 $1012.00	 Dollars	 Section	5.4.6	
Full	Disclosure	Delay	 1	 Days	 Section	5.5	
Coordinated	Disclosure	Delay	 1	 Days	 Section	5.5			
Coordinated	 Platform	 Disclosure	
Delay		
30	 Days	 Section	5.5	
	
MSLOC	 11	 Million	 Lines	 of	
Code	
(Lewis	et	al.,	2015)	
Number	of	VDDS	Participants	 10000	 People	 Estimated	
	
Table 43 - Simulation Initial Condition Parameters 
The initial simulation run using values from Table 43, show several behaviours 
of the state variables, Disclosure Platform, Undiscovered, Potential and Active 
Discoverers and Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities. Initially the Undiscovered 
vulnerability stock depletes quickly (200 by month 12) as there are numerous 
vulnerability discoverers available to find issues within the software. The flow 
from the undiscovered stock continues to approximately month 240, where an 
increase of the vulnerability discovery rate decreases from 20 vulnerabilities 
discovered every month to less than 1 per year. This decreases the stock 
depletion rate significantly, resulting in a tipping point whereby the undiscovered 
stock depletes and the balancing loop starts to dominate around month 12.   
The undiscovered stock is completely depleted at month 240, with no further 
discoveries taking place as all vulnerabilities are now within the disclosure 
subsystem.  The corresponding stock residing at the end of the system is 
publicly disclosed. All vulnerabilities must flow to this end state, unless 
permanently residing in the discovered or platform disclosure stocks in an 
undisclosed state.  
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The publicly disclosed stock is the corollary of Undiscovered Vulnerabilities as 
all details about the vulnerabilities are public, with appropriate fixes created to 
address any issues. The publicly disclosed stock may receive vulnerabilities via 
the full or platform disclosure flows, mediated via appropriate disclosure rates 
and delays. Undiscovered and Publicly Disclosed stocks intersect at month 4 
with 73 of 212 vulnerabilities depleted and publicly disclosed. At month 240 
(end of simulated time) the quantity of disclosed vulnerabilities is 201, showing 
that almost all vulnerabilities have traversed the VDDS in this time, with 13 
remaining within the system. Both Undiscovered and Public Disclosed stocks 
are closing stocks, at the beginning and end of the model. Whereas Platform 
Disclosure is a transitory stock, or buffer that provides a temporary 
accumulation of vulnerabilities. Platform Disclosure shows an increase in the 
quantity of vulnerabilities traveling via this flow, peaking at month 9 at 97 
vulnerabilities and gradually reducing.  
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Figure 57 – Baseline Simulation Run Using Typical Parameters
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7.2.1 Delays 
Within the coordinated and full disclosure flow two delay points disrupt the 
movement of vulnerabilities from the discovered state to the publicly disclosed 
state. These are denoted as delays 2,3,4,5 and retard the flow of vulnerabilities 
via full and platform flows. Three rates are shown in Figure 58 below. 
Dissemination (coordinated) Disclosure Rate, Vulnerability Platform Rate and 
Full Disclosure Rate. The full disclosure flow is a simple movement of 
vulnerabilities from the discovered state to publicly disclosed state, mediated by 
a short time delay of <1 day. The smooth movement of vulnerabilities from state 
to state is due to no delay being in place as once a choice has been made by 
the discoverer then disclosure is almost immediate. The full disclosure rate is 
however dependent upon the introduction of vulnerability discoverers entering 
the VDDS, with a delay related to the rate of entry - the maximal rate of full 
disclosure occurs at month 2 with 15 vulnerabilities per month. 
In contrast to full disclosure, coordinated and platform rates are ‘smoother’ in 
their behaviour. Vulnerabilities flow from the discovered stock entering first the 
coordinated vulnerability delay, mediated by the rate on entering the system for 
processing, denoted as platform entry delay. The maximum entry rate take 
place at month 2 with average 1.5 vulnerabilities taking place per month. 
Alongside the first delay is Platform Disclosure Rate following a smoother and 
elongated behaviour, with a maximum rate of 2.5 vulnerabilities per month at 
month 13. The largest delay of 30 days is encountered once a vulnerability has 
entered the Platform Stock, representing the average time that is taken for a 
vulnerability to traverse from discovered to publicly disclosed. In the base 
simulation this is based upon the average time drawn from chapter five. 
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Figure 58 – Baseline Simulate Vulnerability Disclosure Rate Plot 
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7.3 Critical Variable 1: Perceived Available Rewards  
The provision of monetary rewards for details of vulnerabilities is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, the advent of the rewards system has 
generated an increase in the number of discoverers that have entered the 
VDDS as active discoverers and provided resources to devote more effort to 
finding vulnerabilities. Given this increase in rewards, or more specifically the 
perception of recompense that is on offer, it is logical to assume that the larger, 
or more readily available that the rewards are, the greater the number of 
vulnerabilities that will be discovered via the coordinated disclosure flow. Given 
this assumption, local numerical sensitivity analysis (also known as one-at-a-
time or OAT) was performed upon the rewards variable to characterise the 
impact of variation. OAT sampling or variation is the technique whereby a 
variable changes between consecutive simulations (Saltelli et al., 2007, p.67). 
7.3.1 Numerical Sensitivity Parameters 
The rewards variable influence the quantity of researchers that are available to 
discover vulnerabilities. More specifically, the variable represents the probable 
rewards that are on offer, as there is no certainty that the Vulnerability 
Discoverer will receive the reward due to factors such as failure to discover or 
duplicate discovery. Therefore, the rewards variable is coded within the model 
as a perception factor, representing both the probability of discovery and the 
currency on offer. Sensitivity of the cash variable ranges between [$100 - 
$10000] with 11 simulations performed over 240 months (See Appendix A for 
raw data table). 
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Figure 59 - 10 Simulations Runs for Rewards Variation Between $100 - $1,000 over 240 months
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7.3.2 Model Behaviour Analysis 
Vulnerability Disclosure and discovery is influenced by the monetary rewards. 
The initial simulation using the reward of $100 shows a slow increase of 
vulnerabilities disclosed over time of 240 months (bottom left in Figure 59). 
Starting at 0 public disclosure grows to a maximum of 20 disclosed 
vulnerabilities, which is consistent with a low reward offer. Increasing the reward 
to $200 shows a sharp increase of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. At month 
50, 95 vulnerabilities have been discovered, rising to 120 at month 100. The 
rate of public disclosure then plateaus toward month 150 and 200 with 128 and 
133 vulnerabilities disclosed respectively. Finally, at month 240, 137 
vulnerabilities were disclosed. Increasing the reward to $300 and $400 
increases the vulnerabilities disclosure by an order of magnitude to 145 at 
month 50, in the case of $300 and 158 in the case of $400. With the range of 
rewards between $500 and $1000 insignificant improvements are gained with 
only +/- 10 vulnerabilities gained with double the rewards. Therefore, the 
scenario of diminishing returns, where more money does not mean more 
vulnerabilities, seems to take effect with the maximal number of vulnerabilities 
verses the rewards on offer around the $500-$600 level.   
Simulation Reward 
(US Dollars) 
Month all Vulns Found 
1 $100 Beyond End of Sim 
2 $200 Beyond End of Sim 
3 $300 Beyond End of Sim 
4 $400 Beyond End of Sim 
5 $500 213 
6 $600 174 
7 $700 169 
8 $800 167 
9 $900 166 
10 $1000 165 
Table 44 – Rewards simulation Summary Showing Results 
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7.4 Critical Variable 2: Software Quality Variation 
Software quality within the field of information security has been a contentious 
issue for almost 20 years, with ideas on how to address deficiencies polarising 
debate on both sides  (Anderson, 2001b; Anderson et al., 2013). These ideas 
range from using high quality software standards and languages to economic 
incentives. Given the apparent cognitive dissonance, there is acceptance that 
increasing the quality of produced software can reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities present within software, and therefore result in a reduction in risk. 
Given this, the quality of software that is modelled within the VDDS, is taken as 
a percentage and using Alhazmin and Malaiya (2005) vulnerability density we 
can simulate the impact of increasing and decreasing software quality.  
7.4.1 Numerical Sensitivity Parameters 
The quality of the software ranges from [10% - 100%] in incremental steps, 
expressing the ability to remove vulnerabilities from software prior to release. 
The quality of software is related to the number of vulnerabilities that are 
available for discovery within software, with the tacit assumption that the higher 
the quality the lower the quantity of vulnerabilities. Eleven simulations were 
performed over 240 months (See Appendix A for raw data table). 
7.4.2 Model Behaviour Analysis 
Initially at 10% quality, and very high vulnerability density (1.9x 10-5 per line of 
code) we can see a maximum rate of discovery at month 4 of 69 vulnerabilities 
per month decreasing to 0 by month 22 when all vulnerabilities have been 
discovered. Conversely, examining software with 100% quality indicating 
vulnerability free code, we can see in total 3 vulnerabilities were disclosed 
within 10 years, all discovered within months 1,2 and 3.  
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Simulation 
Run Number 
Quality 
 
Max Rate Month 
1 10% 67 4 
2 20% 61 4 
3 30% 51 4 
4 40% 39 4 
5 50% 28 5 
6 60% 18 5 
7 70% 10 5 
8 80% 4 4 
9 90% 2 2 
10 100% 0 0 
Table 45 – Quality Simulation Showing 10% - 100% Variations 
Clearly the production of vulnerability free software is unrealistic, and therefore 
simulations 8,9 and 10 should be viewed as an idealistic target. However, the 
simulation runs to point to a possible aspect for policy building. 
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Figure 60 – Quality Variation Simulation with 10% Software Quality Public Disclosure Indicated 
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7.5 Critical Variable 3: Sentiment 
Sentiment within the VDDS makes a significant impact upon both the number of 
active discoverers available to discover vulnerabilities, and the disclosure 
stance taken. As outlined in chapter 4, the level of positive or negative 
sentiment that is perceived toward a software originator materially impacts 
which disclosure stance is taken by the Vulnerability Discoverer. The 
assumption here is that if sentiment is high, and that software originators are 
seen in a positive light, then discoverers will act more favourably towards the 
originator and disclosure vulnerabilities directly, or via a disclosure platform. 
Therefore, the opposite must also occur, if sentiment is negative then 
discoverers will tend to adopt a full disclosure stance. 
7.5.1 Numerical Sensitivity Parameters 
Sentiment governs two aspects of the VDDS model, conversion rate and full 
disclosure rate. Specifically, the perception of sentiment toward the software 
originator, which is encoded within the VDDS model in two places, discoverers 
subsystem and disclosure subsystem. Sensitivity of the Sentiment variable 
ranges between [0.1 - 1] with 0.5 representing neutral, and 1 representing 
overwhelming positive sentiment. Eleven simulations were performed over 240 
months (See Appendix A for raw data table), however for visualisation purposes 
graphs are terminated at 40 months. 
7.5.2 Model Behaviour Analysis 
At 10% (low) sentiment the flow is evenly spread between full disclosure and 
vulnerabilities disclosed via the disclosure platform, with a peak of 35 via full 
disclosure (month 3), and 32 per month for platform disclosure (month 4). This 
split suggests that, despite a low level of sentiment vulnerabilities are still 
disclosed via the ethical, platform flow, however, a slight tendency to disclose 
via the full disclosure route still exist. 
With 50%, or neutral sentiment, vulnerability disclosure is skewed toward the 
platform flow, with a peak of 33 vulnerabilities per month in month 5, and 
previous month value of 31. On the other hand, the full disclosure flow has a 
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significant decrease in the number of vulnerabilities, with a peak of 18 in month 
3. Finally, with 100% sentiment (high), the max values via the platform flow 
were 30, 33 and 30 in months 5,6 and 7 respectively, marking a dramatic 
reversal of flow with no vulnerabilities disclosed via the full route.   
 
Simulation Max Vuln Per 
Month 
 Full Plat 
Sentiment 10% 35 32 
Sentiment 50% 18 33 
Sentiment 100% 0 33 
Table 46 – Sentiment Simulation Variation Showing 10% and 100% Values. 
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Figure 61 – Sentiment Impact upon Full and Platform Disclosure Flows
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7.6 Critical Variables 4: Disclosure Delay 
Time within the VDDS makes a direct impact upon all variables within the 
VDDS, specifically the time taken to disclose a vulnerability publicly via both full 
and coordinated routes. As outlined in chapter 5, the level of delay that a 
discoverer may encounter ranges significantly. Moreover, the delay that is 
encountered via the platform route is assumed to impact both the sentiment and 
subsequent disclosure choice, however no data is available to substantiate this. 
It is, however, possible to increase and decrease the time upon which a 
vulnerability takes to transit the platform flow. It is worth noting that there are 
assumed to be no delays associated with full disclosure as details are released 
immediately. 
7.6.1 Numerical Sensitivity Parameters 
Delays govern many aspects of the VDDS, such as acquiring discovery skills, 
and increasing software quality and sentiment toward software originators. 
However, the most visible and impactful delays are via the disclosure system, 
particularly the quantity of vulnerabilities via the platform flow. Specific industry 
policy suggests 30, 45 or 90 days to allow software originators to deal with 
triage and creation of fixes to the issue (CERT, 2017; ISO/IEC, 2014). 
Therefore, delays that are analogous to industry policy are tested. Sensitivity of 
the platform delay variable ranges between [1 - 90] days. Eleven simulations 
performed over 240 months (See Appendix A for raw data table), however for 
visualisation purposed graphs are terminated at 40 months. 
7.6.2 Model Behaviour Analysis 
Vulnerabilities flow from the discovered state, which is the decision point 
whereby discoverers choose to disclose in a full, platform or direct manner. 
Once a disclosure stance has been adopted, vulnerabilities are mediated via 
the rate equations outlined in the previous section. Inspecting Figure 62 we can 
see that small simulated delays within the platform flow generate large transit 
rates, with a peak of 72.1 (indicated by the blue line) being accumulated over 50 
months within the platform and standard deviation of 14.7 resulting in a more 
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peaked distribution (Kurtosis value of 12.5). Conversely, a delay time of 100 
days results in a peak value of 97 accumulated in the stock (Kurtosis value 2.2), 
over 240 Months. This increased delay slows the dispersal rate into publicly 
disclosure and resulting in the stock not being fully drained by the end of the 
simulation.  
 
Figure 62 – Disclosure Flow for Platform with Incremental Increase in Delay 
Figure 63 below shows the increase in the spread of accumulated vulnerabilities 
with mean, and standard deviation values increasing with increasing delays. 
Figure 63 shows a series of boxplots indicating the progression of mean (red 
line), standard deviation (blue box) and outliers (red crosses). 
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Figure 63 – Boxplot Showing Mean, Standard Deviation and Spread of Vulnerability Accumulation 
7.7 Scenario Testing 
Performing both baseline simulations with observed values, and simulated OAT 
sensitivity analysis enables a good foundational overview to be established. 
However, varying more than one variable to simulate policy impact is required. 
Sterman (2000, p.885) advocates simulating both worst and best case 
scenarios outcomes of policies that require testing. Hence, three policy 
scenarios were chosen that are analogous to worst, best and current scenarios. 
Scenario A outlines the worst possible state of the VDDS system where low-
quality software is produced with a high quantity of vulnerabilities present; 
vulnerability discoverers are not incentivised to disclose vulnerabilities and 
sentiment toward software originators is very negative. Scenario B is 
considered the moderate state whereby sentiment towards software originators 
is neutral, rewards are high to incentivise vulnerability discoverers and quality of 
software is low. Finally, Scenario C is the best case, where software quality is 
high, essentially vulnerability free, incentives are also high and the sentiment 
toward software originators is high. Each scenario represents the policy choices 
that could be implemented within real world organisations given the appropriate 
amount of time, resource and political impetus. Each scenario broadly attempts 
to explore the possible inferred future outlined in chapter five, section 5.3.1 with 
exponential, steady and Flat futures relating to scenarios A, B and C 
respectively. 
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 Future Sentiment Money Quality 
Policy Scenario A Exponential 0.1 (10%) $100 0.1 (10%) 
Policy Scenario B Steady 0.5 (50%) $1000 0.1 (10%) 
Policy Scenario C Flat 1 (100% $1000 0.9 (90%) 
Table 47 – Policy Scenario Runtime Parameters 
7.7.1 Policy Scenario A: Low Quality Software, Low Rewards, Low 
Sentiment (Worst) 
In Figure 64 below, low quality software, low rewards and low sentiment all 
contribute to a mixed outcome. The final number of vulnerabilities that were 
publicly disclosed is 22 out of 212 (10.3%). Whilst this may seem a desirable 
outcome as the risk that end users are subjected to is low, due to the number of 
vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities potentially discovered by malicious actors outside 
of the legitimate VDDS. This scenario is also exacerbated by the increase in full 
disclosures peaking a month earlier in month 4. Incentives to draw discoverers 
to a coordinated disclosure stance via the platform is scant, with only $100 used 
to incentivise discoverers. Finally, the sentiment toward software originators is 
low, causing the full disclosure rates to be slightly higher, peaking at 3.85 in 
month 4.  The publicly disclosed vulnerabilities follow a typical logistic (S-
shaped) growth curve, however with the limited number of vulnerabilities found, 
it will never reach the asymptotic limit of 212 vulnerabilities. This is due to 
limited incentives on offer and the low sentiment toward software originators. 
This scenario closely resembles the period when the VDDS existed in a pre-
disclosure platform and self-organised software originator bounty schemes (pre-
2010) predominated. The issues that have stemmed from the uncontrolled 
increase of software vulnerabilities have been well documented (Anderson et 
al., 2013; Bilge and Dumitras, 2012; Frei, 2009; NCA, 2017). Given the 
unknown quantity of vulnerabilities being potentially discovered outside of the 
legitimate VDDS, this scenario is an undesirable set of policy choices.  
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 Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Max 
Full Disclosure 0.94 0.34 3.85 
Discovery 2.32 0.65 12.49 
Disclosure Platform 0.93 0.39 3.7 
Table 48 – Summary Statistics for Scenario A 
Within this scenario there are three variables that represent poor policy 
decisions ultimately resulting in a high number of vulnerabilities that are 
unknown, and therefore uncontrolled. As such the potential risk that 
organisations face is very high. This uncontrolled increase of vulnerabilities is 
broadly in line with the exponential inferred future reference mode. The 
exponential increase of vulnerabilities, which in turn moves discoverers toward 
the black-market due to insufficient motivation or rewards, coupled with poor 
software quality are the defining characteristic of epoch one (see section 5.3.2). 
If the low quality, rewards and sentiment factors do not increase then this 
inferred future is probable. The assumption here is that a) new vulnerabilities 
are introduced to new software and software practices are not significantly 
improved from today’s levels; b) the number of participants within the system 
increases significantly; c) opportunities to sell vulnerabilities increases 
significantly; and d) the desire for vulnerabilities increases.  
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Figure 64 – Scenario A: Cumulative Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities, Discovery Rate and Platform Disclosure.
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7.7.2 Policy Scenario B: Low Quality Software, High Rewards, 
Neutral Sentiment (Current) 
Figure 65 below shows low quality, high rewards and neutral sentiment, 
contributing to a mixed outcome. The final number of vulnerabilities that were 
publicly disclosed is 212, completely exhausting the maximum undiscovered 
amount within the software. In month 10 almost all (202) vulnerabilities have 
been publicly disclosed. Whilst this may seem an undesirable outcome at first 
analysis, the risk that vulnerabilities are discovered outside the legitimate VDDS 
is reduced to zero. As all vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed they must have 
traversed via the full or platform disclosure flows, hence the removal or 
malicious discovery. The scenario is influenced by the high rewards on offer 
($1000), incentivising discoverers to uncover issues within software, and 
disclose via the platform flow. The maximum rate of disclosure via this route is 
30 in month 6, falling to zero in month 27. Full disclosure occurrences also 
exist, with the maximum rate of full disclosure peaking at 16 in month 6, 
reducing to 0 in month 24. 
Scenario B closely resembles todays (2017) current set of policy decisions that 
have been made. Software quality consistently remains low, providing both the 
opportunity for vulnerability discovery and the means to do so. Additionally, 
importance of discovered vulnerabilities in reducing the risk profile of 
organisations is reflected in the high rewards on offer, incentivising discoverers 
to choose a coordinated disclosure flow. Finally, sentiment has increased, 
representing a higher probability of coordinated discovery. Whilst an 
improvement on Scenario A, the activities surrounding the disclosure process 
(contracting platforms etc.), economic outlay of money, and incentives and post 
incident clean-up are potentially larger than increasing the quality of the 
software prior to release, thus eradicating vulnerabilities at source. 
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 Standard Deviation Mean Max 
Full Disclosure Rate 4.9 2.73 16.71 
Discovery Rate 15.9 8.36 56.1 
Disclosure Platform Rate 9.22 5.44 30.85 
Table 49 – summary Statistics for Scenario B 
With average sentiment, quality and high rewards the quantity of vulnerabilities 
that are discovered within the legitimate VDDS continues along the steady 
inferred future. As vulnerabilities are discovered within the VDDS, as opposed 
to the black market, or not disclosed at all the rate of discovery continues in a 
controlled manner, and steady rate. This inferred future is the most probable 
given the recent advancement in markets and awareness of cyber security 
within organisations. This scenario assumes that a) new vulnerabilities are 
discovered in existing software, but improved software practices reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities with new software; b) the vulnerability discovery 
system continues to add new vulnerability opportunities to sell or receive 
bounties; and c) The number of participants increases.  
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Figure 65   -  Scenario B Cumulative Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities, Discovery Rate and Platform Disclosure Values.
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7.7.3 Scenario C: High Quality Software, High Rewards, High 
Sentiment (Best) 
Figure 66 below provides an overview of the best-case scenario with high 
rewards, high positive sentiment and high-quality software. This is reflected in 
the final number of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities which at the end of the 
simulation results in a maximum of 12 discoveries. This low number is due to 
the high quality of the software, and resultant low number of discoverable 
vulnerabilities. As the motivation and sentiment is high to disclose any identified 
vulnerabilities, all flow via the platform route, with none flowing via the full 
disclosure route.  
With all vulnerability factors at the most beneficial to organisations, the flat 
inferred future is the least improbable as it assumes that high motivation, high 
sentiment and high-quality software will be the norm. These factors result in a 
flat increase in the number of vulnerabilities disclosed, thus a modest increase 
in risk is apparent. This future exists where the number of recorded vulnerability 
disclosures and therefore the number of discovered vulnerabilities that are 
found decreases to zero.  This assumes several things: a) the perfect 
debugging of all new vulnerabilities upstream within the development process 
and removal of vulnerabilities within software; b) once a vulnerability is removed 
from the software ecosystem, it is not reintroduced and that no new 
vulnerabilities are introduced via new software versions.  
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7.8 Analysis of Policy Implications 
Choosing the right policy for the right reasons is difficult, with vulnerability 
discovery and disclosure being no exception. Vulnerabilities are by their very 
nature potentially harmful to the stability of the software that they affect. 
Therefore, a key question that must be considered when choosing a set of 
polices is which causes the least harm, most efficiently and with least 
disruption? If we take the introduction of rewards for vulnerability details, we can 
see that it will entice both existing and new discoverers to enter the VDDS, thus 
increasing the number of vulnerabilities within the system.  
However, if the correct procedures, with minimal delays and good 
communication are not followed then there is a distinct possibility that a 
proportion of the vulnerabilities will be disclosed in an uncontrolled way, 
increasing the potential harm to organisations. Similarly, if the rewards that are 
on offer from brokers increase significantly so that software vendors are no 
longer able to access the details of the issue, the risk of stockpiling and 
unauthorised or accidental disclosure may occur (Goodin, 2017a). 
Turning to sentiment, the increase of sentiment toward software originators is 
the most influential, and importantly cost effective. By increasing the sentiment 
toward the originators. Discoverers on the whole disclose more vulnerabilities, 
and do so without recompense via money. Finally, increasing the quality of any 
software that is produced by originators is typically a good option, unless 
resources and skills are at a premium and cause organisational issues, such as 
bankruptcy.  
The first recommendation is centred on the time that is taken to traverse the 
disclosure process. This has been measured to be on average 77 days, with 
extreme examples of 619 and 1612 days encountered. Whilst producing a fix to 
potentially complex software is not considered a trivial undertaking, taking 
around four and a half years from initial contact is inexcusable. This ultimately 
results in both anger from the point of the discoverer, and increased risk as the 
default position is the resumption of a full disclosure stance. Therefore, 
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decreasing the length of time taken to disclose vulnerability details is the 
first recommendation. 
Secondly, and related to the length of time taken to disclose vulnerabilities, is 
communication with discoverers. There are numerous examples of 
communication delays, communication failures and miscommunication between 
discoverers and software originators. Given the nature of the VDDS, 
communication normally occurs via email, normally with initial contact via a 
general email address such as product-security@apple.com (Apple, 2017). As 
such, dialogue, unless carefully managed, could fail, resulting again in a 
resumption of default full disclosure practices. Alongside this, the number of 
communication steps that are taken has been measured to be an average of 4, 
yet a maximum number of 39 has been recorded. Consequentially, the 
second recommendation is that software originators adopt a more 
proactive and managed communication regime. 
A third proposed policy is the adoption of a pan-industry Memorandum Of 
Understanding (MOU) concerning the discovery and disclosure of 
vulnerabilities. This would take a similar form of the MOU between the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
concerning Section 46 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Service, 2017). The 
agreement sets out the protection principles for professionals from prosecution 
and arrest from both the police and CPS with regards the use of the electronic 
communication network when indecent images of children have been 
transmitted. A similar agreement could be adopted here, thus removing the 
threat of legal action if reasonable efforts have been taken to disclose details in 
a coordinated and ethical way. Hence recommendation three is to adopt an 
industry wide memorandum to set out principles of Nolle Prosequi with 
respect to vulnerability disclosure. 
Controversially, the fourth policy aspect is directed toward the vulnerability 
discoverer. As stated, the default position for failures on the part of the software 
originator is to resort to full disclosure. This results in unconstrained risk, and 
potential harm toward end users, for example the recent shadow broker leak of 
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0day vulnerabilities is a form of full disclosure (Goodin, 2017a). As such the 
fourth recommendation is to remove the default position of last resort by 
software vulnerability discoverers and replace it with a more inclusive 
policy. 
Finally, and most impactful is the adoption of secure software practices. It has 
been shown that by adopting secure software practices, a significant proportion 
of vulnerabilities within software can be removed prior to public release. As 
such the fifth and final recommendation is that software originators adopt 
secure coding practices within software engineering teams.  
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7.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described four key variables within the VDDS, and the impact 
and interactions they have on the VDDS behaviour. Alongside this, delays in the 
processing of vulnerabilities via disclosure platforms or directly via full 
disclosure routes were examined. Furthermore, simulations outlining the 
behaviour of the VDDS under differing numerical values, known as sensitivity 
analysis was presented.   
Establishing a baseline of how the model behaves, with normal, or average 
parameters is of importance. As such values were selected from the exploratory 
data analysis thus providing an observed set of initial conditions upon which to 
explore the VDDS model. By modifying the variables, simulations were 
performed to characterise the impact upon simulated behaviours. The advent of 
the rewards system has generated an increase in the number of discoverers 
that have entered the VDDS. Given these increases, it is logical to assume that 
the larger, or more readily available that the rewards are, the greater the 
number of vulnerabilities that will be discovered via the coordinated disclosure 
flow. Alongside the simulated increases in rewards software quality was also 
simulated and considered with significant impact upon the number of 
discovered vulnerabilities, thus suggesting a possible policy choice. Finally, 
sentiment within the VDDS was simulated, also illustrating a significant impact 
upon both the number of active discoverers available to discover vulnerabilities, 
and the disclosure route taken. Time within the VDDS makes a direct impact 
upon all variables within the VDDS, specifically the time taken to disclose a 
vulnerability publicly via both full and coordinated routes. Moreover, the delay 
that is encountered via the platform route is assumed to impact both the 
sentiment and subsequent disclosure choice.  
Three Scenarios were presented illustrating the different behaviours that are 
exhibited when key state variables are changed. All Scenarios can be aligned 
into 3 specific epochs when characterising the evolution of the system. The 
initial epoch can be described as uncontrolled and constrained growth of 
vulnerabilities, with the time span running from the mid 1990’s through to 
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approximately 2009-10. Epoch 2 is suggested to commence around 2010 with 
the advancement of vulnerability disclosure platforms, and a change in 
perception towards vulnerability discoverers from software originators and 
rewards being offered. Finally, epoch 3 is suggested to behave like one of the 
inferred futures. 
In summary, by adopting a set of policies based upon simulated Scenarios 
several vulnerability reduction or vulnerability control mechanisms can be 
brought to bear. With a modest reduction in time, increase in rewards and 
resultant increase in sentiment a flow of controlled and coordinated vulnerability 
discovery is possible. This is outlined in Scenario B in figure 65. 
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8 Conclusion and Discussion 
The aim of this research is to advance the underlying theory of software 
vulnerability, ground it in real empirical data and provide a systemic model to 
increase the understanding of policy choice upon the VDDS. To do this an 
investigation of the factors that underlie the software Vulnerability Discovery 
and Disclosure System was performed.  This was achieved by understanding 
and characterising the Vulnerability Discovery and Disclosure System by 
providing an in-depth and systematic analysis, a mathematically-based model of 
how the system operates and an impact analysis of ‘what if’ policy simulations 
to guide risk reduction interventions. 
This research used a mixed methods approach, coupled with additional 
modelling and simulation phases. What has emerged is a complex, yet 
quantifiable system that is heavily influenced by the entities that inhabit it, and 
policy choices made by those entities. Rooted in direct observations of the 
VDDS, and how it has evolved, this study found that there are five key themes 
that pervade the VDDS, shaping how vulnerabilities are discovered and 
disclosed once uncovered.   
8.1 Discussion  
Based on the phenomenological philosophy, this research considers the VDDS 
to be constructed and subjective. The phenomena under investigation is the 
growth, of software vulnerabilities and is underpinned by both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in an inductive framework. The initial stage of the research 
was to identify key text, data sources and narratives to build a thematic model 
of the VDDS, based on recorded experiences. This Thematic Analysis method 
was used to code, and categorise a wide range of data items, collected from 
online sources. Five key themes emerged that pervade the VDDS, namely 
Perception of Punishment, Software Originator Interactions, Ethics and 
Disclosure Stance, Motivation for Discovery and Emergence of New 
Vulnerability Markets. Throughout the data the repeated concept of punishment 
and fear of punishment emerged when actions of disclosure, specifically 
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coordinated disclosure were undertaken. Furthermore, repeating words and 
phrases such as “nasty”, “threat”, “threatening” suggest an adversarial punitive 
relationship between both discloser and the recipient of the vulnerability 
information. What emerges from the data is the notion that researchers or 
hackers are not taken seriously by software vendors, or when they are listened 
to then the normal course of action is generally punitive in nature.  
Furthermore, there seems to be a distinct division between actors within the 
system, specifically an adversarial relationship between researchers and 
software originators. An overarching feeling of persecution and lack of control 
seems to be present from within the researcher group. In addition, there is a 
theme that researchers who disclose vulnerabilities to software vendors do, or 
more importantly did so for the right reasons, but as the level of perceived 
persecution has increased this ethical stance has been eroded over time.  
Disclosure of vulnerabilities is closely linked to the interactions between the 
discoverer and software originator. A key finding is that the communication 
between originators and vulnerability discoverers has been significantly lacking, 
and in most cases, continues to be. Disclosure of vulnerabilities within the 
VDDS has been categorised into two main stances, full and responsible with 
polarising effects upon the participants.  
Dependent upon which disclosure stance is taken the time frames are 
dramatically different ranging from immediate to several months, but crucially if 
the communication is good, and previous experiences are positive, these 
deadlines imposed by the discovers are quite flexible (Sintonen, 2017). As with 
most psychosocial systems the emotional state of a vulnerability researcher and 
the social constructs that surround them is a critical factor in establishing the 
course of action the researcher may take. For example, when researchers 
consider which disclosure stance to take - either full or coordinated - this choice 
is directly influenced by either personal experience or, more commonly, via 
reflecting on community experiences published within social media when 
soliciting advice.  
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In general, careful consideration is given when researchers choose to divulge 
the vulnerability they have uncovered and typically try to do the right thing. The 
level of sophistication that is apparent here, is startling, as the software 
vulnerability discoverer has been characterised as reckless, with a disposition to 
favour anarchy than harbour a sense of social responsibility. Within the 
motivation theme, the quality of software is an important consideration which is 
often discussed by all entities within the discovery system. There is sentiment 
from two specific groups of entities, users and discoverers, that more could and 
should be done around removing software vulnerabilities in the software 
development process, rather than post release.  Within the VDDS the advent of 
new market forces, coupled with the overwhelming need to adopt an ethical 
stance when disclosing a vulnerability has driven new innovative market 
instruments. These factors have shaped and influenced the creation of a so 
called ‘grey market’ environment, and provided an alternative to underground 
black-markets.  Finally, the value of a vulnerability is a significant factor that is 
discussed at length within the VDDS. The ability to sell a vulnerability in a 
legitimate manner is a recent phenomenon, with the first auction site known as 
WabiSabiLabi being launched in 2007 (Bradbury, 2007). 
The VDDS is a socio-technical system that is paradoxically both global and 
individual at the same time. This is due to the fact that a single vulnerability 
discoverer can affect change on a massive global scale (Goodin, 2017a). With 
this level of duality, it is not surprising that the VDDS seems to be chaotic, 
however there are structures and mechanisms that regulate how the system 
behaves. This internal regulation takes the form of narratives, ethical 
frameworks and institutional memories embedded within the VDDS shaping the 
behaviours of VDDS entities. An example of this is outlined in section 4.7.5 
where vulnerability discoverers regulate the disclosure of vulnerabilities, 
specifically when making a choice to disclose without software originator 
coordination. Alongside this the concept of time weighs heavily and influences 
the VDDS in a significant way. Most significantly is the time impact of the 
discovery phase, whereby skills and technical details of the software are being 
established, and the disclosure of any detected vulnerabilities.  
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Delays encountered in the disclosure phase are the primary reason why full 
disclosure stances are taken, thus increasing the potential for exploitation. 
Within the VDDS the concept of elapsed time is a significant influencing factor 
on all that is undertaken - from the amount of time that vulnerability discovery 
takes, through to the delays that exist when communicating with software 
originators to disclose a vulnerability. Consequentially, the time that elapses 
between steps that make up a complete interaction between entities forms a 
fundamental element of the discourse within the VDDS. These two delays make 
up a significant proportion of all VDDS delay. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
Alhazmi and Malaiya (2005) initiated the field of vulnerability discovery 
modelling, with Anderson (2001b), Frei (2010) and Radianti (2006) investigating 
the economics and black markets for vulnerabilities. However, no evidence has 
been found of researchers who have investigated the systems aspect of the 
legitimate VDDS, quantified the structure or simulated risk reduction strategies 
presented here. This research contributes to the literature on software 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure, not from a technical view, but from a 
systems and policy perspective. Three key contribution have been made.  
Firstly, the creation of theory as to how the VDDS is structured, behaves and, 
importantly, the relationships between entities. The collected data used to build 
this model can be reused to assist future researchers in vulnerability discovery 
and disclosure investigations. Secondly, the creation of a System Dynamics 
model allows for the simulation of policy choices, and the potential avoidance of 
policy that could cause harm or unintended consequences. Finally, and 
crucially, the aim of this research – what is driving the growth of software 
vulnerabilities.  
The implications of this new knowledge, and framework could assist within risk 
management processes, and within professional practice by systematising the 
process of vulnerability risk analysis. It is now possible to test scenarios prior to 
potentially costly, or disruptive policy being applied.  Additionally, future studies 
may build upon the raw collected data corpus, extend the thematic model and 
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augment the system dynamic model.  Indeed, there has always been an 
argument to increase software quality within COTS, this research goes some 
way to reinforcing that argument. The novel model structures that were codified 
to construct the VDDS show a significant number of balancing and reinforcing 
loops, all of which change in dominance over the lifespan of the VDDS. These 
new structures help to refine the current mental models of alternative policies 
organisations may make. For example, the component of time is pervasive as it 
influences almost every choice or policy decision that is made by discoverer 
and software originator alike.  
Three policy scenarios were simulated, representing three policy decisions that 
are broadly analogous to epochs 1, 2 and 3 (see section 5.3.2). Scenario 1 
showed the movement of the vulnerability problem, from the legitimate VDDS to 
the illegitimate vulnerability market or via cyber criminals due to the low quality 
of software and lack of incentives. This scenario shows the unintended 
consequences of inaction due to low software quality, or more importantly a lack 
of activity that is considered to be harmful. Finally, an abstraction of the VDDS 
was created using the System Dynamics approach to simulate the impact of 
differing policy scenarios, mimicking current and future cyber security futures for 
the VDDS and wider cyberspace, validated with existing VDDS data. The policy 
simulations indicated that three approaches can be implemented to 
comprehensively reduce vulnerability centred risk: a) improved software quality; 
b) increased rewards; and c) better relationships between software originators 
and discoverers. 
8.3 Limitations of this Research 
As with all phenomenological research, the observations of an issue, as 
opposed to taking part and living the research, can abstract away detail and 
consequentially the fidelity of the resultant analysis may not be as detailed as 
wished. However, this potential lack of fidelity has been reduced by triangulating 
analysis and collection of multiple data sources.  
Furthermore, the scope of the model boundary was chosen to include the major 
entities that are assumed to impact the VDDS. Therefore, the potential for 
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exogenous entities to influence the modelled system exists, for example 
criminal or national governments.  Also, the implementation of any 
recommendations must be tempered by the reality of economic policy and 
political will of national and international governments.  Finally, the possible 
scenarios that have been explored within the scope of this research were 
limited to three. This is obviously, a smaller subset of the potential set than is 
possible. The number of potential scenarios is only limited by the different 
parameters that can be simulated. Therefore, if only Quality, Sentiment and 
Rewards changed in increments of 0.1 for each, the total number of 
combinations is 1000 different combinations (103). 
Finally, the mixed methods approach, whilst flexible, is very time consuming 
and cognitively expensive as the investigator is required to immerse themselves 
within the subject matter. Alongside this, to use mixed methods there is the 
requirement of being competent in both quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques. As such investigators, may need to learn multiple methods and 
techniques, and understand how to mix and track between them. Upon 
reflection other research frameworks maybe appropriate, not from a subject 
perspective, but from a time and cognitive load perspective. 
8.4 Policy implication 
The results presented show that under certain circumstances, if software 
originators and vulnerability discoverers operate in concert favourable 
behaviours can occur. However, these favourable outcomes can be disrupted if 
feedback loops occur, as is the case of Scenario A, where vulnerability 
discovery is low, yet vulnerabilities may be discovered outside the legitimate 
VDDS. This means that a policy that solely looks inwards, and does not take 
into consideration the human aspects of the VDDS is potentially doomed to 
failure. Failure to focus on critical structures and behaviours, could repeat the 
initial epoch of unprecedented vulnerability growth. A number of simple policy 
recommendations, can impact the VDDS in a positive manner, and in a 
relatively inexpensive way.  
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The first recommendation is centred on the time that is taken to traverse the 
disclosure process. Therefore, decreasing the length of time taken to 
disclose vulnerability details is the first recommendation. 
Second, and related to the length of time taken to disclose vulnerabilities is 
communication with discoverers. Consequentially, the second 
recommendation is that software originators adopt a more proactive and 
managed communication regime. 
A third proposed policy is the adoption of a pan industry memorandum of 
understanding concerning the discovery and disclosure of vulnerabilities. Hence 
recommendation three is to adopt an industry wide memorandum to set 
out principles of Nolle Prosequi with respect to vulnerability disclosure. 
Controversially, the fourth policy aspect is directed toward the vulnerability 
discoverer. As such the fourth recommendation is to remove the default 
position of last resort by software vulnerability discoverers and replace it 
with a more inclusive policy. 
Finally, and most impactful is the adoption of secure software practices. As 
such the fifth and final recommendation is that software originators adopt 
secure coding practices within software engineering teams.  
 
8.5 Further Work 
If the debate is to be moved forward, a richer understanding of the key entities 
and subsystems need to be developed. This research, whilst comprehensive at 
a system level, requires further research at the subsystem levels of discovery, 
disclosure and implications of other human activities such as training and 
education. More broadly, research is needed to determine the power of cyber 
criminals on the legitimate VDDS, and the influence upon the wider VDDS. For 
example, it would be interesting to compare experiences of vulnerability 
discoverers who have been both white hat and black hat discoverers, and why 
they in inhabit both worlds. Therefore, it is suggested that the augmentation of 
cybercriminal and illegitimate system dynamic models are incorporated into the 
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VDDS model and scenarios simulated and investigation between VDM’s and 
the hypothesised vulnerability lifecycles. 
Additionally, further work could usefully explore how the quality assurance 
policies of large software originator organisations (i.e. Microsoft) have affected 
the VDDS, over time. This would establish a historical record of the quality of 
software, and how it has improved. Moreover, the precise mechanism of how 
sentiment and emotional aspects of participants within the VDDS is transmitted 
between each other (outside of publicly accessible forums) is unknown. There 
is, therefore, a definite need for investigations or direct data collection from 
participants to fully characterise this. A practical limitation of this is the covert, or 
demonised nature of the VDDS, however this is changing, so opportunity may 
arise in the future.  
8.6 Conclusion  
What are the factors that contribute to the growth in software vulnerabilities? 
The conclusion of this research is that no one factor is the sole reason for the 
growth, but a set. This set includes definite reasons such as poor software 
quality, increased number of software discoverers and the introduction of 
rewards. However, these factors are a small subset of the probable causes. 
External aspects such malicious threat actors, an economy dependent upon 
information systems and human curiosity, whilst not examined within this 
research in any depth anecdotally have been uncovered. The resultant picture 
is a vulnerability discovery and disclosure system that is complex, yet operates 
within strict rules, ethical boundaries and adopts a sophisticated level of self-
regulation.  
The key findings can be summed up into two key points: 1) if a vulnerability 
discoverer finds and reports a vulnerability then treat them with respect; and 2) 
improve communication with vulnerability discoverers.  This coupled with the 
single most important factor that has contributed to the growth of disclosed 
vulnerability; the poor quality of software that is produced, and continues to be 
produced by software originators. The increase in the quality would mitigate and 
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decrease the quantity of vulnerabilities within software, thus reducing the risks 
faced. 
In conclusion, we can deduce that the factors that are driving the growth of 
software vulnerabilities are incentives via the introduction of new market 
instruments, such as the HackerOne disclosure platform and poor-quality 
software making the ease of discovery higher and the number of participants 
actively looking for vulnerabilities. Coupled together these three factors have 
contributed, and arguably will continue to contribute to the growth of 
vulnerabilities. There are two distinct epochs in the evolution of the VDDS, with 
a third almost certainly to emerge over the coming years. The first epoch is an 
uncontrolled and unchecked growth of vulnerabilities that has caused harm to 
citizens, governments and commercial organisation alike. It seems growth, 
whilst unchecked, has, not prevented the rise of online commerce and human 
communication via the world-wide-web. The second, is centred around a 
realisation that vulnerabilities are critically important to controlling risk within 
information systems. As we are still close to the commencement of the second 
epoch, the utility of rewards and incentives to increase the flow of vulnerabilities 
via a coordinated and arguably more equitable arrangement is unknown, yet 
encouraging.  
Ultimately, we must recognise that whilst we must aspire towards a utopian 
ideal, we must out of necessity accept the Faustian pact between software 
vulnerabilities and use of information systems to conduct trade and 
communicate globally. Failure to do so will result in significant economic loss, 
economic cyber fatalities or worse, loss of life. Hopefully this research is the first 
step in driving evidence based policy making in the critically important area of 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure, whilst taking a practical 
approach to vulnerability centred risk.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – Raw Data Tables 
A.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis Rewards Raw Data Sample 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	
1	 1	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.02	
1	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	
1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	
1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.03	
1.01	 1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	
1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	
1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	
1.01	 1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	 1.05	
1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	 1.05	 1.06	
1.01	 1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.05	 1.06	 1.06	
1.01	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.06	 1.07	
1.01	 1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.07	
1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.07	 1.08	
1.02	 1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	
1.02	 1.03	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	
1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	
1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	
1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	 1.11	
1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.11	 1.12	
1.02	 1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	 1.11	 1.12	
1.02	 1.03	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	 1.12	 1.13	
1.02	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.1	 1.11	 1.12	 1.14	
1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.07	 1.09	 1.1	 1.11	 1.13	 1.14	
1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.06	 1.08	 1.09	 1.1	 1.12	 1.13	 1.15	
1.03	 1.04	 1.05	 1.07	 1.08	 1.09	 1.11	 1.12	 1.14	 1.15	
1.03	 1.04	 1.06	 1.07	 1.08	 1.1	 1.11	 1.13	 1.15	 1.16	
1.03	 1.04	 1.06	 1.07	 1.09	 1.1	 1.12	 1.13	 1.15	 1.17	
1.03	 1.05	 1.06	 1.08	 1.09	 1.11	 1.12	 1.14	 1.16	 1.18	
1.03	 1.05	 1.06	 1.08	 1.09	 1.11	 1.13	 1.15	 1.16	 1.18	
1.03	 1.05	 1.06	 1.08	 1.1	 1.11	 1.13	 1.15	 1.17	 1.19	
1.03	 1.05	 1.07	 1.08	 1.1	 1.12	 1.14	 1.16	 1.18	 1.2	
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A.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis Sentiment Raw Data Sample 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
2.14	 2.8	 2.86	 2.88	 2.9	 2.9	 2.91	 2.91	 2.91	 2.91	
2.65	 5	 5.32	 5.43	 5.49	 5.53	 5.55	 5.57	 5.58	 5.59	
3.05	 7.45	 8.23	 8.52	 8.67	 8.76	 8.83	 8.87	 8.91	 8.93	
3.42	 10.08	 11.52	 12.06	 12.34	 12.51	 12.63	 12.71	 12.78	 12.83	
3.78	 12.83	 15.08	 15.94	 16.39	 16.66	 16.85	 16.98	 17.08	 17.16	
4.12	 15.65	 18.86	 20.08	 20.72	 21.11	 21.37	 21.56	 21.71	 21.82	
4.45	 18.52	 22.79	 24.41	 25.25	 25.77	 26.11	 26.36	 26.55	 26.69	
4.78	 21.4	 26.82	 28.87	 29.92	 30.56	 30.99	 31.3	 31.53	 31.7	
5.09	 24.27	 30.92	 33.4	 34.67	 35.43	 35.94	 36.3	 36.57	 36.78	
5.39	 27.13	 35.05	 37.98	 39.45	 40.33	 40.91	 41.33	 41.63	 41.87	
5.69	 29.95	 39.18	 42.56	 44.23	 45.22	 45.87	 46.33	 46.67	 46.94	
5.97	 32.72	 43.31	 47.12	 48.98	 50.07	 50.79	 51.29	 51.66	 51.95	
6.24	 35.45	 47.4	 51.64	 53.68	 54.87	 55.64	 56.17	 56.57	 56.88	
6.51	 38.11	 51.46	 56.11	 58.32	 59.59	 60.41	 60.97	 61.39	 61.71	
6.77	 40.72	 55.46	 60.52	 62.88	 64.22	 65.08	 65.68	 66.11	 66.44	
7.02	 43.26	 59.39	 64.85	 67.35	 68.76	 69.66	 70.27	 70.72	 71.06	
7.26	 45.74	 63.26	 69.09	 71.73	 73.2	 74.12	 74.76	 75.22	 75.56	
7.5	 48.15	 67.06	 73.26	 76.01	 77.53	 78.48	 79.12	 79.59	 79.95	
7.72	 50.5	 70.78	 77.33	 80.19	 81.75	 82.72	 83.38	 83.85	 84.21	
7.94	 52.78	 74.42	 81.3	 84.27	 85.86	 86.85	 87.51	 87.99	 88.35	
8.16	 54.99	 77.97	 85.18	 88.24	 89.86	 90.86	 91.53	 92	 92.36	
8.37	 57.14	 81.44	 88.97	 92.1	 93.75	 94.76	 95.43	 95.9	 96.26	
8.57	 59.22	 84.83	 92.65	 95.86	 97.53	 98.54	 99.21	 99.69	 100.04	
8.76	 61.24	 88.13	 96.24	 99.52	 101.2	 102.21	 102.88	 103.35	 103.71	
8.95	 63.2	 91.34	 99.73	 103.07	 104.77	 105.78	 106.44	 106.91	 107.26	
9.13	 65.09	 94.47	 103.13	 106.52	 108.22	 109.23	 109.89	 110.35	 110.7	
9.31	 66.93	 97.51	 106.43	 109.87	 111.58	 112.58	 113.23	 113.69	 114.03	
9.48	 68.71	 100.47	 109.64	 113.12	 114.83	 115.82	 116.47	 116.92	 117.25	
9.65	 70.44	 103.35	 112.76	 116.27	 117.98	 118.97	 119.61	 120.05	 120.38	
9.81	 72.11	 106.14	 115.78	 119.33	 121.03	 122.01	 122.64	 123.08	 123.4	
9.97	 73.73	 108.86	 118.72	 122.29	 123.99	 124.96	 125.58	 126.01	 126.33	
10.13	 75.3	 111.49	 121.57	 125.17	 126.86	 127.82	 128.43	 128.85	 129.16	
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A.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis Software Quality Raw Data Sample 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
24.79	 20.91	 17.3	 13.98	 10.95	 8.2	 5.73	 3.54	 1.64	 0	
60.69	 48.98	 38.05	 28.27	 19.89	 13.03	 7.73	 3.89	 1.38	 0	
67.9	 61.18	 51.03	 39.14	 27.32	 17.09	 9.29	 4.11	 1.2	 0	
36.17	 42.01	 42.9	 38.03	 28.9	 18.55	 9.8	 3.99	 1.02	 0	
12.74	 19.78	 26.17	 28.67	 25.3	 17.6	 9.42	 3.67	 0.85	 0	
4.25	 8.29	 13.81	 18.72	 19.62	 15.23	 8.49	 3.24	 0.7	 0	
1.6	 3.63	 7.16	 11.58	 14.26	 12.44	 7.32	 2.77	 0.57	 0	
0.7	 1.75	 3.89	 7.17	 10.09	 9.81	 6.12	 2.32	 0.46	 0	
0.35	 0.94	 2.24	 4.56	 7.12	 7.6	 5.01	 1.92	 0.37	 0	
0.19	 0.54	 1.38	 2.99	 5.07	 5.85	 4.05	 1.56	 0.29	 0	
0.12	 0.34	 0.89	 2.03	 3.65	 4.49	 3.24	 1.26	 0.23	 0	
0.07	 0.22	 0.6	 1.42	 2.67	 3.45	 2.58	 1.02	 0.19	 0	
0.05	 0.15	 0.42	 1.02	 1.98	 2.66	 2.05	 0.81	 0.15	 0	
0.03	 0.11	 0.3	 0.74	 1.49	 2.05	 1.62	 0.65	 0.12	 0	
0.02	 0.08	 0.22	 0.55	 1.13	 1.59	 1.28	 0.52	 0.09	 0	
0.02	 0.06	 0.16	 0.42	 0.86	 1.24	 1.02	 0.41	 0.07	 0	
0.01	 0.04	 0.12	 0.32	 0.66	 0.97	 0.8	 0.33	 0.06	 0	
0.01	 0.03	 0.09	 0.24	 0.52	 0.76	 0.64	 0.26	 0.05	 0	
0.01	 0.02	 0.07	 0.19	 0.4	 0.6	 0.51	 0.21	 0.04	 0	
0.01	 0.02	 0.06	 0.15	 0.32	 0.48	 0.4	 0.17	 0.03	 0	
0	 0.02	 0.04	 0.12	 0.25	 0.38	 0.32	 0.13	 0.02	 0	
0	 0.01	 0.04	 0.09	 0.2	 0.3	 0.26	 0.11	 0.02	 0	
0	 0.01	 0.03	 0.07	 0.16	 0.24	 0.21	 0.09	 0.02	 0	
0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.06	 0.13	 0.2	 0.17	 0.07	 0.01	 0	
0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.05	 0.11	 0.16	 0.14	 0.06	 0.01	 0	
0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.04	 0.09	 0.14	 0.12	 0.05	 0.01	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.03	 0.07	 0.11	 0.1	 0.04	 0.01	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.03	 0.06	 0.1	 0.08	 0.03	 0.01	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.05	 0.08	 0.07	 0.03	 0.01	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.05	 0.07	 0.06	 0.03	 0	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.04	 0.06	 0.06	 0.02	 0	 0	
0	 0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.04	 0.06	 0.05	 0.02	 0	 0	
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A.2 Software Code Used for Analysis 
The following is source code used for data analysis and raw statistics 
generation. 
A.2.1 – ExploitDB Participants Python Code 
import csv, sys, sets 
data =[] 
listName = []  
listDate = [] 
finalList = [] 
unique = [] 
position = [] 
 
with open('files.csv', 'rb') as f: 
 reader = csv.reader(f) 
 for data in reader: 
  listDate.append(data[2]) 
  listName.append(data[3]) 
   
for item in listName: 
 if item in unique: 
  unique.append(item)  
  finalList.append(listDate[listName.index(item)]) 
   
with open("output.csv", "wb") as f: 
 writer = csv.writer(f) 
 writer.writerow(finalList) 
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A.3 – Raw Codes 
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A.4 Survey Structure and Ethical Approval 
Please provide the following information about your research:
 
?LW5HRIUHVHDUFKSURMHFWRUDFWLYLWB $RIW@DUH Y>5QHUDEL5LWB GBQDPLFV @LWKLQ FRPPHUFLD5 RI WKH
VKH5IVRIW@DUH

:DPHRIUHVHDUFKHU VFRQG>FWLQJWKHILH5G@RUN !D>58H@LV8HFW>UHULQ/BEHU0HIHQFH
 5QWHUQD5!K0VWDIIFDQGLGDWH
1PDL5RIUHVHDUFKHUFRQG>FWLQJWKHILH5G@RUN !8H@LV,FUDQILH5GDF>N
:DPH DQG GHSDUWPHQW RI VWDII PHPEHU
UHVSRQVLE5HIRUWKH@RUN
 HJ!ULQFLSD55QYHVWLJDWRUWKHVLVV>SHUYLVRU
HUHPB 4L5WRQ /HQWUH IRU /BEHU $HF>ULWB DQG 5QIRUPDWLRQ
$BVWHPV/UDQILH5G0HIHQFHDQG$HF>ULWB$KULYHQKDP

!K0$>SHUYLVRU 5QWHUQD5
1PDL5RIUHVSRQVLE5HVWDIIPHPEHU

/4L5WRQ,FUDQILH5GDF>N
:DPHRIUHVHDUFKF5LHQWRUVSRQVRU

:D
!5HDVHLQGLFDWHLIWKHUHVHDUFKLVSDUWRID ?D>JKW9DVWHUV 
9$FEB#HVHDUFK 
9!KL5 
!K0 
1QJ0 
#HVHDUFK/RQWUDFW 
5I LW LV SDUW RI D WD>JKW 9DVWHUV SURJUDPPH
S5HDVHJLYHWKHWLW5HRIWKHFR>UVH
:D
5QWHQGHGVWDUWGDWHRIILH5G@RUN 
(WK->J	

5QWHQGHGHQGGDWHRIILH5G@RUN 
VW-SU	
'
BKRDUHWKHLQWHQGHGUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWV
 HJWKRVH@KRBR>@L55EHV>UYHBLQJREVHUYLQJ
RUVSHDNLQJWR
1QJLQHHUV VHF>ULWB UHVHDUFKHUV DQG VRIW@DUH GHYH5RSHUV
IURP ERWK WKH RSHQ VR>UFH FRPP>QLWB DQG FRPPHUFLD5
HQWHUSULVHV
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
BL55WKHUHVHDUFKF5LHQWRUVSRQVRUEHSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWV

:D
:R


CHV

5IBHVS5HDVHSURYLGHGHWDL5DVWRKR@BR>@L55HQV>UHDQRQBPLWBDQGFRQILGHQWLD5LWB
IRUBR>USDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHERAEH5R@
-55 UHVSRQVHV@L55EHDQRQBPR>VDQGQRSHUVRQD55B LGHQWLILDE5HGDWD@L55EHFR55HFWHG IURPWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
#D@GDWDWKDW@L55EHFR55HFWHG@L55EHKH5GLQDFFRUGDQFH@LWKWKHGDWDSURWHFWLRQDFW
))	DQG@L55IR55R@@
JRYHUQPHQWJ>LGH5LQHVIRUGDWDDWUHVW HQFUBSWHGGDWDIL5HVHWF

-55 UHV>5WV@L55EHFR55HFWHGYLDWKH/UDQILH5G@QLYHUVLWBUHFRPPHQGHGV>UYHBVRIW@DUH">D5WULFVFRPDQGWKH
V>UYHBT>HVWLRQVFDQEHIR>QGLQDSSHQGLA-EH5R@

-ULVNDVVHVVPHQWLVDWWDFKHGWRWKLVDSSURYD5IRUP








BHQHHGWRI>55B>QGHUVWDQG@KDWLQIRUPDWLRQGDWDLVEHLQJFR55HFWHGIURPBR>USDUWLFLSDQWV!5HDVHSURYLGHD
VKRUW GHVFULSWLRQ  DSSURALPDWH5B 
'	@RUGV RI BR>U UHVHDUFK DLPV REMHFWLYHV DQGPHWKRGR5RJB LQ WKHERA
EH5R@

?KHDLPRI WKH UHVHDUFK LV WR>QGHUVWDQG WKHSURFHVVHV WKDW LQI5>HQFH WKHGLVFRYHUBRIY>5QHUDEL5LWLHV@LWKLQ
VRIW@DUHLQHYHUBGDB>VH-WKHRUHWLFD5PRGH5KDVEHHQFRQVWU>FWHGDQGUHD5@RU5GYD5LGDWLRQRIWKLVPRGH5LV
UHT>LUHGWRSURYLGHFRQILGHQFHLQLW

?KHGDWD WKDW@L55 EH FR55HFWHG@L55 EH LQ W@R IRUPV T>HVWLRQQDLUH DQG LQWHUYLH@ $LPS5HGHPRJUDSKLFGDWD
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V>FK DV DJH UDQJH DQGQDWLRQD5LWB@L55 LQLWLD55B EH FR55HFWHG@LWKLQ WKH V>UYHB-GGLWLRQD55B VSHFLILF UHVHDUFK
EDVHGT>HVWLRQV@L55EHDVNHG@KLFKFDQEHIR>QGLQWKHT>HVWLRQQDLUHVDWWDFKHGWRWKLVSURSRVD50HSHQGLQJ
>SRQ@KLFKSDUWRIWKHWKHRUHWLFD5PRGH5LVEHLQJYD5LGDWHGRQHRIW@RV>UYHBWHPS5DWHV@L55EH>VHGERWKDUH
DWWDFKHG

2>UWKHUPRUH VSHFLILF LQWHUYLH@V @L55 EH >QGHUWDNHQ @LWK D V>EVHW RI SDUWLFLSDQWV @KLFK @L55 D55R@ I>UWKHU
HAS5RUDWLRQRIWKHV>EMHFWDUHDDQGPRGH5YD5LGDWLRQ



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Section B 
Please answer the following questions to help us evaluate the level of risk associated with your research. If you answer 
‘Yes’ to any of the statements in Section B you should prepare and submit a high risk to SEREC using the guidance 
provided here 
 


	


 

A>5QHUDE5HJUR>SVV>FKDVFKL5GUHQSHRS5H@LWKSKBVLR5RJLFD5DQGRU
SVBFKR5RJLFD5 LPSDLUPHQWV  HJ WKH GLVDE5HG PHQWD55B LPSDLUHG
SHRS5H@LWK5HDUQLQJGLIILF>5WLHV


?D5NLQJ DER>W RU UHIHUHQFLQJ VHQVLWLYH WRSLFV  HJ $HA>D5 EHKDYLR>U
L55HJD5 RU SR5LWLFD5 EHKDYLR>U HASHULHQFH RI YLR5HQFH DE>VH RU
HAS5RLWDWLRQPHQWD5KHD5WKJHQGHURUHWKQLFVWDW>VFRQI5LFWVLW>DWLRQV
SVBFKR5RJLFD55BGLVW>UELQJHYHQWV


">HVWLRQLQJ RU DFWLYLWLHV @KLFK FR>5G ULVN LQG>FLQJ SVBFKR5RJLFD5
VWUHVVDQALHWBRUK>PL5LDWLRQRUFD>VHSKBVLFD5SDLQRUKDUP


5QWU>VLYH LQWHUYHQWLRQV  IRU HADPS5H WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI GU>JV RU
RWKHU V>EVWDQFHV SKBVLFD5 HAHUFLVH RU WHFKQLT>HV V>FK DV
KBSQRWKHUDSB


UR>SV@KHUHSHUPLVVLRQRIDJDWHNHHSHULVUHT>LUHGIRULQLWLD5DFFHVV
WRPHPEHUV HJFKL5GUHQUHVLGHQWVRILQVWLW>WLRQV


?KH >VH RI SDBPHQWV DQG  RU LQFHQWLYHV WR HQFR>UDJH RU UH@DUG
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ


0HFHSWLRQ@LWKKR5GLQJLQIRUPDWLRQRUDFWLYLWLHV@KLFKDUHFRQG>FWHG
@LWKR>WSDUWLFLSDQWVI>55DQGLQIRUPHGFRQVHQWDWWKHWLPHWKHVW>GB
LVFDUULHGR>W


-FFHVV WR UHFRUGV RI SHUVRQD5 RU FRQILGHQWLD5 LQIRUPDWLRQ LQF5>GLQJ
JHQHWLF RU RWKHU ELR5RJLFD5 LQIRUPDWLRQ FRQFHUQLQJ LGHQWLILDE5H
LQGLYLG>D5V


?KHFR55HFWLRQRIK>PDQWLVV>HRURWKHUK>PDQELR5RJLFD5VDPS5HV 

1If your research involves children or other vulnerable groups; you may need to apply to the Criminal Records Bureau 
for clearance. Detailed guidance can be found on the CRB website (http://www.direct.gov.uk/crb)
 
Further details of many of the issues covered in the table can be found in the guidance available on the SEREC website 
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Section C 
 
Please complete the two tables below using the check boxes on the right hand side. If you cannot confirm all the 
statements you should prepare and submit a high risk proposal to SEREC using the guidance provided here. 
 
 



	

	
 
5@L55VHF>UHDQGUHFRUGWKHLQIRUPHGFRQVHQWRID55K>PDQV>EMHFWV 
5@L55HQV>UHWKDWQRRQHLVFRHUFHGRUFRPSH55HGWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHUHVHDUFK 
5@L55QRW>VHDQBLQG>FHPHQWVRULQFHQWLYHVWRVHF>UHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ 
5@L55QRW>VHDQBIRUPRIGHFHSWLRQDVSDUWRIWKHUHVHDUFKPHWKRG 
5@L55HAS5DLQWRSDUWLFLSDQWVWKH5HYH5RIFRQILGHQWLD5LWB@KLFKWKHBFDQHASHFWDQG@L55DLPWRPDLQWDLQ
SDUWLFLSDQWFRQILGHQWLD5LWB@KHUHYHUSUDFWLFDE5H

5@L55GHVLJQDQGHAHF>WHWKHUHVHDUFKLQD@DB@KLFKSURWHFWVSDUWLFLSDQWVIURPKDUP LQF5>GLQJE>W
QRWUHVWULFWHGWRSKBVLFD5SVBFKR5RJLFD5HPRWLRQD5VRFLD5VSLULW>D5FDUHHUUHS>WDWLRQD5ILQDQFLD5RU
5HJD5KDUP

5@L55SULRUWRDQBGDWDJDWKHULQJDFWLYLWBEULHISDUWLFLSDQWVDER>WWKHSURMHFWDQGWKHLUULJKWV 
5 @L55 SULRU WR DQB GDWD JDWKHULQJ DFWLYLWB EULHI DQB LQGLYLG>D5V LQYR5YHG LQ GDWD JDWKHULQJ RQ PB
EHKD5I HJWUDQV5DWRUVRULQWHUYLH@HUVDER>WHWKLFD5UHVHDUFKSUDFWLFHV

5@L55IR55R@LQJDQBGDWDFR55HFWLRQDFWLYLWBGHEULHISDUWLFLSDQWV 
5@L55QRWEH>VLQJDQBREVHUYDWLRQD55BLQWU>VLYHPHWKRGV 
5@L55VWRUHDQBGDWD5REWDLQLQDFFRUGDQFH@LWKWKH0DWD!URWHFWLRQ-FW 

?KHLQIRUPDWLRQ5KDYHSURYLGHGRQWKLVIRUPLVDFF>UDWHWRWKHEHVWRIPBNQR@5HGJHDQGEH5LHI 
5 KDYH UHDG WKH DGYLFH RQ UHVHDUFK HWKLFV FRQWDLQHG RQ WKH @HESDJH C.DVLF SULQFLS5HV RI HWKLFD5
UHVHDUFKLQYR5YLQJK>PDQV>EMHFWVD

?KHSURMHFWGHVFULEHGDERYH@L55DELGHEBWKH@QLYHUVLWBDV1WKLFV!R5LFB 
?KHUH LV QR SRWHQWLD5 PDWHULD5 LQWHUHVW WKDW PDB RU PDB DSSHDU WR LPSDLU WKH LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG
REMHFWLYLWBRIUHVHDUFKHUVFRQG>FWLQJWKLVSURMHFW

$>EMHFW WR WKH UHVHDUFK EHLQJ DSSURYHG 5 >QGHUWDNH WR DGKHUH WR WKH SURMHFW GHVFULSWLRQ DQG
VWDWHPHQWVSURYLGHGDERYH

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5>QGHUWDNHWRLQIRUP$1#1/RIDQBVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVWRWKHUHVHDUFKDFWLYLWB@KLFKPLJKWLQYD5LGDWH
WKHVWDWHPHQWVPDGHDERYH

5>QGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHSURMHFWLQF5>GLQJUHVHDUFKUHFRUGVDQGGDWDPDBEHV>EMHFWWRLQVSHFWLRQIRU
D>GLWS>USRVHVLIUHT>LUHGLQI>W>UH

5>QGHUVWDQGWKDWSHUVRQD5GDWDDER>WPHDVDUHVHDUFKHULQWKLVIRUP@L55EHKH5GEBWKRVHLQYR5YHG
LQWKH>QLYHUVLWBHWKLFD5UHVHDUFKUHYLH@SURFHG>UHDQGWKDWWKLV@L55EHPDQDJHGDFFRUGLQJWR0DWD
!URWHFWLRQ-FWSULQFLS5HV

The person completing this form is the:
Researcher conducting the work   
Supervisor of the project    
 
15HFWURQLFVLJQDW>UHRIWKHUHVHDUFKHUFRQG>FWLQJWKH
@RUN
Paul Lewis	
15HFWURQLFVLJQDW>UHRIWKHSURMHFWV>SHUYLVRU Jeremy Hilton	
 

If you have any queries about this form or the SEREC review process, please email the SEREC administrator at 
serec@cranfield.ac.uk. 
 
Please email your completed form to serec@cranfield.ac.uk 
 
 
Security Researcher Survey (provisional –actual questions may vary a little) 
Question 1 
 
What is the highest educational level you have completed? 
 
 
a) Secondary (GCSE, K12 Ages 11-16)       
b) Tertiary College (As-Level, Highers)   
c) Undergraduate (B.Sc., HND)   
d) Postgraduate (M.Sc, PhD) 
c) None  
 
Question 2 
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In the last 12 months how many vulnerabilities or exploits have you discovered? 
 
 
a) None 
b) 1-5 
c) 6-10 
d) 11-15 
d) 15+ 
 






Question3 
Do you work in a team or as an individual when researching vulnerabilities? 
 
 
a) In a team 
b) Individually 
 
Question 4 
 
How did you learn your security researcher skills? 
 
 
a) College or university 
b) Professional qualification (CEH, CREST, SANS, GIAC etc) 
c) Vendor Qualification (Checkpont, Cisco etc) 
d) Online (forums, IRC, twitter, Y-combinator, reddit etc) 
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e) Physical Meetings (2600, B-sides, DEFCON etc)  
f) Other 
 
Question 5 
 
How many security researchers do you think are actively looking for vulnerabilities within software globally? 
 
 
a) 0 - 10000  
b) 10001 - 20000 
c) 20001 - 30000 
d) 30001 - 40000 
e) 50000 + 
f) Unknown 
 

Question 6 
 
In your opinion which is the most important when discovering vulnerabilities?  
 
 
a) The tools that you use. 
b) The familiarity of the software you are researching. 
c) Your skills as a researcher. 
d) Motivation to find vulnerabilities. 
e) People to discuss ideas with 
f) the quality of the software 
 

Question 7 
 
Would you be willing to be interviewed by a Cranfield University researcher? 
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a) Yes  
b) No 
 

Appendix B – Software Developer (Provisional specific questions may vary a little) 
	
Question	1	
	
	
What is the highest educational level you have completed? 
 
 
a) Secondary (GCSE, K12)       
b) Tertiary College (As-Level, Highers)   
c) Undergraduate (B.Sc., HND)   
d) Postgraduate (M.Sc, PhD) 
c) Other  
 
	
	
	
	
Question	2	
	
	
	
Do you hold any IT specific qualifications?  
 
 
a) None held       
b) Professional Institute (British Computing Society ISEB etc) 
c) Vendor Certification (Microsoft MCSE, Cisco CCNP, Oracle etc)   
d) Vocational (City and Guilds, European Computing Driving Licence)  
e) Information Security Certification (CISSP, Certified ethical hacker H, CISM) 
f) Other   
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Question	3	
	
	
Do you work in a team?  
 
 
a) yes  
b) no 
 
	
	
Question	4	
	
	
Which type of software do you normally develop? 
 
 
a) Application Software (word processor,  database) 
b) Utility Software (firewall, Antivirus etc)  
c) System (OS Kernel, Device Drivers etc)    
d) Middleware. 
 
	
	
	
Question	5	
	
	
Do you use any of the following software development methodologies? 
 
 
a) Waterfall  
b) Agile (Scum, Extreme, SDL) 
c) Incremental (Spiral etc) 
d) Other 
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Question	6	
	
	
Which languages do you use when you are developing the software stated in question 5? 
 
 
a) C/C++ 
b) Java 
c) C#/.Net 
d) Perl 
e) Assembler/Machine Code 
f) Ruby  
g) Ada 
 
	
Question	7	
	
	
How familiar are you with this methodology? 
 
 
a) A sliding scale of 0-10 will be here. 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Question	8		
	
	
Over the past month how many lines of code have you produced (please include debugging) 
 
 
b) None 
c) 100-500 
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d) 501-1000 
e) 1001-1500 
f) 1501+ 
 
	
Question	9	
	
	
On average how many bugs/vulnerabilities have you removed over the past month? 
 
 
g) None 
h) 1-5 
i) 6-10 
j) 11-15 
k) 15+ 
 
	
Appendix C – Risk Assessment 
Risk Name – Loss of Survey Data (outside of Qualtrics) 
 
Description – The data provided could be potentially sensitive, as it contains data pertaining to vulnerability discovery 
and software development methods. Whilst this data is not personally identifiable it could cause embarrassment if lost or 
stolen. 
 
Risk Level 
 
Low 
 
Mitigation  
 
1. Usage of Cranfield University approved data collection web service. 
2. Storage of raw data within Shrivenham secure campus 
3. Storage medium used to store survey responses encrypted with AES-256 encryption software and a complex 
10 digit passphrase. 
4. Storage medium locked in safe storage. 
 

Risk Name – Reputational Damage   
 
Description – The survey and research itself could be potentially seen as coercive as Cranfield has significant 
associations with the MoD and Intelligence community.  This is especially relevant as the research is investigating the 
methods which researchers undertake when undertaking software audits looking for vulnerabilities within software. 
Given the target audience this may be considered intrusive in nature. 
 
Risk Level 
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Medium 
 
Mitigation  
 
1. Ensure that the survey introduction is clear explains that this is a university research initiative and is not UK 
government or defence sponsored. 
2. Provide clear and transparent access to the Science and Engineering ethics committee policies.  
 
 
Risk Name –  Loss of Data (via Qualtrics) 
 
Description – The data provided could be potentially sensitive, as it contains data pertaining to vulnerability discovery 
and software development methods. The qualtrics web survey service is an unknown quantity and the security 
assurance of the service is unproven. Given the nature of the survey, and potential participants, there is the potential for 
data breach via the web service. 
 
Risk Level 
 
Low 
 
Mitigation  
 
1. None as this is a third party service with no direct control from cranfield.  
 
Consent Pro-forma 
NB. Tacit consent will be sought from all participants in the form of a active indication (ie button press) 
We would like to ask you to participate in the data collection for this research project which is looking at the factors that 
influence vulnerability research. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully' 
  
The purpose of this survey is to validate a number of assumptions and ask people involved in vulnerability research, 
such as yourself, whether these views are correct. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. The survey 
includes a small number of questions and filling in the survey will take no more than 2-3 minutes. 
 
The information gained from this survey will only be used for the above objectives, will not be used for any other 
purpose and will not be recorded in excess of what is required for the research. All responses will be anonymous, and 
no personally identifiable data will be collected from the participants. Raw data that will be collected will be held in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1990, and will follow UK government guidelines for data at rest. 
 
 
Even though the study findings will be published in international conferences and journals, only relevant researchers will 
have access to the survey data itself. These researchers will be bound by the principles outlined above and by the 
Cranfield University Science and Engineering Ethics Committee. Details of which are available on request. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this study or would like additional information please contact the research leader 
P.lewis@cranfield.ac.uk or 01793 785490 
 
By filling in this survey you indicate that you understand its purpose and consent to the use of the data as indicated 
above. Should you decide not to complete the survey, the data you have entered up to that point will be used, unless 
you indicate otherwise . We will also provide details of the data upon request. 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
Paul 
 
